Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A group of plaintiffs, represented by the same counsel as earlier litigants, alleged injuries caused by cellphone radiation exposure. Their complaints were nearly identical to those in a previous set of cases involving similar claims. The plaintiffs agreed, through joint stipulations filed in their cases, that the outcome of expert admissibility litigation in the earlier cases would apply to their own. This agreement included being bound by both the substantive ruling on whether expert testimony about general causation was admissible and all procedural rulings leading up to that determination. The stipulations were signed by counsel for both sides, and subsequent court orders stayed the plaintiffs’ cases pending the resolution of expert admissibility in the earlier litigation.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia managed the earlier cases by first resolving whether the plaintiffs had admissible expert testimony on general causation, limiting discovery to that issue. After several hearings and rulings, the court ultimately excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony under the Daubert/Rule 702 standard, and granted summary judgment to the defendants because the plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert evidence to support their claims. The Brooks plaintiffs later moved to lift the stays in their cases, arguing for broader discovery and the opportunity to present new expert witnesses, but the court denied this motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Brooks plaintiffs were bound by their agreements and the trial court’s rulings. The court held that the plaintiffs had agreed—expressly or implicitly—to be bound by both the outcome of the expert admissibility litigation and the procedural rulings in the earlier cases. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs lacked admissible expert testimony required to prove their claims. View "Brooks v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics US, Inc." on Justia Law

An individual regularly visited a commercial exercise facility as a guest of a member who held a special tier of membership, which allowed guests to accompany them. After several months of incident-free visits, the guest experienced two confrontational encounters with facility employees on consecutive days. On the first day, an employee refused the guest entry, questioned his status, and acted in a hostile manner. The following day, the same employee behaved in an intimidating way, and another employee threatened to bar the guest from the facility and called the police. The guest was not barred or arrested, and the police deemed it a non-police matter. Later, the guest was informed that no employees would be disciplined, and, months after the incident, he was accused by the business of making harassing phone calls, which he denied.The guest filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against the facility and related entities, alleging assault, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision, and breach of contract. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the facts alleged did not support any of the legal claims. The Superior Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the guest did not plausibly allege imminent apprehension of harmful contact necessary for assault, nor conduct sufficiently extreme or outrageous to support intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also found that the facility’s marketing statements did not create a duty necessary for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and that the guest was not an intended third-party beneficiary of any contract between the member and the facility. The dismissal of all claims was affirmed. View "Blackwell v. Planet Fitness Franchising, LLC" on Justia Law

The appellant filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and gross negligence against several healthcare providers and associated entities. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, finding it barred by the statute of limitations and for failure to state a claim. After the dismissal, the appellant sought to file a notice of appeal but missed the standard thirty-day deadline, asserting that he did not receive timely notice of the dismissal order due to administrative errors, including misdirected court communications. He filed a motion for leave to late file his notice of appeal, claiming excusable neglect or good cause due to these circumstances.Upon review of the appellant’s motion, the Superior Court denied the request. The court relied on D.C. App. R. 4(a)(7), which allows reopening the time to appeal under limited circumstances, including a fourteen-day deadline after notice of the judgment. Because the motion was filed more than fourteen days after the appellant learned of the judgment, the trial court found it untimely under this provision. The court also cited potential prejudice to appellees from having to defend a “frivolous” appeal.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the Superior Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by applying the timing requirements of Rule 4(a)(7) when the motion was properly brought under Rule 4(a)(5), which provides a different standard for extensions based on excusable neglect or good cause and does not impose the same fourteen-day limit. The appellate court further clarified that the merits of the underlying case and the ordinary burden of defending an appeal are not relevant factors in assessing such motions. View "Newton v. Grajny" on Justia Law

A developer purchased property in the Brookland neighborhood that included a historic mural and an adjacent parking lot providing clear sightlines to the mural. Another individual, who sought to preserve the mural, had previously contracted to buy the property but the deal fell through amid allegations of contract forgery by the seller. The developer, holding a promissory note secured by a deed of trust, initiated foreclosure and ultimately purchased the property at auction. The unsuccessful buyer accused the developer of fraud and publicly made statements labeling him as corrupt and claiming he had “problems with the DOJ” and had taken the property “by theft and fraud.” These statements were repeated online via a media outlet controlled by the unsuccessful buyer.The developer sued for defamation and false light in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The defendant moved to dismiss under the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act, arguing that his statements were protected advocacy on matters of public interest and that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure, thus requiring proof of actual malice. The trial court found the developer to be a limited-purpose public figure and denied most of the motion, allowing the claims to proceed except those related to certain statements outside the statute of limitations.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the Anti-SLAPP Act applied because the statements addressed issues of public interest, such as urban development and historic preservation. The court concluded that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure and therefore must show actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that the developer failed to demonstrate that the statements were false or made with actual malice. As a result, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the Anti-SLAPP motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Capitol Intelligence Group, Inc. v. Waldman" on Justia Law

Caroline McCall was employed for over twenty years as a Clinical Systems Coordinator at a hospital, where her responsibilities evolved to include inventory management, IT systems, and various administrative tasks. Over time, her duties increased and she began to suffer from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, which medical professionals attributed to her intense hand activity at work. Despite undergoing two surgeries and being prescribed specific workplace accommodations, her employer failed to provide some of these adjustments. After her pain worsened and her responsibilities continued to grow, McCall resigned in December 2020, citing physical and mental exhaustion due to her condition.Following her resignation, McCall applied for temporary total disability benefits under the D.C. Workers’ Compensation Act. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found her testimony and the medical evidence credible, determining that her carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related and that she was unable to perform her job due to insufficient accommodations. The ALJ awarded her temporary total disability benefits. The Compensation Review Board (CRB) affirmed the ALJ’s order, agreeing that the correct legal standard was applied and that substantial evidence supported the findings. The employer challenged the CRB’s decision, arguing that the wrong time frame was used to assess her ability to perform her “usual job,” that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ failed to address whether McCall voluntarily retired for reasons unrelated to her disability.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the CRB’s decision. The court held that the CRB applied the correct legal standard by considering McCall’s job duties at the time of her resignation, that substantial evidence supported the finding of temporary total disability, and that McCall’s resignation was causally related to her work injury rather than being a voluntary limitation of income for unrelated reasons. View "Howard v. D.C. Department of Employment Services" on Justia Law

A patient was admitted to a hospital after suffering chest pains and remained hospitalized for three months until his death. During his stay, he developed a severe Stage 4 sacral ulcer. The patient’s widow, acting individually and as personal representative of his estate, filed suit against the hospital and associated medical providers for negligence and medical malpractice, alleging that failures in wound care, skin monitoring, and repositioning caused the ulcer and contributed to his suffering and death. She also asserted a claim for lack of informed consent regarding risks of long-term hospitalization.The case was first reviewed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. During proceedings, the plaintiff shifted her theory to res ipsa loquitur, arguing that negligence could be inferred solely from the development of a Stage 4 ulcer during hospitalization. The Superior Court rejected application of res ipsa loquitur, expressing skepticism about the informed consent claim, and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court also excluded the plaintiff’s expert testimony but gave little explanation for its reasoning.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals conducted de novo review and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a triable res ipsa loquitur case because her experts did not sufficiently address the patient’s multiple comorbidities, which were shown by defense evidence to have contributed to the unavoidable development and worsening of the ulcer. The court also held that the lack of informed consent claim failed due to the absence of expert testimony establishing that long-term hospitalization posed distinct risks compared to alternative care, or that the patient had a meaningful choice. Thus, summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Pearson v. Medstar Washington Hospital Center" on Justia Law

David Kaplan brought a lawsuit against MedStar Georgetown Medical Center, Inc. and an affiliated medical group, alleging that they failed to meet the national standard of care in treating his Crohn’s disease and did not obtain his informed consent for treatment. As a result of the alleged medical negligence, Kaplan endured prolonged use of steroids, which did not alleviate his condition and ultimately led to the complete deterioration of his hip bones. He subsequently required three hip replacement surgeries, experiencing significant physical pain, emotional distress, and limitations on his lifestyle and activities.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over a jury trial, where the jury found MedStar liable for both breaching the standard of care and failing to obtain informed consent. The jury awarded Kaplan $4 million in damages, allocating separate amounts for past and future physical injury and for past and future emotional distress. MedStar timely objected to the verdict form, aspects of Kaplan’s closing argument, and the amount of damages, and subsequently filed a post-trial motion seeking judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a reduction in damages. The trial court denied these motions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the verdict form to separately list damages for physical injury and emotional distress, as these are conceptually distinct forms of harm. The court further found that any improper argument in Kaplan’s closing was adequately addressed by curative instructions, and that the damages award was not so excessive as to shock the conscience or require remittitur. The judgment in favor of Kaplan was affirmed in its entirety. View "Medstar Georgetown Medical Center, Inc. v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

A passenger at a metro station, who was noticeably intoxicated, accidentally fell from the station platform into a non-public area—a trough housing electrical equipment—after stumbling and attempting to sit on a narrow parapet. The fall resulted in immobilizing injuries that compromised his breathing. Although the station manager was required by operating procedures to perform visual inspections of the platform at set intervals, it is disputed whether those inspections were performed and whether they included checking behind the parapet. The passenger remained undiscovered for four days and died from asphyxiation. Experts opined he would have survived if found and aided promptly.The decedent’s parents and estate sued the transit authority for negligence and wrongful death in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the authority’s failure to discover and aid him aggravated his injuries and led to his death. The district court initially denied summary judgment for the transit authority, but later granted it on the grounds of contributory negligence, finding the decedent’s intoxication and actions barred recovery as a matter of law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that under District law, common carriers owe passengers a duty of care even where contributory negligence is present, but recognizing uncertainty as to whether this duty applies once a passenger becomes a trespasser by entering a non-public area involuntarily.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, answering a certified question from the D.C. Circuit, held that a passenger who unintentionally enters a non-public area becomes a trespasser. However, if the common carrier knows or has reason to know the trespasser is injured, trapped, or imperiled, it owes a duty of ordinary care—including a reasonable duty to aid—to prevent further injury. This duty is fact-specific and does not arise for undiscovered trespassers. View "Whiteru v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Linda Jenkins was injured when she slipped and fell on a wet floor being mopped by an employee of Red Coats, Inc. She did not see a wet floor sign in the area and suffered neck, back, and leg injuries. Jenkins sued Jemal’s Atlantic, LLC, and LPC Commercial Services, Inc. for negligence, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, a decision which was affirmed on appeal. Jenkins also sued Red Coats for negligence and negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision. The trial court dismissed the latter claim, and this dismissal was affirmed on appeal. For the negligence claim, the trial court granted summary judgment for Red Coats, stating Jenkins needed expert testimony to establish the standard of care.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment for Red Coats, stating Jenkins needed expert testimony to establish the standard of care. This decision was vacated and remanded for further consideration. On remand, the trial court reaffirmed its decision, concluding that expert testimony was necessary because the actions Red Coats should have taken beyond placing a wet floor sign were beyond the understanding of an average layperson.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that in typical slip and fall cases, laypeople do not require expert assistance to determine if a warning was adequate. The court concluded that a jury could evaluate whether Red Coats exercised reasonable care in warning passersby of the hazard caused by the wet floor based on common knowledge and everyday experience. Therefore, Jenkins’s failure to provide expert testimony was not fatal to her claim. The judgment of the Superior Court was vacated, and the case was remanded for trial. View "Jenkins v. Red Coats, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, Michael Patrick Murray and other plaintiffs, who either suffer from brain tumors or represent estates of decedents who died from brain cancer, sued Motorola, Inc. and other telecommunications companies. They alleged that long-term exposure to cell phone radiation caused their health issues. The litigation began in 2001 and has been through multiple appeals. In a previous decision, the court allowed the litigation to proceed, and in another, it changed the evidentiary standard for admitting expert testimony from the "general acceptance" test to the "reliability" test.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia, post-remand, denied the plaintiffs' motions for additional discovery and to add new experts, struck portions of their supplemental expert reports, excluded all of their expert testimony under Rule 702, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial judges ruled that the plaintiffs failed to provide admissible expert testimony on general causation, which was necessary to proceed with the case.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judges' rulings on discovery and expert testimony. The court held that the trial judges correctly applied the legal principles and managed the discovery process appropriately. The appellate court also agreed that the plaintiffs failed to meet the standards set out in Rule 702 for their expert testimony, and thus, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate. View "Murray v. Motorola, Inc." on Justia Law