Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Deloris Gaulden died in the emergency department of Liberty Regional Medical Center. Her daughter sued Bobby Herrington, M.D., the medical director of the emergency department, alleging that Gaulden could have been saved, if only her treating physician and nurse had promptly and properly implemented a chest pain protocol that the hospital had adopted. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Dr. Herrington, but the Court of Appeals reversed to the extent that the claim against him sounded in professional negligence. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in its reversal of the trial court. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Herrington v. Gaulden" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the limitation period for a claim of pain and suffering in this wrongful death action could be tolled for fraud under OCGA 9-3-96. The victim, Sparkle Reid and Rajeeve Rai, the son of appellant Chiman Rai, married when their daughter was five months old. Within a month of the wedding, the victim was murdered in their apartment in the presence of the daughter. Rajeeve was at work at the time. The victim's father, Bennet Reid and his wife took custody of the child and later adopted her. Rajeeve abandoned the child, and never challenged the adoption nor the consequent termination of his parental rights. The crime went into cold case status until 2004 when, while investigating an unrelated matter, police spoke to a woman who said she was present at the murder and identified the hired killers. This information led eventually to appellant. Appellant was convicted of the murder. Reid filed a complaint and subsequently an amended complaint for wrongful death as the minor child's next friend and for pain and suffering as administrator of the victim's estate. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, awarded $2.5 million to the child on the wrongful death claim and $100,000 to Reid as estate administrator for the victim's pain and suffering. Appellant's motion for new trial was denied. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals divided evenly by a vote of six to six on the issue of whether appellant had committed fraud that would trigger the tolling provisions of OCGA 9-3-96, and thus, prevent the estate's claim for pain and suffering from being time-barred by the statute of limitation for personal injury actions. The appellate court ultimately reversed those portions of the trial court's judgment relating to the tolling of the limitation period for the pain and suffering claim, but affirmed the remainder of the judgment, finding that actual fraud was the gravamen of Reid's claim for pain and suffering and was not supported by the record or the law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with much of the position advocated by the appellate court. That portion of the final judgment entered on the jury's verdict against appellant and in favor of Reid, as administrator of the victim's estate, for pain and suffering was reversed, but the remainder of the final judgment entered on the jury's verdict for wrongful death against appellant and in favor of Reid, as next friend of the victim's minor child, was affirmed. View "Rai v. Reid" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Greenway v. Northside Hosp., Inc." (730 SE2d 742) (2012)), to determine if the appellate court erred in its evaluation of Deputy Sheriff Terry Roper's claim that he was entitled to official immunity from liability in connection with the euthanization of two dogs. Greenway was taken by ambulance from his home to a hospital; two dogs remained at the home. While Greenway was in the hospital's emergency department, and uncertain whether he would live, he was pressured to sign an “Owner Release Form” regarding his dogs; the form was given to him by Roper and authorized Forsyth County Animal Control to destroy the dogs. At the time he signed the form, Greenway was unable to read it without his eyeglasses and understood that his dogs were going to the Humane Society; the dogs were euthanized before Greenway was able to recover from his illness and take further action. Greenway sued Roper, the hospital, the Sheriff, and the County's animal shelter provider. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed as to Roper, the hospital, and the animal shelter operator. As to Roper, the Court of Appeals found that the doctrine of official immunity insulated him from liability from his decision to ask Greenway to sign the form, but not from his execution of that decision. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed that court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Roper v. Greenway" on Justia Law

Thelma Johnson took her 15-year-old son Shaquille to the emergency department at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital; a week earlier, Shaquille had undergone arthroscopic knee surgery. Shaquille complained of chest pain; was first seen by a nurse; and then examined by Dr. Price Omondi. The doctor noted that Shaquille had undergone surgery a week earlier; he inquired about Shaquille's medical history and family history and conducted a physical examination. Dr. Omondi ruled out multiple ailments, specifically, pulmonary embolism as causes of Shaquille's pain. Dr. Omondi diagnosed Shaquille with pleurisy and discharged him from the hospital with a prescription for an anti-inflammatory pain reliever, and instructions to return to the emergency department if his symptoms continued. Two weeks later, Shaquille returned to the emergency department, and died of a bilateral pulmonary embolism. Thelma Johnson and her husband sued Dr. Omondi and Southwest Emergency Physicians, P.C., for medical malpractice. Dr. Omondi moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in to determine whether the appellate court properly applied the standards for a medical malpractice claim in a hospital emergency department as found in OCGA 51-1-29.5 (c). Finding that the plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Omondi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in these cases involving assignment of tort liability to entities who were not parties to the suit. Upon review, the Court found that the Court of Appeals erred by holding that admissions concerning the nonparties found in the pleadings and elsewhere did not constitute evidence for the purpose of summary judgment, and erred in applying the "right for any reason" rule. Accordingly the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Fields" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether physicians employed as faculty members at the Medical College of Georgia ("MCG") were entitled to official immunity in treating a patient at MCG's Children's Medical Center. Plaintiffs-Appellees Kenneth Jones and Clara Ramon filed a medical malpractice action against Appellants Prem Singh Shekhawat, M.D. and Wayne Mathews, M.D., along with other defendants, arising from treatment rendered to Plaintiffs' child at the Center in 2003. The trial court granted summary judgment to both Appellants, concluding that they were entitled to official immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Appellants, in treating Plaintiffs' child, were acting within the scope of their employment with the State, using the Supreme Court's holding in "Keenan v. Plouffe," (482 SE2d 253 (1997)). After further review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Keenan" should have been overruled, because it conflated the standard for official immunity with that for sovereign immunity. Utilizing the proper analysis, the Court held that Appellants were entitled to official immunity because they were acting within the scope of their state employment in rendering the medical care at issue. View "Shekhawat v. Jones " on Justia Law

Stephen Jenkins brought a tort action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. alleging that a Bank teller had improperly accessed Jenkins’s confidential information and given it to her husband, allowing the husband to steal Jenkins’s identity. Jenkins claimed the Bank negligently failed to protect the information, breached a duty of confidentiality, and invaded his privacy. The trial court granted the Bank’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court of Appeals reversed as to Jenkins’s negligence claim after finding that the allegations of his complaint established the elements of negligence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a violation of an alleged duty imposed the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act gave rise to a cause of action for negligence under Georgia law. The Supreme Court concluded that the holding was in error, and reversed that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court. The questions related to the Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford Connecticut's umbrella policy issued to Louis and Betty Wilson. At the time, Georgia law required policies to have uninsured motorist coverage unless the insured rejected that coverage in writing. The Wilsons did not reject uninsured motorist coverage; their policy excluded such coverage despite being required by law. Because it was not written into the policy but required, it was implied by operation of law. In 2010, Louis Wilson was seriously injured in an accident, and gave notice of a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. The insurance company denied the claim, contending that a 2008 amendment to the Georgia law specifically excluded umbrella policies from mandatory uninsured motorist coverage. The questions from the federal court centered on whether the amendment to the applicable Georgia law applied to the Wilson's umbrella policy after 2009, and whether the notice requirements of the amended law applied to umbrella policies. After review, the Georgia Court concluded that the amendment in question here did not apply to the Wilson's umbrella policy, nor did the notice requirement. View "Wilson v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, Connecticut" on Justia Law

Following the fracture of an underground gas pipeline owned and operated by Atmos Energy Corporation, a subsequent fire and explosion damaged a building owned by Woodcraft by Macdonald, Inc. d/b/a Coachcraft. Coachcraft's insurer, Georgia Casualty and Surety Co., paid Coachcraft $1,675,169 under two policies and then pursued its own subrogation rights against Atmos in federal court where Coachcraft and its owner, intervened as plaintiffs. After more than two years of discovery and preparation for trial, Georgia Casualty decided to settle its claims against Atmos for $950,000. Coachcraft filed an objection to the settlement, arguing Georgia Casualty was prohibited from settling its subrogation claims until Coachcraft was "made whole." The federal court denied the objection. In lieu of continuing its own federal case, Coachcraft also settled its claims against Atmos for $125,000. Following the settlements, Coachcraft demanded Georgia Casualty pay, from its settlement, the remaining amount it claimed was necessary to make it whole from the damage to its building ($179,130.59). Georgia Casualty refused the demand, and Coachcraft brought a breach of contract action. The trial court denied Georgia Casualty's motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, but granted summary judgment on the bad faith claim. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals found that summary judgment for Georgia Casualty was warranted on both the breach of contract and bad faith claims. The Supreme Court granted Coachcraft's petition for certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment to Georgia Casualty on the breach of contract claim. Upon review, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals' ultimate conclusion that the "made whole" doctrine did not require Georgia Casualty to demonstrate that Coachcraft had been fully compensated prior to exercising its subrogation rights under the insurance policy. View "Woodcraft by MacDonald, Inc. v. Georgia Casualty & Surety Co." on Justia Law

Following the death of his wife, appellee James Jordan initiated this medical malpractice action against appellants Wellstar Health System, Inc. and Dr. James Sutherland (collectively "Wellstar"). As part of its discovery plan, Wellstar sought to conduct informal ex parte interviews of certain non-party health care providers who previously had treated Jordan's spouse. Wellstar moved the trial court for a protective order. After a hearing, the trial court issued a qualified protective order authorizing Wellstar to conduct ex parte interviews of named health care providers for the limited purpose of questioning them about the "development of, diagnosis of, and treatment of the cancerous condition which caused or contributed to the death of Marilyn Kay Adams Jordan." Although the trial court determined that the circumstances did not require Wellstar's counsel to provide Jordan with prior notice of or an opportunity to appear at the interviews, it did require that "the interviews be transcribed by a court reporter should Jordan make a written request for transcription." Jordan asked that the interviews be transcribed and subsequently sought their production. Wellstar objected to production of the transcripts, claiming they were not subject to discovery because they constituted protected work product. Jordan filed a motion to compel, which the trial court granted without conducting an in-camera review in an order summarily rejecting Wellstar's work product claim. The Court of Appeals denied Wellstar's application for interlocutory appeal, and the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to determine the propriety of the trial court's production order. The Court found that production of such material was not required by the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") or the language of the protective order entered in this case, but the Court vacated the trial court's judgment. "HIPAA . . .does not require the production of the transcripts at issue. Because no findings have been made with regard to waiver or the second criteria for production of the transcripts and the trial court sits as the trier of fact in discovery disputes, the case must be remanded to the trial court." View "Wellstar Health System, Inc. v. Jordan" on Justia Law