Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this workers compensation case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-510e(a)(2)(B) was unconstitutional on its face, holding that the statute is constitutional.Appellant was injured during his employment and filed for workers compensation benefits. A doctor rated Appellant's permanent partial impairment using the Sixth Edition of the American Medical Association Guides, as adopted by the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. See section 44-510e(a)(2)(B). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the statute's use of the Sixth Edition was unconstitutional on its face because it changed the essential legal standard for determining functional impairment. The Supreme Court reversed after construing the ambiguous statutory language to avoid the constitutional question, holding that the language of section 44-510e(a)(2)(B) referencing the Sixth Edition can reasonably be interpreted as a guideline rather than a mandate. View "Johnson v. U.S. Food Service" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Workers Compensation Board that clear and convincing evidence showed that an employee's impairment caused by marijuana consumption did not contribute to the employee's workplace accident, holding that sufficient evidence supported the Board's finding that it was "highly probable" that the employee's impairment did not contribute to his accident.Gary Woessner died after falling fifteen feet from a jobsite catwalk for an unexplained reason. Gary's employer, Labor Max Staffing, paid workers compensation benefits for his temporary total disability and for his treatment and care, but after he died, Labor Max stopped paying not he workers compensation claim. Carmen Woessner, Gary's widow, sought benefits. An administrative law judge ruled that Gary's injuries were not compensable because Carmen failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Gary's impairment caused by marijuana use did not contribute to his accident, injury, and death. The Board concluded that Gary's injuries were compensable and awarded the benefits, finding that, even if Gary was impaired, the impairment did not contribute to his accident. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board, holding that the drug test results were admissible and that the conclusively presumed impairment did not contribute to Gary's accident. View "Woessner v. Labor Max Staffing" on Justia Law

In this personal injury case arising from a bar fight at the San Lo Leyte VFW Post #7515 in Clyde, Kansas (VFW) between Plaintiff and a third party patron of the bar the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the district court's summary judgment in favor of the VFW, holding that there were still necessary questions of fact left unanswered, and therefore, summary judgment was not appropriate.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that despite the injury occurring off VFW-owned premises, the VFW's duty to protect Plaintiff from the assault, and the breach of that duty, arose while Plaintiff and the third party were still inside the bar. The court of appeals agreed, concluding that negligence could have arisen when all parties were on the VFW's premises. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that questions of fact existed regarding the foreseeability of Plaintiff's injury and whether a breach of duty occurred, precluding summary judgment. View "Hammond v. San Lo Leyte VFW Post #7515" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the order of the district court granting summary judgment for the State and Patrick Saleh, a highway patrol trooper, and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging negligence and vicarious liability, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed precluding summary judgment.Plaintiffs, Shelby Montgomery and Scott Bennett, sustained injuries when a Toyota driven by Robert Horton ran a red light and collided with Bennett's truck. Horton was being pursued by Saleh at the time of the collision. Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit, claiming that Saleh was negligent in failing to cease his pursuit of Horton prior to when he did and that the State was vicariously liable. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals reversed the district court's finding on proof of causation and remanded for trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Saleh breached the duty imposed by Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1506; and (2) a dispute existed as to whether Saleh's conduct was a cause in fact of Plaintiffs' injuries. View "Montgomery v. Saleh" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the application of the statutory scheme permitting an employer that has provided workers compensation benefits to an injured employee to obtain both a subrogation interest in any recovery the employee receives from a third party and a credit for future benefits, the Supreme Court held that the Workers Compensation Board used the improper method for determining the subrogation lien and the future credit.In Employee's third party negligence action, the jury decided both the fault of Employer and the measure of Employee's damages from his workplace injury. The Board applied the jury's finding of fault to Employee's settlement with one of several defendants in his negligence action to compute the reduction in Employer's subrogation lien and future credit for workers compensation benefits it provided or will provide to Employee. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) consistent with Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-504(b), Employer's credit for future benefits should have been determined using each annual settlement payment to Employee from one of the third-party defendants when the payment was received; and (2) the Board erred in aggregating those payments and relying on the total amount when Employee would not receive the last installment for twenty years. View "Hawkins v. Southwest Kansas Co-op Service" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reinstated the district court's award granting Plaintiff substitution benefits after a court of appeals panel held that married persons cannot be a provider or recipient of substitution services to each other, holding that Plaintiff was entitled to substitution benefits for the amount he promised to pay his wife for what she did resulting from Plaintiff's automobile accident.Insurer insured Plaintiff when he was injured in an automobile accident. When Plaintiff returned from the rehabilitation hospital, he and his wife agreed she would provide caregiver services for $25 a day. Plaintiff sought payment for personal injury protection (PIP) substitution benefits available to him under his policy, but Insurer refused. Litigation ensued, and the district court granted judgment for Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that an injured person's spouse is excluded from providing substitution services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-3103(w) does not expressly preclude Plaintiff's wife from providing substitution services simply because of her marital relationship with Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff incurred an obligation to pay his wife by entering into a contract with her to perform specific services for him that she would not otherwise have performed while Plaintiff convalesced; and (3) Plaintiff was entitled to PIP substitution benefits. View "Williams v. Geico General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals remanding this case with instructions to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Trust Company of Kansas (TCK) and reverse the jury's verdict finding TCK liable for negligent training, holding that the trial court's jury instructions were erroneous and that, therefore, the case must be remanded for a new trial on proper instructions.Marilyn Parsons sued TCK and its employee, Jon King, asserting various theories of liability. After a trial, the jury found JCK liable for negligent training and King liable for breach of fiduciary duty. The court of appeals reversed as to TCK, finding the evidence insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court's instructions failed to present the jury with an accurate statement of negligence law and improperly separated Parsons' negligence claim against TCK into two causes of action; and (2) the legal errors affected the verdict. View "Reardon v. King" on Justia Law

In this fee dispute between a hospital that provided medical services to an injured worker and a workers compensation carrier that paid the hospital less than the billed amount for those services the Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the Workers Compensation Appeals Board upholding a hearing officer's ruling in favor of the carrier, holding that the relief sought by the hospital and ordered by the court of appeals could not be granted in this proceeding.In ruling in favor of the carrier, the hearing officer held that the carrier had appropriately paid the amount required by the schedule for maximum medical fees established by the director of the Division of Workers Compensation. The Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Board's enforcement of the maximum medical fee schedule was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the applicable fee limiting provision had been accidentally created. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the issue of the rulemaking by the director, and the results of any accidental rulemaking, were not properly before the Board; and (2) the Board's refusal to expand the parameters of the fee dispute statute was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. View "Via Christi Hospitals Wichita, Inc. v. Kan-Pak, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the district court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the City of Overland Park, holding that dismissal was improper on that ground that Plaintiffs would not be able to show that the City and its police officers owed them an individual duty and based on discretionary function immunity under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA).In their petition Plaintiffs alleged that several armed representatives of defendant C-U-Out Bail Bonds, LLC forcibly entered the private residence occupied by Plaintiffs and that police officers withdrew from the scene, leaving Plaintiffs alone and at the mercy of the armed representatives. Plaintiffs sued C-U-Out and the City, alleging as against the City "negligent failure to protect." The district court dismissed the City as a defendant, ruling that Plaintiffs failed to state a valid cause of action. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to support (1) potential intentional illegal conduct on the part of the bail bondsmen, (2) a police undertaking of a duty to investigate owed to Plaintiffs individually, and (3) no discretionary function immunity for the City under the KTCA. View "Williams v. C-U-Out Bail Bonds, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging that his transfer was retaliatory, holding that the common-law tort of retaliation may be premised on an employer's action short of dismissal or demotion.Plaintiff, a Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) trooper, alleged that the KHP retaliated by requiring him to move across the state to keep his job after the Kansas Civil Service Board ordered the agency to reinstate him to work. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed, although the lower courts disagreed as to inquiries at issue on this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding (1) common-law retaliation may be premised on the involuntary job relocation alleged in this case; (2) sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiff's claim; but (3) there were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. View "Hill v. State" on Justia Law