Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005, John Block purchased property in Lewiston from Jack Streibick to develop. Block submitted an application to resubdivide the property into three residential lots, which Lewiston approved. Prior to Block's purchase of the property, Lewiston issued two separate permits to Streibick allowing him to place and grade fill in the area of those lots. In 2006, Block received permits from Lewiston to construct homes on each of the three lots. During construction of the homes, Block hired engineering firms to test compaction of the finished grade for the footings on the lots. Following the construction of the homes, Lewiston issued Block certificates of occupancy for each of the homes after conducting inspections that found the homes to be constructed in accordance with applicable building codes and standards. In April 2007, Block sold the home and property at 159 Marine View Drive. In November of that year, the owner reported a crack in the home's basement. Around that same time, settling was observed at the other two properties. In early December 2007, Block repurchased 159 from the owners. He also consulted with engineers regarding options for immediate repair to the homes. As early as February 2009, further settling problems were reported at the properties. After Lewiston inspected the properties in May following a gas leak at 153, it posted notice that the residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. Block ultimately filed a Notice of Claim for Damages with Lewiston that also named City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw as a defendant, but did not effectuate process on Lewiston and Cutshaw until ninety days had elapsed from the date he had filed the Notice of Claim. The City defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Block's claims should be dismissed because he failed to timely file a Notice of Claim with Lewiston. This first motion for summary judgment was denied because a question of material fact existed concerning whether Block reasonably should have discovered his claim against Lewiston prior to 2009. The City defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of Block's claims against them, arguing that they were immune from liability for all of these claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and that Block could not establish that he was owed a duty. The district court granted this second summary judgment motion dismissing Block's claims based on the application of the economic loss rule. The court also held that immunity under the ITCA and failure to establish a duty provided alternate grounds for dismissal of Block's claims. Block appealed on the issue of immunity. Finding no reversible error as to that issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Block v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's Rule 59(a)(6) motion was denied when the jury found that defendant Dr. John Lundeby did not breach the standard of care owed to his patient, Rick Blizzard. The district court found that although the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence, the ultimate outcome would not have been different if a new trial was granted. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. A such, the district court's decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Blizzard v. Lundeby, M.D." on Justia Law

Appellant Marvin Morgan appealed the dismissal of his wrongful death action, as well as an order imposing sanctions against him and his former attorney. Morgan asserted that he was entitled to special and general damages as a result of the wrongful death of his wife, Ella Morgan. In January of 2004, Mrs. Morgan underwent testing at the Idaho Heart Institute in Idaho Falls. After reviewing Mrs. Morgan’s test results, Dr. John Chambers recommended that she return for an angiogram. The Morgans expected that Dr. Chambers would perform the angiogram. Mr. Morgan drove Mrs. Morgan to the Idaho Heart Institute for her scheduled angiogram. Morgan asserts that it was not Dr. Chambers who performed the angiogram, but Dr. Michael Demos, a doctor who neither of the Morgans had ever met. Morgan alleged that Dr. Demos negligently performed the angiogram, "causing a dissection and damage to Mrs. Morgan’s heart and right coronary artery, creating a medical emergency which then necessitated a high-risk medical procedure in an attempt to repair the damage." Mrs. Morgan passed away on February 24, 2004, purportedly because of complications resulting from the angiogram performed by Dr. Demos. The case sat "dormant for a remarkable twenty one months." Due to the inactivity, Mr. Morgan's son filed notice of substitution of counsel, then attempted to reopen the case. Morgan's motion to reopen was ultimately denied, and the case dismissed with prejudice. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion for dismissing the case without prejudice, but vacated the sanction against Morgan's former counsel. View "Morgan v. Demos" on Justia Law

In September 2010, Corral Agriculture, Inc. (Corral) contracted with Williamson Orchards to provide laborers to pick apples. Marco Fonseca worked as a laborer for Corral as a member of Coronado’s crew at Williamson Orchards. Fonseca's workers' compensation complaint stems from an injury he claims to have suffered while working. He was picking apples near the top of a ten or fifteen foot ladder when the ladder broke, causing him to fall to the ground and resulting in an injury to his hip and back. Fonseca testified that he reported his fall and his hip and back pain to Dr. Partridge on both visits but the medical records contain no notes regarding the fall or complaints of hip or back pain. The Industrial Commission denied Fonseca workers' compensation benefits after concluding he failed to prove he suffered an accident. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Fonseca v. Corral Ag, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff-respondent Jamee Wade was shot twice by a Fruitland police officer after an altercation. Intending to file a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Wade sought copies of investigatory records related to the incident pursuant to the Idaho Public Records Act (IPRA). This appeal arose from a Petition for Access to Public Records filed by plaintiff seeking the disclosure of investigatory records in the possession of the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (CCPA). The district court ordered CCPA to produce the records pursuant to the request, but limited disclosure to Wade and his counsel. CCPA timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment: the district court applied an erroneous legal standard in its analysis under I.C. 9-335. The records Wade requested were active investigatory records. View "Wade v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In 2006, claimant William Waters was working as a drywall hanger and taper. He was injured on a jobsite and sought medical care from a chiropractor. When chiropractic did not resolve his pain, he was recommended for surgery. The surgeon released Claimant to return to light work with a 45-pound lifting restriction. In 2007, the surgeon concluded that Claimant had reached medical stability, and he released Claimant to full activities, restricting him only from impact loading with axial activities, such as diving and gymnastics. Claimant returned to drywall work, but was laid off due to his difficulty keeping up. He applied for jobs at a convenience store and at rental car agencies, but was not hired. Later that year, Claimant sustained a whiplash injury to his neck in a rear-end motor vehicle accident, for which he sought and received emergency medical care. During the first part of 2008, he tripped and fell while running, sustaining an injury to his right shoulder for which he also sought and received emergency medical care. Claimant returned for treatment of right shoulder pain. After examining Claimant and conducting further testing, the doctor determined that Claimant had shoulder weakness from a nerve injury likely due to the industrial accident. Whether and to what extent Claimant was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits was tried to a referee. Claimant relied upon the testimony of two experts: his examining doctor and a vocational rehabilitation consultant. The central issue was whether the medical conditions identified by the doctor after the car accident were caused by the industrial accident. The referee concluded that Claimant had failed to prove that they were. The referee recommended that Claimant had failed to prove any permanent partial disability in excess of a 12% permanent partial impairment, which the State Insurance Fund (Surety) had already paid. The Commission adopted the referee’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own. Claimant then timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission. View "Waters v. All Phase Const." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a judgment dismissing an action wherein the plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained as a result of contracting certain infections. The district court employed a differential diagnosis analysis and held that plaintiff's medical experts were required to rule out possible sources of the infections, other than the defendant's care. The district court determined that plaintiff's medical experts' opinions were inadmissible because they did not address the other possible sources of the infections that were suggested by defendant's medical expert. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court's determination was in error. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nield v. Pocatello Health Services" on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiff Craig Mulford filed a complaint against his employer Union Pacific Railroad (UP) seeking relief under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA). Plaintiff alleged he sustained injury to his knees as a result of UP's negligence. The case went to trial in 2012. The jury reached its verdict, unanimously concluding that UP was not negligent. The district court issued its final judgment and dismissed plaintiff's claims. In this appeal, plaintiff claimed that the district court erred on two separate grounds: (1) failing to disqualify a juror for cause; and (2) admitting evidence that he received disability benefits from the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) to impeach statements made by plaintiff on direct examination. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mulford v. Union Pacific Railroad" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action filed against Defendant-Respondent Mallory Martinez, a National Guard member, by Plaintiff-Appellant William Teurlings. Plaintiff alleged he suffered personal injury and economic damage resulting from a vehicle collision caused by defendant's negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment asserting immunity under I.C. 6-904(4), which provides immunity to National Guard members for claims arising out of certain federal training or duty. The district court granted the motion after concluding defendant fell within the scope of the statutory immunity. Teurlings appealed, arguing that defendant was not immune because she was not "engaged in training or duty" and she was not acting within the course of her employment at the time of the collision. Finding that the district court erred in granting defendant immunity, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in her favor and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Teurlings v. Larson" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a worker’s compensation case in which Michael Vawter sought compensation from his employer, United Parcel Service (UPS), for a back injury he claimed he suffered as a result of his employment. UPS attempted to establish that Vawter did not suffer a compensable injury, but if he did the State's Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) was liable for a portion of his benefits. Ultimately, the Idaho Industrial Commission found that Vawter was totally and permanently disabled and that UPS was solely responsible for Vawter’s disability benefits because it was estopped from arguing Vawter had a preexisting condition, a necessary element of ISIF liability. UPS appealed, arguing: (1) the accident causing Vawter’s injury did not arise out of his employment; (2) the Commission improperly applied the doctrine of quasi-estoppel to prevent it from asserting a preexisting condition; and (3) the Commission improperly awarded Vawter attorney fees. Vawter and ISIF both cross-appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission’s determination that Vawter was not entitled to recover all medical expenses incurred between the date of the accident and September 27, 2010. The Court affirmed the Industrial Commission in all other respects. View "Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law