Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, claimant Scott Chadwick filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission seeking benefits under the Worker’s Compensation Law from his employer, Multi-State Electric, LLC, and its surety, Idaho State Insurance Fund. Claimant alleged that he had suffered back injuries as a result of two separate accidents at work in 2012. The matter was tried to a referee, but the Commission did not adopt the referee’s recommendations. After considering the Claimant’s prehearing deposition, the testimony presented during the evidentiary hearing before the referee, and the exhibits, the Commission issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. The Commission found that Claimant failed to prove that he suffered an injury from a workplace accident in a May event and that he failed to prove that a July event occurred. The Commission alternatively found that he had failed to provide timely notice to his employer of both claimed accidents, and that he failed to prove that Employer was not prejudiced by the failure to give timely notice. Therefore, he was denied benefits. Claimant then timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Chadwick v. Multi-State Electric, LLC" on Justia Law

Claimant Barbara Kelly was an employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. when a cart rolled over her left foot. She filed for workers’ compensation benefits. Kelly sustained additional injuries in an automobile accident when returning home from an Independent Medical Evaluation (IME) scheduled by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (Surety) in connection with the cart incident. The Industrial Commission concluded that Kelly’s injuries from the automobile accident were not compensable because they did not arise out of and in the course of her employment with Blue Ribbon. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the causal connection between Kelly’s employment and the injuries she sustained as a result of the accident was sufficiently compelling that it held that the injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Irina Shea brought a negligence suit against Respondent Kevic Corporation (Kevic), d/b/a Lett’s Downtown Car Wash. Shea claimed that she was injured when she slipped and fell on ice near the exit of the car wash due to Kevic’s negligence in allowing ice to build up near the car wash exit or in failing to warn of the danger of ice buildup. The district court granted Kevic’s motion to strike portions of the affidavit of Shea’s attorney Henry Madsen and also granted Kevic’s motion for summary judgment. Shea appealed these rulings. In addition, Shea appealed the district court’s denial of her two motions for reconsideration. Kevic cross-appealed the district court’s order denying its motion to strike portions of Shea’s affidavit, which Shea filed in support of her first motion for reconsideration. Finding only that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Kevic because Shea showed genuine issues of material fact, the Supreme Court reversed on this issue, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Shea v. Kevic Corporation" on Justia Law

In early June of 2007, Karrin Massey consumed at least one, but perhaps several, poultry pot pies that were manufactured by ConAgra Food, Inc. and sold under the Banquet brand name. Soon after, Karrin, who was six months pregnant at the time, developed salmonellosis. After an outbreak of salmonella was linked to Banquet pot pies, it was discovered that Karrin's strain of salmonella matched the strain of salmonella found in the contaminated pot pies. Karrin, her husband, Mark Massey, and their daughter Emma filed suit against ConAgra, alleging claims of product liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. The district court eventually granted ConAgra's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Masseys had failed to establish the pot pies in question were defective. The Masseys filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The Masseys then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred: (1) in determining that the Masseys failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the pot pies were defective; (2) in granting summary judgment on the issue of negligence; (3) in concluding the Masseys waived their right to challenge the district court's denial of their motion to reconsider; and (4) in finding that the Masseys' failure to warn claim was not adequately pleaded. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Massey v. Conagra Foods" on Justia Law

In 2005, John Block purchased property in Lewiston from Jack Streibick to develop. Block submitted an application to resubdivide the property into three residential lots, which Lewiston approved. Prior to Block's purchase of the property, Lewiston issued two separate permits to Streibick allowing him to place and grade fill in the area of those lots. In 2006, Block received permits from Lewiston to construct homes on each of the three lots. During construction of the homes, Block hired engineering firms to test compaction of the finished grade for the footings on the lots. Following the construction of the homes, Lewiston issued Block certificates of occupancy for each of the homes after conducting inspections that found the homes to be constructed in accordance with applicable building codes and standards. In April 2007, Block sold the home and property at 159 Marine View Drive. In November of that year, the owner reported a crack in the home's basement. Around that same time, settling was observed at the other two properties. In early December 2007, Block repurchased 159 from the owners. He also consulted with engineers regarding options for immediate repair to the homes. As early as February 2009, further settling problems were reported at the properties. After Lewiston inspected the properties in May following a gas leak at 153, it posted notice that the residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. Block ultimately filed a Notice of Claim for Damages with Lewiston that also named City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw as a defendant, but did not effectuate process on Lewiston and Cutshaw until ninety days had elapsed from the date he had filed the Notice of Claim. The City defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Block's claims should be dismissed because he failed to timely file a Notice of Claim with Lewiston. This first motion for summary judgment was denied because a question of material fact existed concerning whether Block reasonably should have discovered his claim against Lewiston prior to 2009. The City defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of Block's claims against them, arguing that they were immune from liability for all of these claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and that Block could not establish that he was owed a duty. The district court granted this second summary judgment motion dismissing Block's claims based on the application of the economic loss rule. The court also held that immunity under the ITCA and failure to establish a duty provided alternate grounds for dismissal of Block's claims. Block appealed on the issue of immunity. Finding no reversible error as to that issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Block v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's Rule 59(a)(6) motion was denied when the jury found that defendant Dr. John Lundeby did not breach the standard of care owed to his patient, Rick Blizzard. The district court found that although the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence, the ultimate outcome would not have been different if a new trial was granted. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. A such, the district court's decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Blizzard v. Lundeby, M.D." on Justia Law

Appellant Marvin Morgan appealed the dismissal of his wrongful death action, as well as an order imposing sanctions against him and his former attorney. Morgan asserted that he was entitled to special and general damages as a result of the wrongful death of his wife, Ella Morgan. In January of 2004, Mrs. Morgan underwent testing at the Idaho Heart Institute in Idaho Falls. After reviewing Mrs. Morgan’s test results, Dr. John Chambers recommended that she return for an angiogram. The Morgans expected that Dr. Chambers would perform the angiogram. Mr. Morgan drove Mrs. Morgan to the Idaho Heart Institute for her scheduled angiogram. Morgan asserts that it was not Dr. Chambers who performed the angiogram, but Dr. Michael Demos, a doctor who neither of the Morgans had ever met. Morgan alleged that Dr. Demos negligently performed the angiogram, "causing a dissection and damage to Mrs. Morgan’s heart and right coronary artery, creating a medical emergency which then necessitated a high-risk medical procedure in an attempt to repair the damage." Mrs. Morgan passed away on February 24, 2004, purportedly because of complications resulting from the angiogram performed by Dr. Demos. The case sat "dormant for a remarkable twenty one months." Due to the inactivity, Mr. Morgan's son filed notice of substitution of counsel, then attempted to reopen the case. Morgan's motion to reopen was ultimately denied, and the case dismissed with prejudice. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion for dismissing the case without prejudice, but vacated the sanction against Morgan's former counsel. View "Morgan v. Demos" on Justia Law

In September 2010, Corral Agriculture, Inc. (Corral) contracted with Williamson Orchards to provide laborers to pick apples. Marco Fonseca worked as a laborer for Corral as a member of Coronado’s crew at Williamson Orchards. Fonseca's workers' compensation complaint stems from an injury he claims to have suffered while working. He was picking apples near the top of a ten or fifteen foot ladder when the ladder broke, causing him to fall to the ground and resulting in an injury to his hip and back. Fonseca testified that he reported his fall and his hip and back pain to Dr. Partridge on both visits but the medical records contain no notes regarding the fall or complaints of hip or back pain. The Industrial Commission denied Fonseca workers' compensation benefits after concluding he failed to prove he suffered an accident. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Fonseca v. Corral Ag, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff-respondent Jamee Wade was shot twice by a Fruitland police officer after an altercation. Intending to file a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Wade sought copies of investigatory records related to the incident pursuant to the Idaho Public Records Act (IPRA). This appeal arose from a Petition for Access to Public Records filed by plaintiff seeking the disclosure of investigatory records in the possession of the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (CCPA). The district court ordered CCPA to produce the records pursuant to the request, but limited disclosure to Wade and his counsel. CCPA timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment: the district court applied an erroneous legal standard in its analysis under I.C. 9-335. The records Wade requested were active investigatory records. View "Wade v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In 2006, claimant William Waters was working as a drywall hanger and taper. He was injured on a jobsite and sought medical care from a chiropractor. When chiropractic did not resolve his pain, he was recommended for surgery. The surgeon released Claimant to return to light work with a 45-pound lifting restriction. In 2007, the surgeon concluded that Claimant had reached medical stability, and he released Claimant to full activities, restricting him only from impact loading with axial activities, such as diving and gymnastics. Claimant returned to drywall work, but was laid off due to his difficulty keeping up. He applied for jobs at a convenience store and at rental car agencies, but was not hired. Later that year, Claimant sustained a whiplash injury to his neck in a rear-end motor vehicle accident, for which he sought and received emergency medical care. During the first part of 2008, he tripped and fell while running, sustaining an injury to his right shoulder for which he also sought and received emergency medical care. Claimant returned for treatment of right shoulder pain. After examining Claimant and conducting further testing, the doctor determined that Claimant had shoulder weakness from a nerve injury likely due to the industrial accident. Whether and to what extent Claimant was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits was tried to a referee. Claimant relied upon the testimony of two experts: his examining doctor and a vocational rehabilitation consultant. The central issue was whether the medical conditions identified by the doctor after the car accident were caused by the industrial accident. The referee concluded that Claimant had failed to prove that they were. The referee recommended that Claimant had failed to prove any permanent partial disability in excess of a 12% permanent partial impairment, which the State Insurance Fund (Surety) had already paid. The Commission adopted the referee’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own. Claimant then timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission. View "Waters v. All Phase Const." on Justia Law