Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked as a service dog trainer but was not disabled. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Drake University Law School, where she was a student, alleging that Drake barred her from bringing with her a dog she was training into the classroom and to another event in violation of Iowa Code 216C.11(2). The district court granted Drake’s motion to dismiss after applying the four-factor test adopted from Cort v. Ash for determining whether an Iowa statute provides an implied private right of action, concluding that section 216C.11(2) creates no private enforcement action. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that, under an application of the Cort factors, section 216C.11(2) does not provide a service dog trainer with a private right to sue. View "Shumate v. Drake Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, filed a lawsuit against the City of Ottumwa alleging that the City negligently managed storm water by approving a development. Plaintiffs alleged this action caused flooding to their downstream home. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs and awarded Plaintiffs damages of $84,400. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by denying the City’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as there was not substantial evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that the City’s negligence caused Plaintiffs’ damages, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support submitting the case to the jury. View "Garr v. City of Ottumwa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of BNSF Railway Company, was injured due to the railroad’s negligence. Because of his injury, Plaintiff was no longer able to work at his job. Plaintiff, who was almost fifty-nine years old, sued BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) seeking $755,000 in economic damages, claiming that he planned to work until he was sixty-six years old. BNSF, in turn, attempted to introduce evidence that Plaintiff was eligible to retire on full benefits at age sixty and that most railroad employees in Plaintiff’s position retire at age sixty. The district court excluded the railroad’s evidence based on its reading of the federal collateral source rule applicable to FELA cases. A jury subsequently awarded $1.25 million, including pain and suffering, to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages, holding (1) when a railroad employee makes a claim of lost earning capacity based on a hypothetical retirement age, federal law does not bar the introduction of evidence as to when railroad employees in the plaintiff’s position typically retire; and (2) BNSF was improperly precluded from presenting this excluded statistical evidence, and the error was not harmless. View "Giza v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s truck was stopped at a red light when it was struck by Defendant’s car. Defendant saw the red light but claimed she didn’t see Plaintiff’s car. Later testing confirmed that Defendant had suffered a stroke that caused a partial loss of vision. During a jury trial, the district court allowed Defendant’s treating neurologist to testify that the stroke preceded the accident and submitted the defense of sudden emergency. The jury found Defendant was not negligent. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding (1) the evidence supported a defense of legal excuse, but (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on sudden emergency. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Defendant’s medical expert to testify; (2) the evidence was sufficient to submit a legal excuse defense based on Defendant’s sudden medical emergency; and (3) any error in the wording of the sudden emergency instruction was harmless. View "Hagenow v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Defendant, a financial advisor to Decedent, was sued by identified beneficiaries of Decedent’s signed written estate plan. The beneficiaries alleged that Defendant was negligent in the performance of his duties, and therefore, the beneficiaries did not receive what they were supposed to receive under the plan. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Defendant, a non-attorney, owed no duty to the beneficiaries. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment entered against plaintiff Steve Bristol and his spouse, holding that Bristol was owed a duty by Defendant and that Bristol raised a genuine of material fact as to whether Defendant’s negligent performance of his agency responsibilities caused Bristol not to receive a specific devise set forth in Decedent’s will; and (2) affirmed the judgment with respect to the charitable recipient plaintiffs, as their damages were too speculative to establish damages. View "St. Malachy Roman Catholic Congregation of Geneseo, Ill. v. Ingram" on Justia Law

The parties in this case, William and Steven Burkhalter, were the sons of Louis Burkhalter. William challenged an unfavorable modification of Louis's revocable trust that occurred just before Louis's death, claiming (1) Steven unduly influenced Louis and tortiously interfered with the trust, and (2) Louis lacked the necessary testamentary intent when he made the modification. The district court directed a verdict for Steven on the tortious interference claim, and the jury returned a verdict for Steven on the testamentary capacity and undue influence claims. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial on the undue influence claim, concluding that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on undue influence, and the error prejudiced William. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury verdict on the undue influence claim, holding that the district court's instruction accurately reflected the law of undue influence and did not unduly emphasize the causation element of the undue influence claim. View "Burkhalter v. Burkhalter" on Justia Law

In the underlying action, Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Defendants, the State, and a volunteer driver for the Iowa Department of Human Services. The Supreme Court held that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment under the statute of limitations and the volunteer-immunity provisions of the Iowa Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff subsequently filed this malpractice action against her attorney (Attorney) in the underlying case. The jury returned a verdict finding Attorney was negligent and that his negligence caused damage to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal and reversed on cross-appeal, holding (1) the driver's volunteer immunity did not preclude the State's respondeat superior liability for Attorney's negligence, and therefore, Plaintiff's legal malpractice claim against Attorney did not fail because she could have recovered in the underlying case had the claim been timely filed; (2) Attorney could not reduce the malpractice-damage award by the contingent fee he would have taken if the underlying action had been successful because he did not earn the fee and because Plaintiff must pay new counsel who prosecuted the malpractice action; and (3) Plaintiff was entitled to interest running from the date by which her underlying action should have been tried, absent Attorney's negligence. View "Hook v. Trevino" on Justia Law

Defendant was the driver in an accident that resulted in the deaths of Mark Empen and Lindsay Gibbs. Defendant entered into civil settlement agreements with the estates of Empen and Gibbs. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to two counts of homicide by vehicle. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment and ordered Defendant to pay restitution to the victims' families. Several years later, Defendant applied for an order stating he had satisfied his restitution obligation, arguing that the settlement amounts paid to the victims' estates should be set off against the restitution amounts he was ordered to pay the families. The district court denied the applications. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to a setoff for the settlement payments made to each estate. View "State v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendants, county and municipal officials, alleging that he was wrongfully assaulted and arrested by certain law enforcement officers and deputies. The district court concluded that Defendants were entitled to immunity because they were acting on behalf of the state in an official capacity and that the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA) barred Plaintiff's claims for assault, battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that any immunity conferred by the ITCA did not protect Defendants from being sued under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), which applies to political subdivisions and their employees, and that the IMTCA does not bar claims for assault, battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. Remanded. View "Thomas v. Gavin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was terminated from his employment as dean of students and vice president of student services at the University of Iowa by the University's president, Sally Mason, after a report from the Stolar Partnership (Stolar), a law firm retained by the Board of Regents (Regents) to investigate the University's response to a sexual assault of a student athlete by other student athletes, came out highly critical of Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the University, Mason, the Regents, and Stolar for wrongful termination and related causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in denying Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery of written communications between Stolar and the Regents based on its finding that the attorney-client privilege protected the communications from disclosure; and (2) in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff's various claims. View "Jones v. Univ. of Iowa" on Justia Law