Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A nursing home patient (Decedent) signed an agreement providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of treatment and care at the nursing home. Decedent subsequently died, allegedly through the nursing home's negligence. Through Decedent's personal representative, Decedent's survivors (Plaintiffs) subsequently brought a cause of action for deprivation of rights under the applicable nursing home statute and, alternatively, a wrongful death action. At issue on appeal was whether an arbitration agreement signed by the decedent requires his estate and heirs to arbitrate their wrongful death claims. The court of appeal concluded that the estate and heirs were bound by the arbitration agreement but certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Court approved of the court of appeal's decision and answered that the execution of a nursing home arbitration agreement by a patient with capacity to contract binds the patient's estate and statutory heirs in a subsequent wrongful death action arising from an alleged tort within the scope of the valid arbitration agreement. View "Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out alleged defamatory statements an attorney (Attorney) allegedly took in the course of investigating an underlying defamation action he was hired to defend. The legal issue was whether absolute immunity applied to Attorney's alleged defamatory statements, which were made during ex-parte, out-of-course questioning of a potential, nonparty witness. The court of appeal concluded that absolute immunity applied to Attorney's statements. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision and held (1) Florida's absolute privilege was never intended to sweep so broadly as to provide absolute immunity from liability to an attorney under the circumstances presented here; and (2) a qualified privilege instead should apply to ex-parte, out-of-court statements, so long as the alleged defamatory statements bear some relation to the subject of inquiry in the underlying lawsuit. View "DelMonico v. Traynor" on Justia Law

The trial court entered a directed verdict against Plaintiff on her rear-end collision case against Defendant on the basis that she could not overcome the presumption of negligence that attached to her as the rear driver in this case. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the decision and remanded, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the rear driver's presumed negligence was not the sole proximate cause of the collision, and thus, under the Court's holding in Birge v. Charron, a directed verdict should not have been entered against Plaintiff on the basis of the rear-end presumption. View "Cevallos v. Rideout" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a passenger on a motorcycle that flipped over when the driver of the motorcycle collided with the rear of an automobile driven by Defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the basis that Plaintiff could not rebut the presumption of negligence that attached to the driver of the motorcycle as the rear driver in a rear-end collision case. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that Plaintiff produced evidence from which a jury could find that Defendant was negligent and at least comparatively at fault in causing the collision. This certified conflict involved the interaction of Florida's comparative negligence system of tort recovery and a rebuttable presumption that has been imposed by courts in rear-end motor vehicle collision cases. The Supreme Court approved of the court of appeal's decision, holding that because tort recovery in Florida is governed by the principles of comparative negligence, the presumption that a rear driver's negligence is the sole cause of a rear-end automobile collision can be rebutted and its legal effect dissipated by the production of evidence from which a jury could conclude that the front driver was negligent in the operation of his or her vehicle. View "Birge v. Charron" on Justia Law

In this negligence action, the Supreme Court considered whether an employee who claims the benefit of sovereign immunity pursuant to Fla. Stat. 768.28(9), which entitles that employee not to be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant for acts within the scope of his or her employment, may obtain interlocutory review of an adverse trial court ruling where the question turns on an issue of law. The court of appeal declined to exercise certiorari review over a trial court's order denying summary judgment based on such a claim of individual immunity pursuant to section 768.28(9)(a). The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision and held (1) a claim of individual immunity from suit under section 768.28(9)(a) should be appealable as a non-final order under Fla. R. App. P. 9.130, obviating the necessity of determining whether common law certiorari would alternatively be available; and (2) the employee in this case was entitled to the individual immunity provided in section 768.28(9)(a). View "Keck v. Eminisor" on Justia Law

This case arose from a fatal automobile-truck collision. Petitioners, as personal representative of the estate of the deceased and other individuals, filed an action against Airgas, a foreign corporation, and the Airgas employee that drove the truck that struck the deceased. The district court certified the following question: "Where an individual, non-resident defendant commits negligent acts in Florida on behalf of his corporate employer, does the corporate shield doctrine operate as a bar to personal jurisdiction in Florida over the individual defendant?" The court answered the question in the negative and concluded that Airgas employees were subject to the personal jurisdiction of Florida courts pursuant to Florida Statute 48.193.

In an automobile and train collision case, the court considered the provisions of Florida law governing the selection of venue based on the residency of defendants. At issue was the limitation placed on the selection of venue - known as the joint residency rule - derived from Enfinger v. Baxley, which held that the selection of venue based on residency was limited to the county of residence shared by the individual defendant and the corporate defendant. Because Enfinger was predicated on a serious misinterpretation of the governing statutes, the court resolved the conflict by receding from Enfinger. The court concluded that the Florida courts should uniformly apply the plain language of the venue statues enacted by the Legislature, not the judicially created joint residency rule. Accordingly, the court quashed the decision of the Fourth District.

Petitioner sued respondent under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine after sustaining injuries caused by respondent's farm tractor. Petitioner sought review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal, which held that a farm tractor was not a dangerous instrumentality as a matter of law. In so holding, the district court rejected petitioner's contentions that, because a farm tractor was a motor vehicle and because it was of such size and character as to be peculiarly dangerous in its operation, a farm tractor was a dangerous instrumentality. The court held that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine could apply to motor vehicles other than automobiles that have the ability to cause serious injury, and Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, where the court concluded that the weight, speed, and mechanism of an automobile or motor vehicle made it particularly dangerous when in operation. Therefore, a farm tractor was a dangerous instrumentality and the First District's decision was quashed.

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Dr. Mary Jane Benson, Dr. George C. Rees, and West Florida Hospital, alleging that the doctors were negligent in rendering medical care to her, which resulted in excessive liver damage. Plaintiff's claim against the hospital were based on both vicarious liability for Dr. Benson's negligence, as well as liability for the direct negligence in granting medical staff privileges to both doctors, which led to the medical care and procedures performed. The court approved the First District's decision because it held that the trial court correctly ordered the disclosure of a blank application for medical staff privileges. Section 381.0287(b)1 impermissible attempted to limit the disclosure requirements of article X, section 25 of the Florida Constitution (Amendment 7), and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. 11101 et seq., did not preempt Amendment 7. In accordance with the court's decision, the court disapproved of the decision of the Fourth District in Tenet Healthsystem Hospitals, Inc. v. Taitel and its contrary holding that a blank form used by a hospital for nurse credentialing was confidential and protected by disclosure.

State Farm petitioned for review of the Third District's determination that the household exclusion in its policy issued to respondents was ambiguous and therefore could not be enforced to eliminate coverage for bodily injuries suffered by members of the household of a permissive-driver insured. The court held that the plain language of the household exclusion precluded coverage for bodily injuries suffered by members of the household of a permissive-driver insured, such as the parents in this case. Therefore, the court quashed the Third District's decision, approved Linehan v. Alkhabbaz, and remanded for further proceedings.