Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against County, alleging he was negligently shot by a police officer responding to a burglary alarm at his place of business. County argued it was entitled to immunity because the officer's actions were discretionary and fell under the police emergency exception. The trial court denied County's summary judgment motion as to the negligence claim and granted its motion as to the negligent retention claim. County filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the court of appeal. The court of appeal granted the writ, concluding that the undisputed facts showed a police emergency exception conferred sovereign immunity on County. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding (1) County's claim that it was entitled to sovereign immunity was not reviewable by the appellate courts through a petition for writ of certiorari; and (2) the court of appeal erred in concluding that County was entitled to summary judgment based on the police emergency exception. Remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's automobile insurance policy with Geico included a condition that Plaintiff submit to examination under oath (EUO) before recovering personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. Geico denied Plaintiff's PIP claim due to her failure to satisfy this condition after she was injured in a car accident. Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that Geico had violated Florida's PIP statute. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding that the PIP statute did not prohibit an insured from requiring an EUO. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of law to the Florida Supreme Court, which answered by holding that, under Fla. Stat. 627.736, an insurer cannot require an insured to attend an EUO as a condition precedent to recovery of PIP benefits. View "Nunez v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After undergoing surgery, Decedent died due to complications resulting from a vein being lacerated during surgery. Decedent's wife, Plaintiff, filed a complaint against the doctor who performed the surgery and the doctor's surgical practice for medical malpractice resulting in wrongful death. Defendants moved to compel arbitration based on a financial agreement signed by Decedent prior to his surgery. The trial court entered an order compelling arbitration, and the court of appeal affirmed. Plaintiff appealed,. The Supreme Court quashed the decision compelling arbitration, holding (1) the damages clause of the arbitration provision of the financial agreement violated the public policy pronounced by the legislature in the Medical Malpractice Act; and (2) the offensive clause was not severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision. View "Franks v. Bowers" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a California resident, was sexually assaulted while vacationing in Mexico. The assault occurred while Petitioner received a complimentary massage in exchange for her attendance at a resort's timeshare presentation. Petitioner sued the resort, a corporation with its primary place of business in Florida, (the Florida Defendants) for negligent vacation packaging. The Florida Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, arguing that Mexico would be a more convenient forum. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding that the court misapplied the forum non conveniens analysis, particularly by failing to afford a strong presumption in favor of Plaintiff's initial choice of an otherwise proper forum. View "Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estate of Lance Ruble, sought to amend the original complaint filed in this action before Respondents served an answer to that complaint. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's amended complaint, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed based on its holding in Capone v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc. (Capone II) and Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum, holding (1) when an injured Plaintiff in a personal injury action dies, the personal representative of the decedent's estate is not required to file a separate wrongful death action but may be added as a party to the pending action and thus may file an amended pleading that alleges new claims and causes of action; and (2) the right of a plaintiff under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a) to amend a complaint once before the service of a responsive pleading is absolute, and a trial court has no discretion to deny that amendment. Remanded. View "Ruble v. Rinker Material Corp." on Justia Law

Frank and Karen Capone filed an action against Philip Morris USA, a tobacco manufacturer, alleging several claims. After Frank died, Karen, in her capacity as personal representative of Frank's estate, sought to amend the complaint to add a wrongful death claim. Karen also filed a motion to substitute herself as a party plaintiff. The circuit court denied Karen's motions and dismissed the entire action, concluding that the personal injury action in this case could not be amended to include a wrongful death action. Although the circuit court, upon reconsideration, granted Karen's previously-filed motions, it vacated that order, finding Karen's motion for reconsideration was not timely served. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the original personal injury action filed by the Capones could not be amended after Frank's death to include a wrongful death claim. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District, holding that upon the death of a party plaintiff in a personal injury action, the personal representative of the decedent's estate may be added to the pending action as a party and thus may file an amended pleading that alleges new or amended claims and causes of action. Remanded. View "Capone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Raymond James Financial Services required its clients (the investors) to sign an agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the handling of their investments. At issue in this case was whether Florida's statute of limitations that is applicable to a "civil action or proceeding" applies to arbitration proceedings. In 2005, the investors filed a joint claim for arbitration against Raymond James, alleging federal and state securities violations and negligent supervision. The investors filed an action in state court seeking a declaration that the statute of limitations applied only to judicial actions and thus did not limit the time in which to bring their arbitration claims. The trial court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the investors. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the investors' arbitration claims in this case were barred by the statute of limitations, holding that Florida's statute of limitations applies to arbitration because an arbitration proceeding is within the statutory term "civil action or proceeding" found in Fla. Stat. 95.011. View "Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Law Firm, located in Virginia, leased a vehicle from Company. Tortfeasor, who was driving the car with permission by Law Firm, collided with a car driven by Plaintiff. The day before the accident, the insurance policy on the vehicle lapsed for nonpayment. Plaintiff filed suit in Florida against Law Firm, Tortfeasor, and Company, alleging that because Company had failed to comply with the insurance requirements of Fla. Stat. 324.021(9)(b)(1), Company was vicariously liable for Tortfeasor's negligent operation of the car under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Company moved for summary judgment, contending that its liability should be based on Virginia tort law and that if Florida law applied, section 342.021(9)(b)(1) was preempted by the Graves Amendment, a federal law providing that the owner of a motor vehicle who leases the vehicle shall not be vicariously liable from harm that results from the operation of the vehicle during the lease. The trial court concluded that Florida law applied but that the Graves Amendment did preempt section 324.021(9)(b)(1). The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court approved the decision, holding that the Graves Amendment preempts section 324.021(9)(b)(1). View "Rosado v. Daimlerchrysler Fin. Servs. Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the personal representative of the estate of Charlotte Douglas, filed a complaint against cigarette companies and industry organizations for damages on claims based on Charlotte's smoking-related death. After a jury trial, Plaintiff was awarded $2.5 million in damages. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in the application of the Phase I findings in the class action case Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. Charlotte was a member of the Engle class. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff did not prove legal causation on his negligence theory but did prove legal causation on his strict liability claim. Although the court of appeal rejected Defendants' argument that applying res judicata to the findings violated their due process rights, it certified the due process question to the Supreme Court. The Court approved of the court of appeal's decision affirming the general verdict for Plaintiff based on strict liability but disapproved the court's rejection of negligence as a basis for the general verdict because the court's analysis required causation instructions and findings beyond those required by Engle. In addition, the Court answered that accepting as res judicata the eight Phase I findings approved in Engle did not violate Defendants' due process rights. View "Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Tiara Condominium Association (Tiara) retained Marsh & McLennan (Marsh) as its insurance broker. Marsh secured windstorm coverage through Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), which issued a policy that contained a loss limit in an amount close to $50 million. Tiara's condominium subsequently sustained damages caused by two hurricanes. After being assured by Marsh that the loss limits coverage was per occurrence, Tiara spent more than $100 million in remediation efforts. However, when Tiara sought payment from Citizens, Citizens claimed that the loss limit was $50 million in the aggregate, not per occurrence. Tiara filed suit against Marsh, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Marsh on all claims. The appeals affirmed with the exception of the negligence and breach of fiduciary claims, as to which it certified a question to the Supreme Court to determine whether the economic loss rule prohibits recovery, or whether an insurance broker falls within the professional services exception that would allow Tiara to proceed with the claims. The Court answered by holding that the application of the economic loss rule is limited to products liability cases. View "Tiara Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos. " on Justia Law