Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding the availability and scope of an "appropriation of likeness" claim under Georgia law. In the spring of 2000, fourteen-year-old Lindsay Bullard exposed her breasts to two unknown men in a parking lot in Panama City, Florida. She was aware that the men were videotaping her at the time and expressed no objection to being videotaped. MRA Holding LLC obtained the recording and included it in its "College Girls Gone Wild" video series. MRA also used a still photo of Bullard that was taken from the video clip and placed it in a prominent position on the cover of the video box for the College Girls Gone Wild video that it later marketed and sold nationwide. MRA did not obtain Bullard's permission to use the video footage of her in the video or to use her photo on the video box cover. Television and internet advertisements were aired that incorporated Bullard's image. As a result, Bullard suffered humiliation and injury to her feelings and reputation as a result of the use of her image. Bullard sued MRA for, among other things, appropriation of her likeness. MRA moved for summary judgment. The District Court then certified several questions relating to Georgia law with regard to the appropriation of Bullard's likeness. Taking each in turn, the Supreme Court concluded that Georgia law governed Bullard's claim, and Georgia law gave rise to a cause of action. The Court concluded that Bullard could not have given her consent based on an analysis of the facts in relation to Georgia law, and that the measure of damages for an appropriation of likeness case would not include general damages, but would be measured by the value of the use of the appropriated publicity. View "Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC " on Justia Law

In July 2011, Jing Liu sued Hao Wang alleging that Wang held stock in a Chinese company, that Wang held this stock on behalf of Liu, that Wang had misappropriated the stock for his own use, and that Wang wrongfully withheld distributions and other funds derived from his holding of the stock, to all of which Liu was entitled. A few weeks later, the trial court entered an interlocutory injunction that prohibited Wang from transferring certain assets while the lawsuit was pending, and Wang moved to dismiss the lawsuit pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In early 2012, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss the lawsuit, stayed the lawsuit pending the resolution of a related lawsuit in China, and ordered the interlocutory injunction be made permanent. Wang appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss and the order making permanent the interlocutory injunction. Upon its review of the record and briefs, the Supreme Court concluded that Wang failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss, but concluded that the trial court erred when it entered a permanent injunction without adequate notice to, or the consent of, the parties. View "Wang v. Liu" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that appellants failed to preserve for appeal their objection to a jury instruction. Appellants Hershell and Cindy McDowell were involved in a traffic accident in which their vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by appellee Gregory Hartzog. Appellants sued Hartzog and his employer, Optimus Solutions, LLC. Because there was some evidence that Mr. McDowell, who was driving his vehicle, may have run a stoplight before the collision and skidded into Hartzog while avoiding a third vehicle, Hartzog requested a charge on failure to obey a traffic signal. Because the Court found that the objection was properly preserved, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to that court for further proceedings. View "McDowell v. Hartzog" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court: "Is it proper for a jury to consider a defendant’s worldly circumstances when deciding the amount of damages that should be imposed under OCGA 51-12-6?" The question arose from a case in which the issue on appeal was whether admission of "worldly circumstances" evidence in a tort action where the only injury to plaintiff was to his peace, happiness or feelings. Steven Caviness was injured in a train accident and retained attorney James Holland, II to pursue an action against the train company. The attorney filed a complaint; the company raised the affirmative defense of the expiration of the statute of limitation. The client was not told of the mistake until twenty days after his attorney learned of the missed statute of limitation. Caviness sued his attorney, and the attorney was granted summary judgment on the legal malpractice claim. A breach of fiduciary duty claim was allowed to proceed, but the district court found that because the only remaining injury to Caviness's peace, happiness or feelings, OCGA 51-12-6 applied. Caviness introduced evidence of Holland's worldly circumstances, including the law firm's income, the attorney's salary, the attorney's real estate holdings and personal property. A jury awarded Caviness $700,000 in damages. Holland's motion for a new trial was denied with leave to renew pending the Supreme Court's answer to the certified question. The Supreme Court responded that OCGA 51-12-6 precludes admission of worldly circumstances when the only injury is to a plaintiff's peace, happiness or feelings. View "Holland v. Caviness" on Justia Law

After Mack Pitts was killed in a construction accident at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, his estate and minor children sued the City of Atlanta and several contractors for breaches of contracts concerning the construction project on which Pitts had been working. Although Pitts was not a party to these contracts, his estate and children asserted that he was an intended beneficiary and that they, therefore, had standing to sue for breach of the contracts. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that Pitts was not an intended beneficiary, denied summary judgment to the estate and children, and awarded summary judgment to the City and contractors. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court should have awarded summary judgment on the claims for breach of contract to the estate and children, not to the City and contractors. The Court of Appeals determined that Pitts was, in fact, an intended beneficiary of the contracts, and it found that the evidence was undisputed that the City and contractors had breached the contracts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals misapplied or failed to apply several fundamental principles of contract law in its consideration of these cases. Accordingly, the Court vacated the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Holder Construction Company v. Estate of Pitts" on Justia Law

In March 2006, appellant Michael Everett was employed as an engineer for appellee Norfolk Southern Railway Company and was tasked with using his locomotive to push a six-car train into an auto plant in Georgia. One of the employees working with appellant misinformed him that the train derailment device was in the "off" position when in fact it was in the "on" position. Acting at the direction of his supervisor, appellant moved the train forward, and, due to the position of the derailment device, three of the six cars derailed and two of the derailed cars crashed into the auto plant. Appellant’s locomotive did not derail and he suffered no physical injury from the accident, however, soon after the accident, appellant was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and he has not been able to return to work. Appellant brought a suit against appellee to recover damages for emotional distress. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether a jury could decide whether a plaintiff in a case brought pursuant to the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) was within the "zone of danger" in order to recover for emotional distress injuries stemming from a work-related accident. Because the Court answered that question in the negative, it reversed and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Everett v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly stated and applied the law governing accident and proximate cause in a "strict liability" offense. Appellee Shirley Ogilvie struck and killed a seven-year-old boy with her car as she drove through a crosswalk while the child was crossing the street. The trial court had declined to give Ogilvie's requested jury charge on the defense of accident. On appeal, she contended that the accident charge was authorized by her testimony that she could not stop before hitting the child because he ran across the street in front of her car, giving her only a second or two to avoid hitting him. The Court of Appeals concluded that Ogilvie's testimony that she could not avoid hitting the child warranted an accident charge. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that Ogilvie's defense at trial was not that she acted involuntarily, and thus without the required criminal intent, where her car struck the child. Her defense was that the act (or failure to act) of another person – the child in running into the crosswalk (or the crossing guard in failing to stop him) – was the proximate cause of the deadly collision. "That is a proximate cause defense, not an accident defense, regardless of how she tried to characterize it." The trial court therefore was not required to give an accident instruction, and the properly charged jury rejected her proximate cause defense. View "Georgia v. Ogilvie" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an employee who filed an injury claim against his employer under the State Workers' Compensation Act and receives compensation in exchange for a "no liability" settlement with his employer that is approved by the State Board of Workers' Compensation may then turn around and sue the co-employee who caused the injury in a tort action. Ten years ago, the Court of Appeals answered this question no, holding that the Act's exclusive remedy provision bars such a lawsuit based on the same injury for which the employee has already received a remedy. In this appeal, however, the Court of Appeals was equally divided as to whether the underlying case law should be overruled, and the case was sent to the Supreme Court for resolution. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Ridley" was correctly decided. Thus, appellant Joseph Smith, having previously entered a Board-approved settlement with his employer in exchange for compensation, would be barred from suing appellee John Ellis for the same injury in tort if Ellis qualified as an "employee of the same employer" as Smith, rather than a "third-party tort-feasor," as those phrases are used in the applicable statutory authority. However, the evidence did not establish that Ellis was acting as "an employee of the same employer" in the course of his employment, at the time he injured Smith. The trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to Ellis, and that judgment was reversed. View "Smith v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in this professional negligence action to address: (1) the standard for harmless error where a trial court refuses to strike an unqualified juror; and, (2) the trial court's duties under OCGA 9-10-185 to remedy prejudicial statements by counsel. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of both issues, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Stolte v. Fagan" on Justia Law

In this premises liability action, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified two questions to the state Supreme Court: (1) In a premises liability case in which the jury determines a defendant property owner negligently failed to prevent a foreseeable criminal attack, is the jury allowed to consider the "fault" of the criminal assailant and apportion its award of damages among the property owner and the criminal assailant, pursuant to OCGA section 51-12-33?; and (2) would jury instructions or a special verdict form requiring the jury to apportion its award of damages among the property owner and the criminal assailant result in a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights to a jury trial, due process or equal protection? The plaintiff in this case suffered a violent attack by unknown criminal assailants while staying in a hotel and subsequently brought suit against the owner of the hotel for failing to keep the premises safe. Upon review, the Supreme Court found: (1) the jury is allowed to apportion damages among the property owner and the criminal assailant and (2) instructions or a special verdict form requiring such apportionment would not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.