Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Reuben Cordero appealed a Superior Court order that affirmed an order of the Industrial Accident Board dismissing his petitions against a general contractor, Gulfstream Development Corporation, and a Gulfstream subcontractor, Delaware Siding Company. On appeal, Cordero argued that the Superior Court reversibly erred in interpreting 19 Del. C. sec. 2311(a)(5). Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Board's decision. View "Cordero v. Gulfstream Development Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Keila Rodriguez Alvarez appealed a Superior Court order granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The case arose from an automobile accident that occurred in 2010. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court by granting the motion erred as a matter of law because the parties had made a mutual mistake of fact about the existence and scope of her injuries resulting from an automobile accident. The record reflected that the unambiguous language of the release executed by Plaintiff was controlling and that there was no mutual mistake. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Alvarez v. Castellon" on Justia Law

A woman fell off a curb and injured herself while walking from Dover Downs Casino to a smoking area. The woman sued Dover Downs, claiming in various ways that a problem with the curb led to her fall. Dover Downs moved for summary judgment, and the trial judge granted the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judge's decision to grant summary judgment to Dover Downs on all claims. View "Polaski v. Dover Downs, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Virginia Edmisten appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc. Plaintiff sued Greyhound alleging that her husband (now deceased) was exposed to asbestos contained in Greyhound products. She argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court erred by impeaching the credibility of witnesses in order to grant summary judgment. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. View "Edmisten v. Greyhound Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Owner of Pulse Construction Defendant-Appellant Gerry J. Mott appealed appealed a Superior Court judgment which him guilty of one count of Construction Fraud. the Superior Court sentenced him to probation and ordered restitution in the amount of $68,576.89. During the restitution hearing, the trial judge refused to hear testimony regarding a loan of $20,000 Mott claimed he made to the complainants for windows and doors that Mott installed in their home. On appeal, Mott claimed that the sentencing judge improperly interpreted the statutory formula for calculating the amount of loss to a victimized home buyer. He also contended that the trial judge improperly refused to allow testimony at Mott’s restitution hearing regarding the "set off" for the $20,000 given to the home buyers for windows and doors. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment because Mott failed to bring a counterclaim in an earlier mechanics lien suit implicating the $20,000 alleged debt and Super. Ct. Civ. R. 13(a) barred him from doing so.

After an attorney filed a settlement offer under Rule 68, opposing counsel accepted the offer. Before either attorney filed the offer and acceptance with the Superior Court, the accepting attorney realized he had made a mistake, and revoked his acceptance. The attorney who had extended the offer responded to his revocation by filing the written acceptance, thereby securing a final judgment in the form of the settlement order by means of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 68’s instruction to the Prothonotary. The attorney did not mention that the written acceptance had been revoked before it was filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court judge’s order denying the Motion to Vacate the Judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Elizabeth, Edmond, John and James Plummer appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. Vanderbilt moved to dismiss the Plummers' appeal as untimely. Vanderbilt took the position that the Superior Court's June 28, 2011 dismissal order was the final order in the matter below. Thus, Vanderbilt contended, the Plummers' notice of appeal filed on September 6, 2011 was untimely under Supreme Court Rule 6(a)(i). Vanderbilt argued in the alternative that if the June 28 Order was not the final order, the appeal is interlocutory and any appeal must await entry of a final order. The Plummers contended that their appeal was timely and not interlocutory because a Special Master's August 9, 2011 order dismissing nine defendants and not the June 28 Order, constituted the final order. The Plummers contended that under accepted Superior Court practice, the June 28 Order was not understood to be final. After its review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the June 28 Order was the only final order in this case and that no court error contributed to the Plummers' delayed filing of this appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Plummers' appeal as untimely under Supreme Court Rule 29(b).

Plaintiff-Appellee William Mohr was struck in Delaware as a pedestrian by a car insured in Delaware. He recovered the minimum $15,000 coverage limit from the carrier that insured the striking car. Plaintiff also sought to recover from Defendant-Appellant Progressive Northern Insurance Company which sold an automobile insurance policy to Plaintiff's mother. Under the policy, Plaintiff's mother was the named insured, and Plaintiff was a member of her household. The Progressive policy, by its terms, did not cover Plaintiff as a pedestrian. The superior court held nonetheless that Plaintiff was entitled to recover under Progressive's policy because insofar as it denied PIP coverage, the policy conflicted with the Delaware automobile insurance statute which mandated such coverage. Progressive appealed. The court ordered Progressive to pay the difference between the amount Plaintiff recovered from the striking-car's policy and PIP limit of his mother's policy. Finding no error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, alleging that she suffered injuries when defendant rear ended her car. The trial court held that plaintiff failed to state an opinion on causation and denied a request for a 24 hour continuance to clarify the expert's report. Plaintiff appealed on two grounds: (1) the expert report was sufficient to survive the motion for summary judgment; and (2) the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the continuance. The court held that, although plaintiff's expert failed to provide an opinion on causation, the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to grant the 24 hour continuance. Without a continuance to obtain clarification on the expert testimony, plaintiff suffered prejudice in the form of a final judgment dismissing her claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued defendant for personal injuries he sustained in a bicycle accident when he used defendant's parking lot as a short cut while riding his bicycle. Plaintiff claimed that defendant failed to maintain a safe premises, thereby breaching a duty defendant owed to plaintiff as a licensee. On appeal from summary judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff claimed that the Superior Court erred by holding that he was a trespasser, and not a licensee. Because commercial property owners/occupiers were held to the same common law standard whether or not the claimant was a licensee or a trespasser - namely to refrain from willful and wanton conduct - the court affirmed the judgment.