Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the Bank for negligence, battery, and false imprisonment after bank employees mistakenly identified him as a bank robber. The jury awarded plaintiff a total of $2,603,000 in compensatory damages and $700,000 in punitive damages. The Third District reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for the bank. At issue is whether those who falsely report criminal conduct to law enforcement have a privilege or immunity from civil liability for the false report. The court held that a cause of action is available to one injured as a result of a false report of criminal behavior to law enforcement when the report is made by a party which has knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge that the accusations are false or acts in a gross or flagrant manner in reckless disregard of the rights of the party exposed, or acts with indifference or wantonness or recklessness equivalent to punitive conduct. The court quashed the decision below and remanded for a new trial. View "Valladares v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff prevailed in an action filed against GEICO General Insurance Company. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff sought discovery related to her opposition’s attorneys’ time records and propounded Lodestar/Multiplier Fee Determination Interrogatories. GEICO objected to the discovery requests, but the circuit court overruled the objections. GEICO filed a petition for writ of certiorari requesting that the Fourth District quash the orders relating to the request to produce and the interrogatory. The Fourth District granted the petition, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish that the billing records of opposing counsel were actually relevant and necessary and that their substantial equivalent could not be obtained elsewhere. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District, holding that hours expended by counsel for a defendant insurance company in a contested claim for attorney’s fees filed pursuant to Fla. Stat. 624.155 and 627.428 is relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of time expended by counsel for the plaintiff, and discovery of such information, where disputed, falls within the sound decision of the trial court. View "Paton v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the definition of “manifestation” for purposes of determining class membership in the Engle class. In Engle v. Liggett, the Supreme Court held that membership in the Engle class is established when the tobacco-related disease or medical condition “first manifested itself.” In the instant case, Plaintiff, as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband (Decedent), filed suit against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. The trial court instructed the jury that “manifestation” occurred when Decedent experienced symptoms of or was diagnosed with peripheral vascular disease. Decedent was not diagnosed until after the November 21, 1996, cut-off date for Engle class membership. The jury decided the issue of Engle class membership in favor of Plaintiff and later found in favor of Plaintiff on the majority of her claims. The Court of Appeal largely affirmed, concluding that Decedent’s “pre-1996 knowledge of a causal link between symptoms and tobacco” was unnecessary for class membership. The Supreme Court approved the Court of Appeal’s definition of “manifestation,” holding that “manifestation” for purposes of establishing membership in the Engle class is defined as the point at which the plaintiff began suffering from or experiencing symptoms of a tobacco-related disease or medical condition. View "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Ciccone" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit against Mauna Loa Investments, LLC alleging that she was injured when she fell on property owned, maintained, and/or controlled by Mauna at the time of the injury. The trial court entered a default judgment against Mauna. Petitioner subsequently filed a complaint in a separate action against Iberia NV, LLC, alleging that she was injured on the same property and alleging that Iberia owned, maintained, and/or controlled the property at the time of the injury. The Iberia case was consolidated with Petitioner’s suit against Mauna. Mauna filed an amended motion to set aside the default, alleging that the Iberia complaint constituted Plaintiff’s admission that her prior allegations in the Mauna complaint were false. Thereafter, Petitioner voluntarily dismissed without prejudice the Iberia complaint. The circuit court ultimately denied Mauna’s motion. After a jury trial solely on damages, the jury found for Petitioner. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and vacated the default, concluding that Petitioner’s Mauna complaint failed to state a cause of action. The district court reached its conclusion based on its consideration of the complaint in the Iberia case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in considering documents outside the complaint in determining the complaint’s sufficiency to state a cause of action. View "Santiago v. Mauna Loa Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

Maurice Soffer died from lung cancer caused by smoking. Soffer’s widow, Lucille Soffer, brought a wrongful death action against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company pursuant to Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., alleging four causes of action, all of which had been pled in the Engle class litigation. Prior to trial, Soffer moved to amend her complaint to add a demand for punitive damages. The trial court granted the motion to amend. A judgment was entered for Soffer in the amount of $2 million. Soffer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it was prohibited from awarding punitive damages on the counts for negligence and strict liability based on the procedural posture of the original Engle class action. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that individual members of the Engle class action are bound by the procedural prosture of the Engle class representatives when they pursue their individual lawsuits and, thus, cannot seek punitive damages on negligence or strict liability counts. The Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding that the individual members of the Engle class action are not prevented from seeking punitive damages on all claims properly raised in their subsequent individual actions. View "Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a professional artist, brought suit against the United Parcel Service (UPS) and other defendants, alleging that two of her paintings were unscrupulously removed from their packaging during the interstate shipment process and sold to a third party without her consent or knowledge. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims against UPS, concluding that they were preempted by the federal Carmack Amendment. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision to the extent it was inconsistent with this opinion, holding that Plaintiff’s state law causes of action were not preempted because neither the Carmack Amendment nor public policy supports UPS’s attempt to evade liability arising from its intentional misconduct. View "Mlinar v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner was injured in an automobile accident with an underinsured motorist. Petitioner filed a claim with his insurer (Insurer) for the limits of his uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) policy of $50,000. After Insurer refused to pay, Petitioner filed a complaint against Insurer to determine liability under the UM policy and the full extent of his damages. Prior to trial, Insurer tendered a check to Petitioner for $50,000 and filed a confession of judgment for that amount. Petitioner opposed the entry of a confessed judgment, arguing that a jury verdict would determine the upper limits of Insurer’s potential liability under a future bad faith claim. The trial court denied Insurer’s motion to confess judgment. After a trial, the jury set Petitioner’s damages at $1 million. The court of appeal vacated the jury’s verdict, concluding that after Insurer confessed judgment in the amount of $50,000, Petitioner’s UM action became moot. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal’s decision, holding (1) an insured is entitled to a determination of liability and the full extent of his damages in a UM action before filing a first-party bad faith action; and (2) that determination of damages is generally binding, as an element of damages, in a subsequent first-party bad faith action. Remanded. View "Fridman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff contracted peritoneal mesothelioma, he sued Union Carbide Corporation (Defendant), claiming that his disease was caused by his exposure to an asbestos product designed and manufactured by Defendant. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff, finding that Defendant was liable for Plaintiff’s damages, in part, under theories of negligence and strict liability defective design and failure to warn. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision and remanded to the Third District with directions that the judgment be reinstated, holding (1) the Third District improperly applied the Restatement (Third) of Torts to Plaintiff’s strict liability defective design claim; and (2) the Third District improperly reversed the judgment for the failure to warn claim based on the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the learned intermediary defense. View "Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp." on Justia Law

Walter Saunders and his wife, Ruby Saunders, sued Dr. Willis Dickens, a neurologist, filed a failure to diagnose action against Dickens after Saunders developed quadriplegia from his condition. Saunders died during the pendency of the appeal. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Dickens. The Fourth District affirmed, holding that counsel for Dickens did not improperly shift the burden of proof when he asserted that Saunders had not established causation in light of a subsequent treating physician’s testimony that he would not have changed the course of treatment even if Dickens had not acted negligently. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that testimony that a subsequent treating physician would not have treated the patient differently had the defendant physician acted within the applicable standard of care is inadmissible and will not insulate a defendant physician from liability for his own negligence. View "Saunders v. Dickens" on Justia Law

Robert Christensen ("Robert") paid for a vehicle, and the certificate of title was placed in the name of Robert and his wife, Mary, as co-owners. Thereafter, Mary struck and killed Thomas Bowen while driving the vehicle. Mary Jo Bowen ("Bowen"), the executor of her husband’s estate, filed an action for wrongful death against both Mary and Robert, alleging that Robert, as an owner of the vehicle, was vicariously liable for Mary’s negligence under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Robert argued that he purchased the vehicle as a gift to Mary and that, afterwards, he had no involvement with the vehicle. Bowen unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict on the issue of ownership. The jury subsequently found that Robert was not an owner of the vehicle. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court approved the district court’s ruling, holding (1) a person whose name is on the certificate of title of a vehicle as co-owner may not avoid vicarious liability under an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine by asserting that he never intended to be the owner of the vehicle and further claiming that he relinquished control to a co-owner of the vehicle; and (2) therefore, Robert was the owner of the vehicle as a matter of law. View "Christensen v. Bowen" on Justia Law