Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant John Stem was helping to load a forklift at his place of work when another employee backed the forklift over a water meter cover which broke under the weight of the forklift. The forklift toppled and pinned Appellant to the ground, resulting in severe injuries and the amputation of his right leg. He sued Respondent Wesley Prouty, the owner and landlord of the property where the accident occurred, for negligence under a theory of premises liability for failing to keep the premises safe. Appellant alleged that the water meter cover was a light duty cover and was inadequate to support heavy duty vehicles such as forklifts. He later amended his complaint to include a negligence-per-se claim against Respondent for failing to obtain a building permit in violation of city and state codes, which he argued would have likely led to the discovery of the defective water meter cover. The district court granted Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dismissing the negligence claim based on premises liability. Respondent filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment on the negligence-per-se claim which was originally denied by the court. Then, upon Motion for Reconsideration, the court granted Respondent summary judgment. Appellant appealed the judgments in favor of Respondent. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no genuine issues of material facts. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Respondent.

This appeal arose from a negligence action brought by Plaintiff-Appellant Isabel Enriquez against Defendant-Respondent Idaho Power Company (Idaho Power). Plaintiff received severe electrical burns when he encountered an aluminum sprinkler pipe that had become energized by a high-voltage power line. He claimed that after the power line broke and electrified the pipe, Idaho Power's safety equipment did not shut off the current to the downed line, allowing him to be shocked when he approached the pipe to move it. The case went to trial, and Plaintiff argued that Idaho Power was negligent under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. At the close of Plaintiff's case in chief, Idaho Power moved for a directed verdict. The district court determined that res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the facts of this case and granted the motion. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in holding that res ipsa loquitur did not apply and the directed verdict was therefore improper. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted a directed verdict in favor of the power company. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

On June 28, 2010, Appellant Maria Gomez filed a Worker’s Compensation Complaint with the Industrial Commission (Commission) claiming benefits for an accident that occurred in 2009, when she injured her lower back lifting sixty-pound boxes. The injury occurred at Blackfoot Brass (Dura Mark). Appellant had previously suffered two work-related accidents while working with Dura Mark, one in 2002, the other in 2006, but had returned to work without restrictions after participating in physical therapy for both injuries. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on a Commission order denying reconsideration of Appellant's motion to reopen the record to allow for additional evidence on the issue of causation. The Industrial Commission previously ordered that Appellant had failed to prove the medical treatment she received for a back injury was related to an industrial accident and injury. At the emergency hearing pursuant to the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure adopted by the Commission, Appellant introduced evidence regarding her entitlement to reasonable and necessary medical care pursuant to I.C. 72-432, but the referee denied Appellant's claim on the grounds of causation. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's judgment. In doing so, the Court wanted to provide a "clear message that without a specific stipulation that causation will be a contested issue at the hearing pursuant to I.C. 72-713, and especially if there is a difference of opinion as to causation by opposing parties and their experts, claimant’s attorneys should no longer be lulled by anything other than a stipulation to all legal prerequisites and elements for recovery and be prepared to present evidence of a causal connection between the industrial injury or sickness and the required treatment."

Plaintiff-Appellant Alesha Ketterling alleged that she slipped on snow in the parking lot of the Burger King restaurant in Burley, Idaho, on December 22, 2006. BDSB of Western Idaho, L.C. had the contractual right to operate the restaurant under a franchise agreement with Burger King. HB Boys managed the Burley Burger King under a contract with BDSB. According to Plaintiff, her fall aggravated an existing knee injury. Plaintiff alleged that Burger King’s failure to make the premises safe was negligent and entitled her to damages for her injuries. HB Boys moved for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff failed to timely join it as a defendant. The district court agreed and granted the motion. The court subsequently granted summary judgment to Burger King, holding that, as franchisor, it did not control the premises where Plaintiff fell and had no vicarious liability for her injuries. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether either Defendant was entitled to summary judgment. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

Plaintiffs-Respondents father and daughter Jose and Nayeli Carrillo, father and daughter, sued Boise Tire Co. (Boise Tire), alleging that Boise Tire improperly performed a tire rotation on their vehicle and that as a result, the Carrillos and Marisela Lycan, Jose’s wife and Nayeli's mother, were in a motor vehicle accident. Marisela was killed, Jose was injured, and eighteen-month old Nayeli underwent testing that revealed no physical injury. A jury found that Boise Tire's conduct was reckless. Boise Tire moved for new trial on the grounds that: (1) the Carrillos' pleadings merely alleged negligence and therefore the court committed legal error by permitting the Carrillos to argue that Boise Tire's conduct was reckless; (2) the jury verdict was excessive and the result of passion or prejudice; and (3) the jury verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence. The district court issued a remittitur as to Nayeli's noneconomic damage award but otherwise denied the motion. Boise Tire appealed that denial and the court's holding that I.C. 6-1606 did not require the Carrillos' damage awards to be reduced by the subrogation interest transferred from the Carrillos' insurer to their attorney, nor by social security benefits obtained by the Carrillos. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Boise Tire's motion for a new trial, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the district court to reduce Jose's personal injury reward by the value of his social security benefits when judgment was originally entered.

In 2006, Appellant V. J. Magee sustained a work-related injury causing harm to his lumbar spine and impacting the use of his right leg, leaving him in chronic pain. The Idaho Industrial Commission found that Appellant suffered a compensable industrial accident, that he sustained a ten percent permanent partial impairment to the whole body, and sustained a twenty percent permanent partial disability to the whole body. Magee appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the Commission's 2004 decision. While that appeal was still pending, Appellant filed a second complaint with the Commission, arguing that the Commission's 2004 decision should be modified because of a change in his condition. The Commission held a second hearing, additional evidence was presented, and the Commission issued a final decision, concluding that Appellant failed to prove that a change in condition had occurred. The Commission also found that its earlier 2004 decision did not result in manifest injustice and that the benefit claims, which were previously litigated, were barred by res judicata. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant failed to establish a change in condition, that the 2004 decision did not result in manifest injustice, and that the issues regarding his medical benefits were barred under res judicata.

In 2007, Defendant Joseph Verska, MD performed two back surgeries upon Plaintiff Kristeen Elliott. She hired attorney Thomas Maile, IV to handle a malpractice claim against Dr. Verska. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned the district court's partial judgment that dismissed Plaintiff's action against Dr. Verska and St. Luke's Meridian Medical Center on the ground that they had not been served with process within six months of the date that the complaint was filed. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court that Defendants were not timely served, and that the district court's finding was supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Plaintiff Minor Miracle Productions, LLC (MMP) was a film company for whom Third-Party Respondent David Richards worked. MMP provided a film location and funding for a film written and directed by Defendant Randy Starkey. After the film was completed, Starkey refused to turn over possession of the film and various pieces of equipment from the film. MMP brought suit against Starkey alleging breach of the duty of loyalty, breach of contract, and conversion. After initially appearing via counsel in the case, Starkey proceeded pro se. When Starkey failed to appear at motion hearings and disregarded the district court’s orders regarding discovery, the court sanctioned Starkey, striking his defenses and precluding him from using any evidence not previously disclosed. MMP then moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the district court granted the motion. The court ordered Starkey to pay Richards over one million dollars in damages and interest for the costs of the film’s production, to return the film and to release the copyrights to the film and its website to Richards, and enjoined Starkey from selling the film and from using any of the equipment related to the film. Starkey timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings.

This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal from a jury verdict entered in a wrongful death case in favor of Jose Aguilar, Guadalupe Aguilar, Alejandro Aguilar, Lorena Aguilar and Jose Aguilar, Jr. (collectively, "the Aguilars") against Dr. Nathan Coonrod, his employer Primary Health Care Center (Primary Health) and employees of Primary Health. On appeal Dr. Coonrod asserted that the district court abused its discretion in barring him from questioning the Aguilars' expert about his opinion as to the professional negligence of Dr. Chai and Dr. Long (two previous defendants who settled or were dismissed prior to trial) in their treatment of the decedent Maria Aguilar either on cross-examination or during his case in chief. Dr. Coonrod alleged that the district court also abused its discretion in forbidding him to read portions of Dr. Blaylockâs deposition into the record. Finally, Dr. Coonrod alleged that the district court erred in interpreting the statutory cap on non-economic damages as applying to each of the Aguilars individually instead of collectively. Upon review, the Court affirmed the district courtâs denial of Dr. Coonrod's motion for a new trial, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in barring Dr. Coonrod from questioning the expert on the issue of the purported negligence of Drs. Chai and Long. Dr. Coonrod failed to properly disclose Dr. Blaylock as an expert he intended to call, and was thus barred from calling him during his case in chief. Furthermore, the Court held that the district court correctly found that the statutory limitation on noneconomic damages applied on a per claimant basis, rather than a per claim basis.

Do Nguyen, Jana Nguyen, Kenny Nguyen and John Doeâs (collectively "the Nguyens") appealed a district court's grant of a motion to set aside a default judgment in favor of Janice Maynard. On appeal, Maynard contended that the district court abused its discretion in setting aside its previously entered default judgment. In 2006, Maynard filled out an application to rent a trailer home from the Nguyens and reached an agreement with the Nguyens under which Maynard would receive title to the home if she paid $500 in rent each month for a period of three years. In 2008, Maynard reported to the Ada County Jail to serve a sentence, and when she returned home on November 27, 2008, she discovered that the Nguyens had removed her belongings from the trailer home and rented the trailer to other tenants. In 2009, an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of damages. At the beginning of that hearing Maynardâs attorney told the court that he had received a two-page letter on June 29, 2009, which was addressed to "[counsel for Maynard], Janice Maynard and To Whom it May Concern." Counsel asked whether the court had received that letter, and described various documents which were attached to it. When the court said that it had not received the letter, the attorney offered no further information concerning the letterâs contents, but proceeded to present evidence concerning damages. The district court entered a default judgment against the Nguyens in the amount of $3,265 in actual damages and an enhanced penalty of $15,000 for the ICPA violation. The Nguyens filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The Nguyens noted that they had sent Maynardâs attorney a letter explaining their version of events and why they believed that Maynard had abandoned the trailer home. On December 7, 2009, the district court granted the Nguyensâ motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that the Nguyens had demonstrated that there were unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district courtâs order setting aside the default judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.