Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Do Nguyen, Jana Nguyen, Kenny Nguyen and John Doeâs (collectively "the Nguyens") appealed a district court's grant of a motion to set aside a default judgment in favor of Janice Maynard. On appeal, Maynard contended that the district court abused its discretion in setting aside its previously entered default judgment. In 2006, Maynard filled out an application to rent a trailer home from the Nguyens and reached an agreement with the Nguyens under which Maynard would receive title to the home if she paid $500 in rent each month for a period of three years. In 2008, Maynard reported to the Ada County Jail to serve a sentence, and when she returned home on November 27, 2008, she discovered that the Nguyens had removed her belongings from the trailer home and rented the trailer to other tenants. In 2009, an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of damages. At the beginning of that hearing Maynardâs attorney told the court that he had received a two-page letter on June 29, 2009, which was addressed to "[counsel for Maynard], Janice Maynard and To Whom it May Concern." Counsel asked whether the court had received that letter, and described various documents which were attached to it. When the court said that it had not received the letter, the attorney offered no further information concerning the letterâs contents, but proceeded to present evidence concerning damages. The district court entered a default judgment against the Nguyens in the amount of $3,265 in actual damages and an enhanced penalty of $15,000 for the ICPA violation. The Nguyens filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The Nguyens noted that they had sent Maynardâs attorney a letter explaining their version of events and why they believed that Maynard had abandoned the trailer home. On December 7, 2009, the district court granted the Nguyensâ motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that the Nguyens had demonstrated that there were unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district courtâs order setting aside the default judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Randy Hoffer challenged the district court's dismissal of three of his five tort claims against the City of Boise (City). Of two in particular, the district court dismissed Plaintiff's claims of tortious interference with a contract and defamation against the City because it held as a matter of law that under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), a governmental entity could not be held liable for the torts of its employees when a complainant alleges malice and/or criminal intent. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial record, the Supreme Court found that the ITCA indeed exempted governmental entities from liability for the intentional torts at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff Janet Nightengale brought a medical malpractice action against emergency room doctor Defendant Dr. Kevin Timmel. Defendant failed to diagnose a clot in one Plaintiff's vascular arteries. That condition cut off circulation to Plaintiff's left arm, eventually requiring its amputation above the elbow. At trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding that Defendant had not breached the relevant standard of care in his treatment of Plaintiff. Plaintiff contended on appeal that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the special verdict. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision in support of Defendant.

Plaintiff Eileen McDevitt tripped and fell on a recessed irrigation box outside Sportsman's Warehouse. The store was part of a larger shopping center. Plaintiff sued the store and others to recover for her injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the store, finding that as a tenant in the shopping center, the store owed no duty to shoppers (or invitees) to warn them of potential hazards. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Appellant Twin Lakes Canal Company (Twin Lakes) owned a reservoir. Respondents Warren and Sessilee Choules own property subject to a "prescriptive overflow" easement by Twin Lakes. In 2008, Twin Lakes filed suit against the Choules, alleging that the Choules moved earth, rocks, concrete and other debris from elsewhere on their property into areas below the height of the reservoir, which reduced the reservoir's storage space and damaged a lining designed to prevent leaks. The district court determined that state law allows the Choules as owners of the servient property, to use their property in any way they see fit, despite the common law rule that generally prohibits them from using their property in a way that interferes with the "dominant estate." The district court dismissed Twin Lakes' complaint. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Twin Lakes argued that the district court misinterpreted state law in its ruling in favor of the Choules. Upon careful consideration of the plain meaning of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Appellant Lesia Knowlton appealed the Industrial Commission's determination that she was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Appellant was employed as a secretary at Respondent Wood River Medical Center. In 2000, Appellant was working at her assigned station when a drain in a nearby patient's bathroom became clogged. One of the maintenance workers used a chemical cleaner to clear the drain. The chemical produced a foul odor. Workers placed fans at the doorway of the room for ventilation. The air blew past Appellant's station from morning until her shift ended in the afternoon. That night, Appellant developed a cough and body aches. Her symptoms persisted, allegedly from exposure to the chemical drain cleaner. Over the course of five years, Appellant visited multiple doctors and specialists to treat her "bronchitis-like" symptoms. Appellant filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission seeking reimbursement for her medical expenses and for temporary total disability benefits. At a Commission hearing, the referee ultimately concluded that Appellant failed to demonstrate that her medical symptoms were causally related to the chemical exposure. Although the referee determined that Appellant was not entitled to "time loss" benefits or any form of disability benefits, he did find that because the medical treatment Appellant received during the six weeks following the incident was a "reasonable precautionary step" taken in response to the exposure, she was entitled to compensation for those expenses. The Commission adopted the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commission denied Appellant's motion for reconsideration. Subsequently Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed that Appellant failed to demonstrate her medical symptoms were related to the chemical exposure. Accordingly the Court affirmed the Commission's determination.

Plaintiff-Appellants Franz and Betty Suhadolnik appealed the district courtâs grant of summary judgment in favor of their doctor, Defendant-Respondent Scott Pressman. Mr. Suhadolnik argued that his cataract surgeon, Dr. Pressman, failed to adequately inquire about his prior use of a prescription drug that resulted in increased risks during surgery. Mr. Suhadolnik presented expert testimony to demonstrate that Dr. Pressman was negligent when he performed the surgery. The district court determined that Mr. Suhadolnikâs expert failed to address any knowledge of the local standard of care, which was necessary to avoid having the testimony stricken from the trial record. Mr. Suhadolnik appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the district court erred by dismissing his expertâs testimony. The Supreme Court found that the district court acted within its discretion in holding the expertâs testimony to be inadmissible. Accordingly the Court affirmed the lower courtâs holding.

Defendants Milt and Mary Erhart owned a commercial building in Meridian that contained offices that they rented to various lessees. The building had external stairs that consisted of carpet-covered, wooden steps from a ground level landing to the second floor. Mr. Erhart determined that rot made the steps a hazard, and he replaced them with concrete steps in October 2003. Plaintiff Jim Phillips had an office on the second floor. In 2006, Mr. Phillips walked down the stairs to take out the trash when he tripped. He was found lying face-down on the concrete landing at the bottom of the stairs. He suffered various injuries including a closed head injury that caused permanent brain damage and a loss of memory. The Phillipses filed suit against the Erharts in 2007 to recover damages resulting from the fall. A jury returned a verdict for over $1.5 million, finding Mr. Erhart solely at fault for the accident. The Erharts filed motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for a new trial, and for a remittitur. The district court granted only the remittitur, ordering a new trial unless the Phillipses accepted a reduction in economic damages. The Phillipses accepted the reduction, and the Erharts timely appealed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Erharts challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support finding Mr. Erhart solely at fault for the accident. The Supreme Court found the evidence presented at trial supported the decision of the court and the damages awarded in the case. The Court affirmed the decision of the district court.

Plaintiffs-Appellants James and Lori Mareci brought suit on behalf of their minor son Tristen against Defendant-Respondent Coer D'Alene School District and Defendants Scott and Stevie Kamara. Tristen was injured at school by his classmate Quinton Kamara. On the School District's motion for summary judgment, the Marecis' claims against it were dismissed, and the Marecis appealed. The Marecis' asserted that the School District's staff members were reckless, wanton and willful in how they treated their visibly injured son, and negligent in their supervision of Quinton, who was in their custody. State law limits the liability of a school district when a claim arises out of an injury caused by a person under its supervision, custody or care. On review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's finding insufficient evidence to establish the school district's liability under state law, and affirmed the lower court's decision.