Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that the superior court improperly affirmed a damages award to Petitioner Valencia Scott on her workers' compensation claim because the ALJ erred in ruling Petitioner's deniability resulted from a fictional new accident as opposed to a change in condition, and that her claim for total temporary disability was thus not barred by the applicable statute of limitation. The Supreme Court granted review of the case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a "fictional new accident" could not apply to situations where an employee who suffered a compensable injury and subsequently suffers a progressive worsening of that condition whereby she must cease working completely. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner sustained a foot injury and was awarded compensation. She subsequently returned to work in a new position that required no strenuous activity, but she developed knee and gait problems as a result of the wear and tear of ordinary life. This gradual worsening constituted a change of condition, not a new accident. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Glass v. Gates" to answer whether the definition of "any motor vehicle" in OCGA 33-24-51(a) continued to be the broader definition of the term provided for in prior case law, notwithstanding the 2002 passage of OCGA 36-92-1. As inmates at the Troup County Correctional facility, Jonathan Glass and Tony Smith were operating tractors when Smith's tractor got stuck in a ditch. Donrell Gates, Glass' detail supervisor, instructed the men to attach a chain to the tractors so Glass could use his tractor to pull Smith's from the ditch. As Glass did so, Smith engaged his tractor's bush hog, causing a rock to take flight and pierce Glass' throat. Glass bled profusely and died later that day. Plaintiffs, Glass' minor son and the executor of his estate, brought a wrongful death and survivor action against Troup County and Gates. The county sought summary judgment, claiming plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The County asserted that by revising OCGA 33-24-51 (b) in 2002 (effective 2005), the legislature demonstrated its intent to apply the more narrow definition of "motor vehicle" found in OCGA 36-92-1 (6) in determining whether a local government waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance on a motor vehicle. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the county did not waive sovereign immunity because neither a tractor nor a bush hog could be deemed a "motor vehicle" under OCGA 36-92-1. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the broader definition of "motor vehicle" should have been applied under 33-24-51, and that therefore, the County waived its sovereign immunity as long as it purchased insurance for the tractor and bush hog used by Smith. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' reasoning, and affirmed by answering the appellate court's original question in the affirmative.

In The Landings Association, Inc. v. Williams, et al., the court of appeals held that the trial court properly denied in part motions for summary judgment brought by The Landings Association, Inc. and The Landings Club, Inc., finding that a question of fact remained as to whether The Landings entities failed, pursuant to the law of premises liability, to take reasonable steps to protect Gwyneth Williams from being attacked and killed by an alligator in the planned residential community and golf club owned and/or managed by The Landings entities. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in reaching this conclusion. Because the record showed that Williams had equal knowledge of the threat of alligators within the community, the court reversed.

Appellant, a young child with severe cerebral palsy, was excluded from most of the liability phase of the trial of her and her parents' lawsuit alleging that her condition was caused by appellees' medical malpractice. At issue was whether a party could be denied a right to be present in court during the trial of their case and excluded from the courtroom because her physical and mental condition could evoke undue sympathy from the jury and thereby improperly prejudice the other party. The court concluded that a party could not be excluded from her own trial simply because her physical and mental condition could evoke sympathy, even under these circumstances. Instead, trial courts could and should address the risk of undue sympathy by using jury instructions and other common and time-tested means of ensuring that both parties received a fair trial, without infringing on the parties' right to be present. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.

Plaintiff sustained a serious brain injury when he fell while climbing down from the roof of a residence while working for EWES. At the time of the accident, EWES held a commercial liability insurance policy issued by Maxum. Maxum denied coverage and refused to defend, citing the policy's Employer Liability Exclusion. After plaintiff obtained a negligence judgment against EWES, he filed suit against Maxum pursuant to an assignment of claims from EWES, asserting breach of the duty to defend and seeking indemnification. The court reversed as to the notice issue, finding that Maxum waived its right to assert a defense based on untimely notice because it did not properly alert EWES that the lack of timely notice would be a potential bar to coverage. The court also reversed the Court of Appeals' decision regarding Maxum's duty to defend, finding that since Maxum waived its right to assert a defense related to EWES' failure to give timely notice of the occurrence, timely notice of the occurrence was not a prerequisite to Maxum's duty to defend.

Lisa Krebs sued Carmen McReynolds and GM for serious injuries she received when McReynold's car struck the GM vehicle in which Krebs was a passenger. McReynolds subsequently appealed the trial court's rulings. The court granted certiorari to consider two questions: (1) Did the Court of Appeals correctly construe OCGA 51-12-33 to require a trier of fact to apportion an award of damages among multiple defendants when the plaintiff was not at fault?; and (2) Did the Court of Appeals correctly find that McReynolds's insurer made a counteroffer in response to Krebs's settlement demand? The court answered both questions affirmatively. The court held that in applying section 51-12-33, the trier of fact must "apportion its award of damages among the persons who were liable according to the percentage of fault of each person" even if the plaintiff was not at fault for the injury or damages claimed. In light of this holding, there was no error in the dismissal of McReynolds's cross-claims for contribution and set-off against GM. The court construed the response by McReynolds's insurer to Krebs's settlement offer, proposing to resolve the hospital and other liens "as part of this settlement," as a counteroffer rather than an unconditional and unequivocal acceptance. Accordingly, no binding settlement was formed.

Plaintiff brought a slip and fall action against CSX under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., which provided a federal tort remedy for interstate railroad employees who were injured while working within the scope of their employment. At issue was whether 29 C.F.R. 1910.24(f) applied to an indoor office building and whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence of, and determine whether, plaintiff was out of service because he was within the broad scope of protection of the FELA. The court held that, because the requirement of section 1910.24(f) that the nosings be of nonslip finish was applicable to the stairs in CSX's office building, was raised by the evidence, and was not otherwise covered in the jury instructions, the trial court should have given plaintiff's request to charge the jury that it could consider a violation of that regulation as evidence of negligence on the part of CSX. The court also held that because the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's dispute with the supervisors a few hours before he went to CSX's administration building to attend the safety meeting were at least indirectly material to matters at issue in this case, including whether plaintiff was acting within the cope of his employment at the time of his fall, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing CSX to cross-examine plaintiff on the issue and in admitting the testimony of supervisors for purposes of disproving certain facts to which plaintiff had testified.

This case arose from an automobile collision in which a police officer employed by the City of Newman was driving a City police car when it was struck by a motor vehicle owned and operated by the insured, who had $25,000 of motor vehicle liability coverage. The City had a Member Coverage Agreement (Agreement) with the Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency (GIRMA), established under OCGA 36-85-1 et seq. The officer subsequently sued the insured in tort and served a copy of the complaint on GIRMA to notify GIRMA that it might be held responsible as an uninsured motorist carrier pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. The court subsequently granted a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals to consider whether that court properly determined that a municipality's motor vehicle liability coverage secured through an interlocal risk management agency was not statutorily obligated to satisfy the requirements for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that were applied to commercial insurance policies and private self-insurance plans. The court held that the district court reached the correct conclusion when it determined that there was no authority for the conclusion that an interlocal risk management program such as that offered by GIRMA must include uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. Therefore, the Agreement was limited to its express terms and did not include the underinsured motorist protection that the police officer sought. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in order to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the State Board of Worker's Compensation exceeded its authority in promulgating its Rule 205. The court held that, contrary to the analysis and resulting conclusion by the Court of Appeals, Rule 205 was not burden-shifting in the manner found and did not interfere with the substantive rights of the parties. The court also held that there was evidence to support the subject ruling that Mulligan did not sustain a subsequent compensable injury. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the order of the superior court interpreting Rule 205 was affirmed.

Appellants filed suit against all appellees for compensatory and punitive damages, asserting breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), OCGA 16-14-1 et seq. In 2009, the trial court, inter alia, granted summary judgment to all appellees on the contract, negligence, and RICO claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grants of summary judgment. The court held that, since the Court of Appeals erred in making reliance an element of mail fraud and in affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees based on the failure of appellants to establish reliance, the court reversed that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees on the RICO claim based on mail fraud and remanded for further proceedings. The court also held that there was no evidence in the record that would provide the basis for a fact-finder to calculate damages upon a finding of liability and therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that summary judgment was authorized due to the failure of appellants to present evidence of damages.