Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in these cases filed actions based on various degrees of asbestosis. According to plaintiffs, when they filed their lawsuits before the adoption of the Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fairness Act (Act), Chapter 774, Part II, Florida Statutes, it was not necessary to establish that any malignancy or physical impairment had already resulted from their contraction of asbestosis. Instead, plaintiffs claimed that it was merely necessary to show that they had suffered an injury from an asbestos-related disease. At issue was whether the Act could be retroactively applied to prejudice or defeat causes of action already accrued and in litigation. The court held that, based upon well-established common law precedent, plaintiffs had an accrued cause of action for the injuries they allegedly sustained due to asbestos exposure, and these causes of action constituted a property interest in which plaintiffs had a vested right under article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. The court also held that retroactive application of the Act here would operate to completely abolish plaintiffs' vested rights in accrued causes of action for asbestos-related injury. Therefore, the court held that the Act could not be constitutionally applied to plaintiffs.

Petitioner, a company that processed perlite for horticultural and construction use, sued respondent alleging several counts for damages based on the claim that natural gas being supplied to petitioner was contaminated with debris that caused damage to petitioner's furnaces. Discovery and trial preparation were undertaken, during which time the parties engaged in numerous disagreements concerning discovery and other matters. Neither party filed a motion to have the case reset for trial and respondent subsequently filed a notice of lack of prosecution under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), alleging that there had been no record activity for the prior ten months. At issue was the proper interpretation of rule 1.420(e), which provided for involuntary dismissal of court actions for lack of prosecution. The court held that the filing made by petitioner during the sixty-day grace period set forth in rule 1.420(e) met the rule's requirement for record activity and therefore, precluded dismissal for lack of prosecution. Accordingly, the court quashed the decision of the First District and approved the conflict cases certified by the First District.

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, alleging the negligence of certain residents, fellows, and nurses at Jackson Memorial Hospital where her newborn son contracted a severe bacterial infection and subsequently died. At issue was whether, under section 768.28(7), Florida Statutes, the timing of respondent's service of process on the Florida Department of Financial Services ("DFS") was fatal to her negligence action. The court expressly rejected the argument that service of process on DFS was a condition precedent to respondent's cause of action and that proving service of process was an element of her burden of proof. Therefore, the court held that DFS was not a party to the cause of action and petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. The court concluded that the timing of respondent's service was not fatal to her negligence claim against petitioner and affirmed the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for directed verdict.

Petitioner appealed the district court's decision that the trial court erred as a matter of law by directing a verdict on permanency where "permanency was a jury question" and where "the jury was free to reject any testimony regarding permanency, including uncontradicted testimony." At issue was whether permanency was a jury question and whether the jury could reject uncontradicted expert testimony. The court held that the trial court properly directed a verdict for petitioner on the issue of permanency because the district court's statements were overly broad and did not accurately reflect Florida law on these issues where it was not improper to direct a verdict when the evidence of injury and causation were such that no reasonable inference could support a jury verdict for defendant and where, although the medical experts disagreed as to the medical cause of the thigh injury, they agreed that petitioner sustained a permanent injury to his right thigh that was causally related to the accident. The court also held that section 627.737(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes did not preclude an award of noneconomic damages to petitioner for his thigh injury and that respondent did not preserve any issue relating to the adequacy of the injury instruction or the verdict form. Accordingly, the district court improperly reversed the final judgment in favor of petitioner and the court quashed and remanded to reinstate the jury verdict.

Petitioner sued respondents alleging that, as a result of one of the respondent's negligence, petitioner suffered an acute myocardial infarction when he went to the emergency room complaining of chest pains. At issue was whether the First District Court of Appeal erred or exceeded its constitutional authority in reviewing the trial court's order on certiorari. The court quashed the First District's decision in Oken v. Williams and approved the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in St. Mary's Hospital v. Bell where the First District exceeded the scope of certiorari review when it granted the petition to determine whether a certain doctor was a qualified expert. The court also held that, because it found that the First District's grant of certiorari was inappropriate, it declined to address petitioner's remaining issues.