Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A woman, attending a class at a Chicago Park District fieldhouse, fell while attempting to step over a pile of snow that had collected at the edge of the parking lot during plowing. She fractured her femur and had surgery, but later suffered complications which led to her death. Her estate filed a wrongful-death action. The park district claimed immunity based on section 3-106 of the Tort Immunity Act, which provides that there can be no liability “based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes.” The circuit court certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice constitutes “the existence of a condition of any public property.” The appellate court held that it did not, precluding immunity. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Section 3-105 of the Tort Immunity Act provides that generally local public entities undertaking snow removal operations must exercise due care in doing so. That provision has no impact on section 3-106, which specifically provides immunity from liability for injuries on public recreational property. The allegation that the snow accumulation was “unnatural” was irrelevant to immunity because recreational uses were involved. View "Moore v. Chicago Park Dist." on Justia Law

Gott was a resident of Odin Healthcare where she died, on January 31, 2006. Her estate brought a survival action under the Nursing Home Care Act and the Wrongful Death Act, claiming that as a result of violations of the Nursing Home Care Act, Gott sustained gastrointestinal bleeding, anemia, and respiratory failure. The wrongful-death claim sought damages for injuries sustained by her heirs. Odin sought to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by Gott and by her “legal representative.” The trial court refused to compel arbitration, viewing the agreement as unenforceable for lack of mutuality and as contrary to public policy. The court held that the wrongful-death claim was not arbitrable and that the Federal Arbitration Act was inapplicable. On remand, the appellate court accepted applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act but still affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part. Arbitration can be compelled on Survival Act claims, alleging Nursing Home Care Act violations and seeking damages for injuries sustained by Gott while alive. However, the wrongful-death claim did not accrue until Gott died, and benefits obtained under it are payable to the next of kin rather than to her estate. No previously signed arbitration agreement is applicable to this claim. View "Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was 12 years old when, in 2003, his left foot was severed above the toes when he attempted to jump onto a freight train that was moving by the parking lot of an apartment building in Chicago Ridge. The track was partially fenced off and there was a sign warning of danger and prohibiting trespassing. As a result, an amputation below the knee was performed. The company which operated the train settled for $25,000, but plaintiff sued three other railroad companies. The trial judge found that the question of whether the danger of jumping onto a moving freight train was so obvious as to preclude any duty by the defendants was a question of fact for the jury. The jury assessed $6.5 million; that amount was reduced to $3.9 million by the earlier settlement and because plaintiff was found to have been 40% negligent. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed without remand. Under Illinois law, a moving train is an obvious danger as to which any child old enough to be allowed at large should recognize the risk. The defendants never had a legal duty to the plaintiff trespasser in this situation. View "Choate v. IN Harbor Belt R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured at work, filed a product liability complaint, identifying himself as “Juan Ortiz,” the name he used at work. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, naming additional defendants, identifying himself as “Juan Ortiz.” Plaintiff identified himself as “Juan Ortiz” in discovery documents. In a deposition, plaintiff stated that his birth name was “Rogasciano Santiago,” but that he had also used the name “Juan Ortiz.” The trial court allowed a second amended complaint to identify plaintiff as “Rogasciano Santiago, f/k/a Juan Ortiz.” The appellate court held that, when a plaintiff intentionally files a complaint using a fictitious name, without leave of court pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-401, the court may dismiss with prejudice and that amendment, after expiration of the limitations period, to correct plaintiff’s name, requires dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A court has discretion to dismiss with prejudice a complaint filed using a fictitious name without leave of court. Dismissal is justified only when there is a clear record of willful conduct showing deliberate and continuing disregard for judicial authority and a finding that lesser sanctions are inadequate to remedy harm to the judiciary and prejudice to the opposing party. The original complaint is not a nullity, per se, and an amended complaint correcting the name may relate back to initial filing.

Plaintiffs were sexually abused by their teacher, White, at an Urbana school. Before working in Urbana, White was a teacher in the McLean County school district. Plaintiffs filed suit against White, Urbana, individual administrators, the McLean County district, and individual McLean administrators. Plaintiffs alleged that between 2002 and 2005, McLean administrators acquired actual knowledge of White’s teacher-on-student sexual harassment, sexual abuse, or sexual “grooming” of minor female students, but never recorded these incidents in White’s personnel file or employment record, failed to make timely mandated reports of abuse by White, and failed to investigate parental complaints. According to the complaint McLean disciplined White for “sexual harassment, sexual grooming, and/or sexual abuse” of minor female students, then entered into a severance agreement with White which concealed his sexual abuse of students and created a falsely positive letter of reference for White. The trial court dismissed with respect to the McLean defendants, finding they owed no duty. The appellate and supreme courts ruled in favor of plaintiffs. The state sovereign immunity law does not extend to conduct that is willful or wanton, 745 ILCS 10/2-202; the alleged fact are sufficient to establish that, having undertaken the affirmative act of filling out White’s employment verification form,defendants had a duty to use reasonable care in ensuring that the information was accurate.

In 2004 an ambulance, answering an emergency call, drove through a stop sign and was hit by a passenger vehicle that had the stop sign in its favor. The injured driver of the passenger car sued the ambulance driver and Massac County Hospital, for which he worked, and recovered $667,216.30 for negligence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the situation was governed by the Vehicle Code, not by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, which protects local public entities and their employees from liability for injuries "caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle or firefighting or rescue equipment, when responding to an emergency call." The Vehicle Code imposes duties on drivers of both public and private emergency vehicles to refrain from negligence. The supreme court reversed. The evidence was insufficient to establish the willful and wanton conduct that might preclude municipal immunity. The statutes at issue are not in conflict; each governs in its own sphere. Under the plain language of the Tort Immunity Act, the legislature has chosen to grant immunity from negligence liability to public employees and employers, such as the driver and hospital, and this result is not abrogated by the Vehicle Code.

Plaintiff and defendant, both women, met in 2005 through a chatroom connected with a television series. Defendant, in Illinois, used her own name and aliases to communicate with plaintiff, in Los Angeles. One alias was that of a man, and a romantic relationship developed through the Internet, telephone, and mail. Defendant disguised her female identity using a voice-altering device. Plaintiff purchased airline tickets for a meeting in Denver, but her new “boyfriend” cancelled the plans. Plaintiff was informed that he had attempted suicide. In 2006 the two planned to live together in Colorado, but defendant subsequently informed plaintiff, using another alias, that the man had died of cancer. The deception continued for seven more months until plaintiff’s real friends confronted defendant and obtained a videotaped admission as to what had occurred. Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and seeking damages for the cost of a therapist, lost earnings, and emotional distress, was dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, holding that claims made in the previous complaint, but not incorporated into the third amended complaint, had been abandoned. The supreme court affirmed, holding that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation does not apply to a personal relationship with no commercial component.

In 2007 plaintiff died, a few months after filing a complaint, alleging exposure to asbestos brought home from work on her husband’s clothes and body between 1958 and 1964. The defense argued that no duty was owed to a third party. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the question of duty for purposes of the negligence claim was not simply a matter of whether the injured spouse worked for the defendant, but of whether defendant could have reasonably foreseen that its actions would cause this injury. Although the complaint alleged that the defendant knew or should have known that there was an unreasonable risk of harm to the worker’s wife, the complaint failed to allege specific facts as to what the defendant actually knew, or should have known, between 1958 and 1964. A complaint should not be dismissed, however, unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recover.

Firefighters, who suffered career-ending injuries during required training exercises, obtained line-of-duty disability pensions and sought continuing health coverage under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, 820 ILCS 320/10, which requires employers of full-time firefighters to pay health insurance premiums for the firefighter and family if the firefighter suffers a catastrophic injury as a result of a response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency. The trial court dismissed a declaratory judgment action by one firefighter and affirmed denial of the insurance benefit for one firefighter. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court held that an "emergency" means an unforeseen circumstance calling for urgent and immediate action and can arise in a training exercise. The other firefighter had obtained a declaratory judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. The supreme court distinguished the situation because, although he was instructed to "respond as if it were an actual emergency," he was not injured while making an urgent response to unforeseen circumstances involving an imminent danger to person or property.

A jury awarded more than $20 million for the death of three persons in a 2002 collision between a car and a tractor-trailer. Original defendants included the truck driver, his employer, the owner of the load being carried, the owner of the tractor (Adler), and the owner of the semi-trailer. The driver and his employer obtained a substitution of judge, but a second motion to substitute the judge was denied on the ground that it had been requested by the same entity (employer) operating under a different name. A motion for substitution brought by the Adler was denied on the ground that the determination concerning the employer was a substantial ruling. Section 2-1001(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure gives all defendants the right to one substitution of judge, provided no substantial ruling has yet been made in the case. The appellate court ordered a new trial. The parties agreed to dismiss Adler, releasing it from liability. The Supreme Court vacated the new trial order, but remanded on other issues. Once Adler, whose request to substitute had been denied, was no longer in the case, no other defendant had standing to challenge that denial.