Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff suffered injuries in a collision with Jolene Wright, who was employed by South Central Community Action Program, Inc. Plaintiff and South Central's liability insurer attempted to settle, but settlement efforts failed. Plaintiff later sued Wright and South Central for personal injury damages. Defendants asserted the affirmative defense that South Central was a political subdivision subject to the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and that Plaintiff failed to comply with the ITCA notice requirement. The trial court granted summary judgment in Defendants' favor. Plaintiff appealed, citing several reasons to excuse his failure to comply with the notice requirements of the ITCA, including waiver, substantial compliance, agency, and estoppel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether South Central should be estopped from asserting its ITCA notice defense. Remanded. View "Schoettmer v. Wright" on Justia Law

After a police officer rear-ended Plaintiff's vehicle, Plaintiff submitted a tort claim notice to the City of Indianapolis. Plaintiff and her husband subsequently filed a complaint against the City and the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, alleging Plaintiff suffered personal injuries as a direct result of the police officer's negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The City appealed, arguing that Plaintiff's tort claim notice did not substantially comply with the requirements of the Indiana Tort Claims Act because, on the form, Plaintiff stated that she suffered no injuries from the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's notice complied with the requirements of Ind. Code 48-8001; and (2) although the notice stated "no injuries," the statute as amended no longer requires any statement regarding injuries, and the legislature did not intend to penalize claimants for including information beyond what the statute requires. View "City of Indianapolis v. Buschman" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury awarded John Doe $150,000 in punitive damages as part of a judgment in Doe's lawsuit against a priest for childhood sexual abuse. The priest moved to reduce the punitive damages pursuant to the statutory cap. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the statutory cap and allocation statutes violated the State Constitution's separation of governmental powers provision and right to a jury trial in civil cases provision. The State subsequently intervened. In 2011, the trial court issued an order declaring that the statutory cap and allocation statutes violated the separation of powers and right to a jury trial. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statutes did not violate the Indiana Constitution. Remanded with instructions to grant the priest's motion to reduce the punitive damages to the statutory maximum. View "State v. Doe" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Katherine and Michael, were living together in a home that was destroyed by a fire in 1998. Seeking to rebuild their home, Michael and Katherine completed an application for property insurance with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. American Family issued the policy. In 2003, Plaintiffs' garage was destroyed in a fire, and Plaintiffs filed a claim with American Family. During follow-up investigations, Michael disclosed the 1998 fire to American Family. American Family, treating the prior fire loss nondisclosure as a misrepresentation, voided the insurance policy ab initio and denied Plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs filed suit against American Family claiming breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment for American Family. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the grant of summary judgment on grounds that American Family failed to return the premiums paid by Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' assignment of error was not properly before the Court on appeal. View "Dodd v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A steel fabrication company deposited solid waste on a landowner's property, after which the landowner (Plaintiff) filed a complaint seeking damages against multiple parties (Defendants) and on multiple grounds, including a claim for an environmental legal action (ELA). Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on his environmental legal action claim and sought to impose corporate liability on Defendants. Defendants filed cross motions for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims, except for his claim of negligence. The trial court denied Plaintiff's motions and granted Defendants' motions as to all claims, leaving for trial only Plaintiff's negligence claim and the claims of potential liability against Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that summary judgment was (1) not proper for either party on Plaintiff's ELA claim; (2) not proper for Defendants on Plaintiff's illegal dumping, fraud, nuisance, and trespass claims; (3) proper for Defendants on Plaintiff's unjust enrichment and intentional torts claims; (4) proper for certain defendants on Plaintiff's responsible corporate officer claim but improper as to others; and (5) proper for Plaintiff on his claims against one defendant as responsible corporate officer. View "Reed v. Reid" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff experienced dizziness and difficulty walking, she was admitted into a medical clinic (Clinic) and seen by the on-duty physician (Doctor). Doctor diagnosed Plaintiff with vertigo. Two days later, Plaintiff was unable to move her right arm or leg and was later diagnosed with having suffered a stroke. Defendant subsequently filed a complaint alleging negligence by Doctor and Clinic (collectively, Defendants) for the failure to diagnose a transient stroke. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1.25 million but denied Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest. The court thereafter denied Defendants' motion for a new trial based upon the cumulative effect of Plaintiff's counsel's alleged unprofessional conduct during the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendants' motion for a new trial, despite Plaintiff's counsel's dissatisfying behavior; and (2) denying the discretionary award of prejudgment interest. View "Wisner v. Laney" on Justia Law

After an automobile collision involving Driver, Plaintiff sued Driver. When Driver passed away, Plaintiff amended her complaint to substitute the Administrator of Driver's estate. A jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded her $210,000 in damages. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion asking the trial court to award her prejudgment interest pursuant to the Tort Prejudgment Interest Statute (TPIS). The trial court enied Plaintiff's motion because her damages were not ascertainable within a time frame that justified an award of prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the TPIS abrogates and supplants the common law prejudgment interest rules in cases covered by the statute; and (2) Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest should have been evaluated as provided in the statute and not on abrogated common law. Remanded for reconsideration of the motion. View "Kosarko v. Padula" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's vehicle was rear-ended by Driver's vehicle. Plaintiff sued Driver and settled with his insurer for $50,000, the maximum of Driver's automobile liability policy. Plaintiff then sought an additional $50,000 under her underinsured motorist (UIM) policy with State Farm. State Farm declined to award the requested amount. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $50,000. The trial court declined Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest pursuant to the Tort Prejudgment Interest Statute (TPIS). Plaintiff appealed the trial court's denial of her motion for prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the TPIS does apply to UIM coverage disputes; (2) because prejudgment interest is a collateral litigation expense, it can be awarded in excess of an insured's UIM policy limits; but (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to prejudgment interest because the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied her request for prejudgment interest. View "Inman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

At age four, B.O. was diagnosed with a mild form of cerebral palsy called spastic diplegia. Subsequently, his parents filed a complaint under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, claiming that the healthcare providers who attended B.O.'s birth were negligent. Shortly before trial, B.O.'s healthcare providers settled for a sum allowing B.O. to seek excess damages from the Indiana Patients Compensation Fund (PCF). B.O.'s parents then filed a petition for excess damages, after which the PCF disclosed five expert witnesses prepared to testify either that B.O. did not have spastic diplegia or that if he did, it did not result from the conduct of the healthcare providers at his birth. The parents then sought partial summary judgment seeking to limit the issue at trial, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PCF was precluded from disputing the existence or cause of B.O.'s claimed injury under Ind. Code 34-18-15-3(5). View "Robertson v. B.O." on Justia Law

A company hired an accounting firm to provide auditing services. During the years covered by the parties' agreement, an employee of the company committed fraud and theft, causing significant losses to the company. The company alleged negligence, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment against the accounting firm and demanded arbitration pursuant to the agreement. An arbitration panel found the accounting firm negligent and the company comparatively negligent. The company then filed the present suit, claiming the accounting firm committed deception because the documents the accounting firm produced during the arbitration were misleading. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the accounting firm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that issue preclusion barred the company's deception claim because the issue underlying the deception claim was the veracity of the documents produced at arbitration, which was necessarily decided by the arbitration panel. View "Nat'l Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP" on Justia Law