Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Owner of Pulse Construction Defendant-Appellant Gerry J. Mott appealed appealed a Superior Court judgment which him guilty of one count of Construction Fraud. the Superior Court sentenced him to probation and ordered restitution in the amount of $68,576.89. During the restitution hearing, the trial judge refused to hear testimony regarding a loan of $20,000 Mott claimed he made to the complainants for windows and doors that Mott installed in their home. On appeal, Mott claimed that the sentencing judge improperly interpreted the statutory formula for calculating the amount of loss to a victimized home buyer. He also contended that the trial judge improperly refused to allow testimony at Mott’s restitution hearing regarding the "set off" for the $20,000 given to the home buyers for windows and doors. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment because Mott failed to bring a counterclaim in an earlier mechanics lien suit implicating the $20,000 alleged debt and Super. Ct. Civ. R. 13(a) barred him from doing so.

After an attorney filed a settlement offer under Rule 68, opposing counsel accepted the offer. Before either attorney filed the offer and acceptance with the Superior Court, the accepting attorney realized he had made a mistake, and revoked his acceptance. The attorney who had extended the offer responded to his revocation by filing the written acceptance, thereby securing a final judgment in the form of the settlement order by means of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 68’s instruction to the Prothonotary. The attorney did not mention that the written acceptance had been revoked before it was filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court judge’s order denying the Motion to Vacate the Judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Elizabeth, Edmond, John and James Plummer appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. Vanderbilt moved to dismiss the Plummers' appeal as untimely. Vanderbilt took the position that the Superior Court's June 28, 2011 dismissal order was the final order in the matter below. Thus, Vanderbilt contended, the Plummers' notice of appeal filed on September 6, 2011 was untimely under Supreme Court Rule 6(a)(i). Vanderbilt argued in the alternative that if the June 28 Order was not the final order, the appeal is interlocutory and any appeal must await entry of a final order. The Plummers contended that their appeal was timely and not interlocutory because a Special Master's August 9, 2011 order dismissing nine defendants and not the June 28 Order, constituted the final order. The Plummers contended that under accepted Superior Court practice, the June 28 Order was not understood to be final. After its review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the June 28 Order was the only final order in this case and that no court error contributed to the Plummers' delayed filing of this appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Plummers' appeal as untimely under Supreme Court Rule 29(b).

Plaintiff-Appellee William Mohr was struck in Delaware as a pedestrian by a car insured in Delaware. He recovered the minimum $15,000 coverage limit from the carrier that insured the striking car. Plaintiff also sought to recover from Defendant-Appellant Progressive Northern Insurance Company which sold an automobile insurance policy to Plaintiff's mother. Under the policy, Plaintiff's mother was the named insured, and Plaintiff was a member of her household. The Progressive policy, by its terms, did not cover Plaintiff as a pedestrian. The superior court held nonetheless that Plaintiff was entitled to recover under Progressive's policy because insofar as it denied PIP coverage, the policy conflicted with the Delaware automobile insurance statute which mandated such coverage. Progressive appealed. The court ordered Progressive to pay the difference between the amount Plaintiff recovered from the striking-car's policy and PIP limit of his mother's policy. Finding no error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, alleging that she suffered injuries when defendant rear ended her car. The trial court held that plaintiff failed to state an opinion on causation and denied a request for a 24 hour continuance to clarify the expert's report. Plaintiff appealed on two grounds: (1) the expert report was sufficient to survive the motion for summary judgment; and (2) the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the continuance. The court held that, although plaintiff's expert failed to provide an opinion on causation, the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to grant the 24 hour continuance. Without a continuance to obtain clarification on the expert testimony, plaintiff suffered prejudice in the form of a final judgment dismissing her claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued defendant for personal injuries he sustained in a bicycle accident when he used defendant's parking lot as a short cut while riding his bicycle. Plaintiff claimed that defendant failed to maintain a safe premises, thereby breaching a duty defendant owed to plaintiff as a licensee. On appeal from summary judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff claimed that the Superior Court erred by holding that he was a trespasser, and not a licensee. Because commercial property owners/occupiers were held to the same common law standard whether or not the claimant was a licensee or a trespasser - namely to refrain from willful and wanton conduct - the court affirmed the judgment.

Nantichoke filed a hospital lien for the cost of Maria Acosta's medical treatment resulting from a car accident. Appellant law firm represented Acosta in a personal injury claim against the tortfeasor who caused her injuries. Nationwide subsequently paid her a sum to settle her claim. Nantichoke argued that its hospital lien attached to the entirety of Acosta's recovery and the law firm contended that the hospital lien did not attach until the attorney's fees have been deducted from the settlement fund. The court held that an attorney's charging lien existed at common law and the law firm's agreed contingent fee must be deducted from the recovery before the hospital lien.

Defendants, Dana and Zoom, appealed from a Superior Court order denying their post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, for a new trial. A Superior Court jury found defendants partially liable for asbestos-related mesothelioma suffered by decedents. The trial court denied defendants' motions on the ground that the jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. Plaintiffs cross-appealed from the trial court's denial of their separate motions for additur or, alternatively, a new trial on damages. On the principal appeal by Dana and Zoom, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the basis of its well-reasoned opinion. On the cross-appeal by plaintiffs, the court found that the trial court committed legal error in ruling on plaintiffs' additur motion, and also that trial court erroneously failed to address a potentially determinative issue of Louisiana law. Therefore, the court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

The Delaware Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) appealed from a Superior Court order reversing a DHSS Administrative Hearing Officer's decision to place Madhu Jain on the Adult Abuse Registry for three years, because Jain had "neglected" a patient as defined by 11 Del. C. 8564(a)(8) and 16 Del. C. 1131(9). On appeal, DHSS claimed that the Superior Court erroneously concluded that DHSS had failed to show that Jain neglected the patient within the meaning of the two statutes because Jain's conduct breached basic, fundamental nursing standards. The court held that the facts did not support a finding that Jain committed an act of neglect, recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally. Therefore, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

Plaintiff alleged that years of living with her husband, who worked around products containing asbestos as a maintenance technician for defendant, exposed her to asbestos fibers and subsequently caused her to suffer from bilateral interstitial fibrosis and bilateral pleural thickening of the lungs. Plaintiff appealed from a Superior Court order denying her Motion to Amend her household asbestos exposure complaint as futile. The court held that, because the allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint amount to a claim against defendant for nonfeasance, and the complaint did not allege any "special relationship" between plaintiff and defendant, her proposed amendments, if allowed, would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.