Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Heidi Beers (a minor) was injured after jumping from a bridge into the Payette River. At the time, she was attending a campout organized by ward members of her church. Her parents, Gregory and Caralee Beers, brought negligence claims individually and on behalf of their daughter against the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and a number of individual ward members. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment in part, dismissing all negligence claims, but denied the motion for summary judgment as to the statutory claim against four ward members. The Beerses appealed and the four ward members cross-appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court propertly granted summary judgment as to the Beerses' negligence claims, but erred by denying the ward members' motion for summary judgment as to the Beerses' claim based on tort child abuse. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for entry of judgment dismissing the Beerses' complaint. View "Beers v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a medical malpractice claim brought against a physician's assistant, two supervising physicians and Rocky Mountain Emergency Physicians, LLC. Plaintiff-Appellant Heather Hall went to the emergency room complaining of headache, blurred vision and sensitivity to light. The assistant examined her, and in the process, plaintiff alleged the assistant touched her inappropriately while trying to listen to plaintiff's heartbeat through a stethoscope. Plaintiff's medical expert opined that this conduct fell below the standard of care for a physician's assistant working in an emergency room in Pocatello. Rocky Mountain moved for summary judgment, arguing that the expert lacked proper foundation. The district court granted Rocky Mountain's motion and dismissed the suit. Finding no error in the district court judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hall v. Rocky Mtn Emergency Physicians" on Justia Law

Claimant Rubio Izaguirre settled with a third-party tortfeasor following a work-related automobile accident. His employer and surety asserted a right of subrogation against the entirety of that settlement. On appeal, claimant argued that subrogation rights should have extended only to damages that workers’ compensation typically insures and not to pain and suffering. The Commission found in favor of the employer and surety, holding that all of the settlement proceeds were subject to subrogation. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Izaguirre v. R&L Carriers" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a worker’s compensation claim stemming from an accident at an onion processing plant. Petitioner James Clark was injured when his right forearm was caught in a roller machine which resulted in significant soft-tissue damage. The Industrial Commission determined that Clark suffered a compensable injury and that he was entitled to medical treatment for approximately one year. The Commission also found that Clark had a permanent partial impairment (PPI) of 10% of the whole person and a permanent partial disability rated at 25% of the whole person. Clark appealed that determination pro se, arguing the Commission relied on fraudulent evidence because his medical records were fraudulently obtained. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Clark v. State Ins Fund" on Justia Law

A bank hired a contractor to perform janitorial and snow removal services. The written contract between the parties lapsed, but they orally renewed their agreement according to the same terms. One morning, a bank employee arrived at work and parked in the parking lot. She stepped out of her car, slipped on black ice, and was injured. The employee sued the contractor, claiming that it had negligently failed to spread ice melt on the parking lot. The district court granted the contractor's motion for summary judgment, holding that the contractor owed no duty to spread ice melt on the parking lot on any day in which less than two inches of snow had fallen. The employee then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no genuine issue of material fact remaining regarding whether the contractor owed a duty to spread ice melt on the parking lot, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the contractor. View "Gagnon v. Western Building Maintenance, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting a new trial on plaintiffs' claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and its denial of defendants' request for attorney fees at trial. Plaintiffs Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed purchased a home from Robert and Jorja Shippen via warranty deed. After the basement of the home flooded, the Goodspeeds filed suit against the Shippens, alleging breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The district court denied a request for a jury instruction on the requirements for disclaiming the implied warranty of habitability and the case went to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Shippens, and the Goodspeeds moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing the disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability in the purchase and sale agreement was ineffective because it was not conspicuous. The district court granted a new trial after determining it had excluded the disclaimer instruction based upon its incorrect belief that the Goodspeeds had actual knowledge of the disclaimer. View "Goodspeed v. Shippen" on Justia Law

The State Board of Dentistry fined Plaintiff-Appellant Lon Peckham, DMD for failing to adequately inform a patient prior to performing a procedure, and for publishing misleading material on his website. The district court affirmed the Board's decision. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the district court's affirming of the Board's final Order. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to support findings that Plaintiff failed to inform a patient prior to performing a procedure or for publishing misleading material. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court. View "Peckham, DMD v. State Bd of Dentistry" on Justia Law

Katherine Harris sought workers' compensation benefits after falling and injuring herself at work in January of 2008. Following a hearing, the Idaho Industrial Commission decided that Harris was not entitled to disability or medical benefits after February 19, 2008. Harris appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the Commission record, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission did not err in its conclusion that Harris was only entitled to benefits provided up to February 19, 2008. View "Harris v. Ind School Dist No 1" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action filed against the City of Lewiston by Tim Thompson, Janet Thompson, and Thompson's Auto Sales (collectively, Thompson). Thompson filed a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), alleging the City negligently designed and installed a storm water drain system on a city street adjacent to Thompson's property, which caused storm water runoff to flow onto Thompson's property and damage it. After suit was filed, Thompson entered bankruptcy proceedings and the bankruptcy trustee, C. Barry Zimmerman, was substituted as Plaintiff in the action. The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds of discretionary immunity and design immunity. The district court denied the motion as to design immunity, but granted the motion on the ground of discretionary immunity. Zimmerman appealed, arguing that the discretionary immunity exception to liability under the ITCA does not grant immunity from liability for damage caused by negligent design and, alternatively, that even if discretionary immunity was considered, it was inapplicable in this case because the City's actions were not discretionary within the meaning of the exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the City was not entitled to immunity from liability under any exception to the ITCA. View "Zimmerman v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas R. Taylor filed this action seeking to recover damages for alleged medical malpractice. Pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1001, he then filed a request for a prelitigation screening panel four days later. The panel appointed regarding the alleged malpractice in this case conducted its proceedings and then issued its report on April 19, 2011. Although Plaintiff filed this action on January 20, 2011, he did not attempt to serve the summons and complaint upon any of the Defendants within six months after filing the complaint as mandated by Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. On August 16, 2011, defendant Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss this action as to it for the failure of Plaintiff to serve the summons and complaint upon it within the six-month period. Plaintiff filed a motion asking the district court to stay this lawsuit "nunc pro tunc from January 24, 2011, to April 19, 2011, or, alternatively, to extend [Plaintiff's] deadline for serving all Defendants to this lawsuit from July 19, 2011, to October 12, 2011." The district court entered an order denying Plaintiff's motions and granting the motions to dismiss filed by defendants. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Because the partial judgment was not yet final due to the fact that there was no judgment resolving the claims against the remaining defendants, the Supreme Court then issued a notice that the appeal would be dismissed. Plaintiff then filed an amended notice of appeal timely appealing both the initial judgment and the amended judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court: if there is not good cause for the failure to serve a defendant with the summons and complaint within six months after the complaint was filed, Rule 4(a)(2) states that "the action shall be dismissed as to the defendant without prejudice." Had Plaintiff served the Defendants before the prelitigation screening panel had completed its work, the worst that could have happened is that the district court would have stayed the court proceedings until after the panel had completed its work and for thirty days thereafter. Even if Plaintiff had thought he should wait until thirty days after the panel issued its report before serving the Defendants with a summons and complaint, he had from May 19, 2011, until July 20, 2011 to do so, but did not even attempt service during that time. View "Taylor v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law