Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

While driving a sedan, Carol Shipley rear-ended Reginald Person's eighteen-wheeler. Person sued Shipley for injuries that he claimed he had sustained in the accident. During trial, the trial court admitted testimony of two experts retained by Shipley that opined that it was unlikely the accident caused Person's injuries. The jury later returned a defense verdict in favor of Shipley and awarded no damages to Person. Person appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it permitted Shipley's experts to testify that Person's lower-back injury was not likely caused by the rear-ending accident because the impact on Person's truck was minimal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the experts' testimony under Ind. R. Evid. 702 and in finding (1) the experts were qualified to offer their opinions, and (2) the experts' opinions were based on reliable scientific principles that could be applied to the facts at issue.

While operating a truck, Henry Bennett rear-ended John Richmond's vehicle. Richmond and his wife sued Bennett for injuries Richmond sustained in the collision. During trial, a psychologist testified that Richmond experienced a traumatic brain injury in the accident. The jury returned a judgment in favor of Richmond. Bennett appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it admitted the psychologist's causation testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the psychologist's causation testimony under Ind. R. Evid. 702 where (1) the psychologist was qualified to offer his opinion as to the cause of Richmond's brain injury, and (2) the psychologist's testimony was based on reliable scientific principles that could be applied to the facts at issue.

Robin Everhart filed suit against the Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund (PCF) to recover excess damages after settling a wrongful death claim against an emergency room physician in whose care her husband died. The PCF asked the trial court to reduce its award of damages to account for the twenty percent change that Robin's husband would have died anyway, even in the absence of the physician's negligence. The trial court declined to do so, awarding Robin the statutory maximum of $1 million in excess damages. The Supreme Court affirmed but on slightly different grounds, holding that the PCF was required to pay the statutory maximum in excess damages and was not entitled to a set-off because of how the trial court's peculiar findings of fact interacted with the rules for calculating a set-off.

After an automobile collision in which Travis Becker struck Rickey Whitaker, Whitaker filed suit for personal injuries. Thereafter, Whitaker's lawyer ignored repeated requests to provide information about his client's medical treatment, responded only after the trial court ordered him to do so, and then supplied false and misleading information in a way that damaged Becker's ability to ascertain the facts necessary to litigate the case. Becker's counsel filed a motion for sanctions. The trial court found that Whitaker and his lawyer had acted in bad faith and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding that the court acted within its discretion in making it clear to counsel that this type of behavior was unacceptable.

Players on a local youth soccer team sought to recover under the state youth soccer governing association's business auto-insurance policy for injuries sustained when the van in which they were riding was involved in an accident. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the association's insurance carrier. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that under the relevant insurance policy language, the rented van was not being used in the business of the association at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that because Castro was not using the automobile "in the business" of the association, a condition for coverage under the insurance policy at issue, the policy provided no coverage to the injured players.

Following the death of their full-term baby daughter in utero during labor, Plaintiffs brought an action against the hospital, the Plaintiffs' nurse-midwife, and the nurse-midwife's alleged employer for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court, holding (1) Plaintiffs' claims were not precluded by the Indiana Child Wrongful Death Act; (2) Plaintiffs were not precluded from maintaining an action for emotional distress under the bystander rule; and (3) Plaintiffs' actions were not barred by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. Remanded.

Plaintiff was injured by a golf ball at a golf outing. Plaintiff filed an action against four Defendants, her grandfather, the golfer who hit the ball that struck her, a tavern that promoted the event, and the operator of the golf course. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of each Defendant. Plaintiff appealed, claiming that genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment on her claims of general negligence, negligent supervision, and premises liability of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was a sports participant's liability to others. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the golfer and the golf course operator but reversed summary judgment as to the tavern and the grandfather, holding (1) a participant in a sporting event may owe a duty of care to protect others from inherent risks of the sport, and (2) summary judgment is proper due to the absence of breach of duty when the conduct of a sports participant is within the range of ordinary behavior of participants in the sport and therefore is reasonable as a matter of law.

Plaintiff, the executor of a decedent's estate, settled medical malpractice claims against several medical care providers for the decedent's wrongful death. Plaintiff then initiated this action against Defendant, the Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund, for damages that exceeded the $250,000 future value of her settlement with the medical providers pursuant to the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. The trial court awarded Plaintiff the full amount. Defendant appealed, challenging the trial court's ruling that damages under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS) included expenses of administration, contingent attorney fees, and loss of services. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that such damages may be sought under the AWDS.

Jacob Gordon's mother sued Howard Community Hospital, alleging it committed medical malpractice while caring for her newborn son. In another count of the complaint, the mother sought separate damages for spoliation, alleging that the hospital had lost certain medical records associated with Gordon's care and that this loss made it impossible for Gordon to pursue a medical malpractice claim against one of his doctors, who was also a defendant. The trial court granted the Gordons partial summary judgment with respect to the third-party spoliation claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and reversed the grant of partial summary judgment, holding that because the Court had so far declined to recognize a count alleging spoliation as representing a separate cause of action, the hospital was entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Remanded.

After sustaining serious injuries from an attack by a rottweiler, six-year-old Shawn Davis, through his mother as his next friend, filed a complaint against defendants Animal Control and the City of Evansville for failing to protect Davis from the attack. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that defendants were entitled to law enforcement immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). The court of appeals reversed, and defendants sought transfer. At issue was whether defendants were enforcing a law under the ITCA or rather failing to follow their own procedures for determining whether an animal is dangerous. The Supreme Court held that the alleged failure of defendants to follow their procedures constituted at worst a failure to enforce a law, for which defendants were immune from liability under the ITCA. Judgment of the trial court affirmed.