Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff co-established Company. Plaintiff later sold his majority interest pursuant to an agreement calling for payments to Plaintiff and giving Plaintiff a security interest in Company's assets. Company subsequently applied for credit with Bank, which transaction made Plaintiff's security interest in Company's assets subordinate to Bank's. Thereafter, Company went out of business, leaving loans unpaid. Plaintiff brought claims against Bank for negligence, constructive fraud, actual fraud, and tortious interference with a contract. The trial court granted Bank's motion for judgment on the evidence on all claims, including finding that Bank owed no duty to Purcell. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling as to the issues of duty but reversed the trial court's judgment on the evidence as to Purcell's remaining claims. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) there was not sufficient evidence presented in this case to withstand a motion for judgment on the evidence on Purcell's claims of fraud, deception, and tortious interference with a contract; and (2) Purcell's relationship with Bank as a subordinate creditor did not give rise to a duty of care required to prove Purcell's claims of negligence and constructive fraud.

Parents of a young man killed in a helicopter accident in British Columbia appealed an Indiana trial court's dismissal of their complaint in favor of the Canadian forum, arguing that their claim should be tried in Indiana because they would only be entitled to nominal damages under British Columbia law. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment after adopting the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, holding that British Columbia provided an available and adequate forum under applicable law, and the trial court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens.

At issue in this case was the Indiana Guest Statute (Statute), which prevents certain designated passengers from recovering damages for injuries resulting in ordinary negligence of the motor vehicle operator, where such passenger was "being transported without payment in or upon the motor vehicle." Son was traveling as a passenger in a motor vehicle operated by Father. When they arrived at their destination, Son exited the vehicle and began motioning for Father to drive forward into a parking space. Father then accidentally pinned Son between his vehicle and the next vehicle, resulting in injuries to Son. Son and his wife brought a damage action alleging negligence by Father. The trial court granted summary judgment to Father, finding that the Statute was applicable to the facts. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court, holding that, as to injuries inflicted when a passenger has exited the vehicle and is standing outside of it and directing the driver's attempt to park, the passenger is not "in or upon" the vehicle and thus is not precluded from bringing a negligence action against the driver.

Plaintiff claimed that her husband's death was caused by Defendant's negligence in installing or removing asbestos-containing materials and brought product-liability and contractor-negligence claims against Defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding (1) the application or removal of asbestos-containing products or asbestos-insulted equipment by a contractor is an improvement to real property, and (2) thus, the claim had not been brought within the time Indiana law requires for a claim arising from the construction of an improvement to real property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's work constituted an "improvement to real property," as that phase was commonly understood.

An employee of a concrete subcontractor was injured in a workplace accident during the construction of a stadium. The employee sought to recover damages for negligence from the project's construction manager by whom she was not employed but whom she contended had a legal duty of care for jobsite-employee safety. The trial court ruled in the employee's favor that the construction manager could be held vicariously liable for the actions of the subcontractor. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court, holding (1) the construction manager was not vicariously liable to the worker for any negligence of the subcontractor because the construction manager and subcontractor did not have the requisite relationship; and (2) the construction manager did not have, either by the terms of its contracts or by its actions, a legal duty of care for jobsite-employee safety, and therefore the construction manager could not be held liable to the employee for negligence. Remanded.

Several family members were injured in a car accident and divided the benefits paid by the tortfeasor's insurer. One family member, Hannah Lakes, also sought to recover under the underinsured motorist (UIM) endorsement of an insurance policy provided by Grange Mutual Casualty Company that applied to all the family members involved in the accident. The trial court granted Grange's motion for summary judgment, holding that the tortfeasor's vehicle was not underinsured because the per-accident limit of his policy was equal to the UIM coverage under the family members' policy. The Supreme Court reversed after reaffirming its decision in Corr v. American Family Insurance, holding that the tortfeasor's vehicle was underinsured because the amount actually paid to Lakes was less than the per-person limit of liability of the under-insurance endorsement.

Defendant Harold Klinker managed and owned Trucks Unlimited (Trucks), a used-car dealership. Plaintiff First Merchants Bank (FMB) financed Trucks' vehicle inventory. After it was discovered that thirty-one vehicles for which FMB had loaned purchase money were not in Trucks' possession, FMB filed an eight-count complaint against Klinker, Trucks, and others (only Klinker appealed), alleging fraud, among other claims. FMB moved for summary judgment on seven counts, but by then only twenty-two vehicles were missing. The trial court nevertheless granted summary judgment to FMB on all seven counts and awarded treble damages and attorney's fees on the fraud claims under the Indiana Crime Victims' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the fraud claims and treble-damages claims because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendant acted with the requisite criminal intent.

Plaintiff Maria Rosales filed this wrongful death action against LaPorte Community School Corporation after her son choked to death on food while eating lunch at his elementary school. The jury returned a $5 million verdict for Plaintiff, and judgment was entered in the sum of $500,000, the maximum amount then permitted under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The School Corporation appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in giving certain jury instructions. The Supreme Court granted transfer and agreed that the giving of the instruction, which could have reasonably been interpreted and applied by the jury in a way that substantially misstated Plaintiff's burden of proof with respect to establishing negligence on the part of the School Corporation, required reversal, but the error created by the instruction related only to the issue of liability and did not affect the jury's assessment of damages. Remanded for a new trial on the issue of liability only.

Appellant, R.L. Turner Corporation, filed suit against Appellee, the Town of Brownsburg. The court subsequently granted Appellee's petition for attorneys' fees. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant appealed, contending, principally, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order on fees because entering a final judgment terminates a trial court's jurisdiction and the order granting Appellee's motion to dismiss constituted a final judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in awarding the petition, and noting that jurisdictional concepts were the wrong analytical tool for determining whether an Indiana trial court's post-judgment action was a valid exercise of its authority.

The City of Kokomo terminated the employment of Mark Thatcher, a police officer, after Thatcher sustained a knee injury in the line of duty. Thatcher was a member of the 1977 Fund, a disability and pension fund for police officers. Thatcher began receiving disability benefits subsequent to his injury. After Thatcher's knee was repaired, he sought reinstatement to active duty. The City decided not to reinstate Thatcher, who was fifty years of age and had completed four years of service in the police department, based on Ind. Code 36-8-4-7(a). Thatcher brought claims in federal district court against the City and Kokomo Police Department (KPD) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. The Supreme Court accepted certification and held that the City correctly determined that Thatcher was statutorily prohibited from returning to the KPD, as (1) section 36-8-4-7(a) applies to a member of the 1977 Fund who is receiving disability benefits and who has been determined to have been recovered; and (2) the time period during which a person receives disability benefits does not count toward "years of service" as that term is used in section 36-8-4-7(a).