Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, hired as a public school basketball coach in 1999, and made athletic director in 2003, was fired as coach in 2008, following a campaign based on his allegedly abusive and bullying style of coaching. He filed suit for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy to intentionally interfere with prospective business advantage, and slander per se. The trial court dismissed as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation under the Citizen Participation Act, 735 ILCS 110/15. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. The purpose of the Act is to protect citizens who are attempting to speak freely or petition government from retaliatory meritless lawsuits, intended to chill exercise of constitutional rights and impose burdensome expenses. The special summary dismissal under the Act, without discovery, allows attorney fees. For SLAPP protections to apply, plaintiff's claim must be solely based on the movant's rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government. The Act is not intended to apply to tortious acts and does not create a new privilege concerning defamation. It is possible that defendants could spread lies about plaintiff while at the same time genuinely petitioning government for redress, but such a situation cannot support dismissal as a SLAPP.

Plaintiffs' 1993 Lincoln Town Car was hit while stopped. A pipe wrench in the trunk penetrated the gas tank. The car burst into flames. Husband was killed, wife was severely injured. A jury awarded wife compensatory damages totaling $23.1 million and punitive damages of $15 million and awarded compensatory damages to the estate in excess of $5 million. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The duty analysis in a negligent-product-design case encompasses a risk-utility balancing test. Compliance with industry standards (NHTSA) is a relevant, but not dispositive. Plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence that Ford breached its duty of reasonable care on three negligent-design theories. Balancing foreseeable risks and utility factors, plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that, at the time of manufacture, Ford's conduct was unreasonable or that it had acted unreasonably in failing to warn about the risk of trunk contents puncturing the tank. There was no evidence of a feasible shield that would have prevented this injury. Plaintiffs' fourth theory, premised on a postsale duty to warn, was not cognizable under Illinois law and its voluntary undertakings with respect to law enforcement vehicles did not create a duty to civilian customers.

Plaintiff sought damages based on the death of her 18-year-old son in an automobile accident after allegedly consuming alcoholic beverages at defendants' residence. The trial court dismissed. The appellate court upheld the dismissal of counts IV through VI, but reversed and remanded as to counts I through III, which were based on a theory that defendants voluntarily undertook to prevent underage drinking and negligently performed that duty. The Supreme Court reversed, characterizing the case as involving "nonfeasance." Defendants owed no duty to prohibit voluntary possession or consumption of alcohol, and took no action to do so pursuant to their verbalized intent to monitor, which was communicated only to their son.

The plaintiffs sought damages for wrongful-birth and negligent infliction of emotional distress, based on medical-provider defendants' failure to inform them that their older child had a genetic mutation. They claim that they would not have conceived a second child if they had been given correct information. The trial court held that damages available in a wrongful-birth action do not include the extraordinary costs of caring for a disabled child after he reaches the age of majority. The appellate court held that plaintiff parents in a wrongful-birth case may recover damages for the cost of caring for their dependent,disabled, adult child and that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded, noting a question of fact concerning when the limitations period began to run. The court affirmed the holding that the plaintiffs have a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress; the "zone of danger" test does not apply when damages for emotional distress are an element of another tort. The court reversed and reinstated the judgment that plaintiffs may not recover damages for the postmajority expenses of caring for their son; damages incurred after the age of majority are incurred by the child, who suffered no legal harm.

Phoenix Insurance Company ("Phoenix") filed a complaint in circuit court rejecting the arbitration award given to appellee when she requested coverage under the underinsured-motorist provisions of her policy with Phoenix after she was injured in a car accident and the other driver's vehicle was underinsured. At issue was whether a provision allowing either party to an insurance contract to demand a trial de novo following arbitration was unenforceable when it appeared in an underinsured-motorist policy. The court held that the provision in appellee's underinsured-motorist policy allowing either party to reject an award over the statutory minimum for liability coverage did not violate public policy and was not unconscionable.