Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants, residential landlords, after Plaintiff slipped and fell on the premises while visiting her son, who leased an apartment from Defendants. After a jury trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the district court erred in excluding Plaintiff's proposed instructions informing the jury of a landlord's obligations under the lease agreement and under Iowa Code 562A.15(1)(a)-(d). The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the legal concepts contained in Plaintiff's requested instructions were adequately embodied in other instructions given by the district court. View "Crawford v. Yotty" on Justia Law

While accompanying students on a field trip to a dairy farm, a chaperone (Plaintiff) was injured when she fell through a hole in the floor of a hayloft. Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against the dairy farm's owners (Defendants). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Iowa's recreational use statute barred Plaintiff's claims. The court of appeals agreed that Defendants' property was covered by the recreational use statute, that Plaintiff was engaged in a recreational purpose, and that Defendants had not willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, but the court found that Plaintiff could still maintain a suit against Defendants as tour guides. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the judgment of the district court, and remanded, holding (1) recreational use immunity did not extend to Defendants because Plaintiff was not engaged in a recreational purpose within the scope of the statute; but (2) Plaintiff had not raised a material issue of triable fact as to whether Defendants willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against the presence of the hole. View "Sallee v. Stewart" on Justia Law

After a contentious divorce from his ex-wife, Beth Weier, Scott wrote a memoir called Mind, Body and Soul. The book discusses Scott's personal transformation following his divorce. Beth and her father, Gail Bierman, filed suit against Scott and Author Solutions, Inc. (ASI), the company that produced the book, for invasion of privacy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Scott and ASI (Defendants) filed motions for summary judgment, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly denied Scott's motion for summary judgment on all claims; but (2) as a bona fide book publisher, ASI should be considered a media defendant, and therefore, ASI was entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' libel and false light invasion of privacy claims because Plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient proof to establish a prima facie case under the established standards applicable to such defendants. View "Bierman v. Weier" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a home along the Cedar River. At the time, they were told, incorrectly, that the property was not in a special flood hazard area and that flood insurance would not be required as a condition of their loan. Plaintiffs received the same erroneous information when they refinanced their loan to pay for remodeling. Years later, their loan servicer was advised that the property actually was in a special flood hazard area. However, this information was not passed along to Plaintiffs until after their home had flooded and it was too late to buy flood insurance. Plaintiffs brought suit against the lender as well as the loan servicer. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part, finding a claim could potentially exist based on Restatement (Second) of Torts, 551(2); and (2) affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment. Remanded. View "Bagelmann v. First Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a trial court's entry of a default judgment under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.971(3) is justified when a party fails to appear personally for trial, but the party's attorney is present and able to proceed in the client's absence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's entry of default judgment due to Plaintiff's failure to appear personally at the time of his scheduled trial. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that because Rule 1.971(3) does not require a party to appear personally for trial, it was an abuse of discretion to enter a default judgment against Plaintiff when his counsel was present and able to proceed to trial on his behalf. View "Jack v. P & A Farms, Ltd." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to review a summary judgment ruling dismissing a wrongful death action because it was commenced later than is allowed under Iowa Code 614.1(9), a statute of repose limiting the time allowed for commencing medical negligence cases. Plaintiffs contended their case should not have been dismissed because Defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that a tissue specimen harvested from Plaintiffs' decedent more than six years before the filing of this action was not evaluated by a board-certified pathologist. In the alternative, Plaintiff contended the continuum-of-negligent-treatment doctrine precluded the summary dismissal of this case notwithstanding the statute of repose. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 614.1(9) in this case operated to extinguish the decedent's cause of action even before she and her husband knew it had accrued; and (2) under the the circumstances, the fraudulent-concealment doctrine and the continuum-of-negligent-treatment doctrine did not preserve Plaintiffs' causes of action, and section 614.1(9) denied Plaintiffs a remedy for negligent acts or omissions occurring more than six years prior to the commencement of this action.

In this case the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Iowa's workers' compensation statute allows a claimant to recover healing period benefits - after he had reached maximum medical improvement and returned to substantially similar work following a work-related injury - for a period of approximately thirteen weeks of postsurgical convalescence during which he was unable to work. The workers' compensation commission awarded such benefits, and the district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that Iowa Code 85.34(1) did not authorize the benefits under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court's judgment affirming the award, holding that section 85.34(1) did authorize an award of healing period benefits in this case.

At issue in this appeal was whether to judicially invalidate an insurance contract requirement that the insured file her lawsuit for underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) within two years of her auto accident. Plaintiff argued the deadline was unenforceable because, although she was still experiencing pain two years after the accident, only later did she discover the full extent of her injuries and realize her claim exceeded the other driver's liability limits. Plaintiff filed this UIM action against her insurer (Defendant) nearly six years after the accident. The district court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment enforcing the contractual deadline as reasonable. The court of appeals reversed, holding the two-year limitation period was unreasonable under the circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that the two-year UIM insurance policy deadline was enforceable as a matter of law because it matched the two-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code 614.1(2) for personal injury actions.

This case presented a battle between banks over the proceeds of the sale of cattle by a financially strapped borrower who had financial dealings with both banks. When Security Savings Bank (Security) obtained the proceeds of the sale, Peoples Trust and Savings Bank (Peoples) claimed a security interest in the proceeds and sued for conversion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Peoples. After Security appealed, Peoples commenced garnishment proceedings against Security to enforce its judgment, and Security paid the underlying judgment. The court of appeals then determined that Security had waived its right to appeal and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant faced with post-judgment garnishment does not waive a pending appeal by paying the judgment in order to avoid further enforcement proceedings; and (2) the district court correctly determined that Peoples had a security interest in the proceeds superior to Security's interest and that Peoples did not waive its superior position through its course of conduct.

In this real estate dispute, some of the defendants filed a motion for sanctions, alleging Defendant brought the action to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation. The district court ordered sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel for $1,000. The court of appeals affirmed the sanctions, ordering them payable to the jury and witness fund. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of the sanction at $1,000; (2) the court abused its discretion by ordering the sanction be paid to the jury and witness fund; and (3) given Rule 1.413(1)'s preference of compensating victims, the district court should enter an order requiring Plaintiff's counsel to pay the sanction in equal sums to the defendants who sought the sanction as partial reimbursement of the legal fees they incurred in defending against the unfounded claims brought against them. Remanded.