Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was the only child of Susan Shore. Susan and her children were beneficiaries of the Shore Family Trust. After Susan died, Plaintiff sued Defendant, the trustee of the trust, alleging (1) Defendant sold the farmland that formed the principal of the of the trust and distributed the proceeds to himself for his personal use, and (2) Plaintiff was unaware of Defendant's actions until within two years before filing suit. Plaintiff's complaint claimed breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and constructive fraud. The district court dismissed the action, finding that the applicable statues of limitations and repose barred all of Plaintiff's claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that three of four of Plaintiff's causes of action were time barred, but his claim based on constructive fraud survived. Remanded. View "Hemphill v. Shore" on Justia Law

Kody Bicknell sought review of a court of appeals decision permitting Tammy Anderson to pursue punitive damages in her lawsuit against him after Bicknell rear-ended Adamson's vehicle at a train crossing. The punitive damages claim was based, in part, on Bicknell's drug use prior to the collision. Bicknell also appealed from the panel's decision permitting Adamson to submit medical bill write-offs to the jury. On the punitive damages issue, the Supreme Court (1) agreed with the panel's decision that the district court set a higher burden of proof for the punitive damages claim than statutorily necessary by requiring that Adamson provide what would amount to scientific evidence of Bicknell's impairment resulting from his consumption of drugs; (2) concluded that the panel erred in deciding the district court should have permitted Adamson to amend for punitive damages based on the evidence as the panel perceived it; and (3) remanded for rehearing on that issue and application of the proper legal standard. On the medical bill write-off question, the Court held that the court of appeals erred in reaching the merits because the issue was not preserved for appeal. View "Adamson v. Bicknell" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into an oral agreement with his sister, Defendant, for the bailment of farm animals and farm equipment on her land. After their cooperative effort to breed horses broke down, Defendant sold her farm and the horses. Plaintiff subsequently retrieved most of his equipment from the farm and sued Defendant for conversion and breach of the bailment contract. Defendant counterclaimed for the expenses of maintaining the equipment and caring for the horses. The district court awarded no damages. The court of appeals affirmed the rulings against Plaintiff but found the district court erred in denying sanctions against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs' action in tort was not barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the district court erred by rejecting Plaintiff's claim for conversion; (3) the court of appeals correctly found that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to award attorney fees as a sanction, but the question of attorney fees was remanded to the district court for determining the amount of fees to be awarded. View "Schoenholz v. Hinzman" on Justia Law

In 2007, Defendant accidentally released about 90,000 gallons of crude oil into floodwaters of a river in Coffeyville. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed an action in federal court alleging the oil spill damaged their pecan grove. Plaintiffs asserted a statutory right to recover damages under Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-6203. Defendant argued Plaintiffs' claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-513(a)(4). Plaintiffs contended they timely filed their action under the three-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-512(2). Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that section 65-6203 creates an "absolute" liability different in kind than the strict liability doctrine applied under Kansas common law, and therefore, the three-year limitation period applied. The federal district court certified two questions to the Kansas Supreme Court, which answered by holding (1) section 65-6203 imposes liability for an accidental release or discharge of materials detrimental to the quality of the waters or soil of the state that differs from the Kansas common-law strict liability standard; and (2) the three-year statute of limitations in section 60-512(2) applies to actions brought under section 65-6203. View "Eastman v. Coffeyville Res. Ref. & Mktg." on Justia Law

Tim Lilley leased pastureland adjacent to Mark and Janis Evanson's property. Lilley started a fire on the pastureland that spread to the Evensons' property, destroying the outbuildings on the property and around 200 trees. Lilley stipulated that he was at fault for the fire and the resulting damage. The district court held that the measure of damages was the difference in the fair market value of the property before and after the fire. The court awarded damages in the amount of $4,687 for the loss in value of the property. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court and court of appeals incorrectly attempted to superimpose principles of temporary and permanent damages on the facts of this case; but (2) the lower courts' conclusions were nonetheless correct, and the district court did not err in relying on a diminished-value calculation of property loss. View "Evenson v. Lilley" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Hughes was the driver in a one-car accident that killed one passenger and injured two others. At the time of the accident, the four were traveling together to work on a drilling crew for employer Duke Drilling. The two injured passengers and the common law wife of the deceased passenger brought civil suits against Hughes. After a jury trial, Hughes was found to be negligent. Because the jury found Hughes was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, the trial court concluded Hughes was not covered by a fellow servant immunity under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the travel in which Hughes was engaged on the morning of the accident was an intrinsic part of Hughes' job, and thus, Hughes was within the course and scope of his employment; and (2) therefore, Hughes was entitled to fellow servant immunity, and Plaintiffs' civil lawsuits against him were barred.

After allowing discovery on the issue of whether Kansas courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over some of the defendants in this case, the district court granted defendant Tel-Instrument Electronics Corp.'s (TIC) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. At issue on interlocutory appeal was the correct standard for judging a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction when that motion is decided after discovery but without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) plaintiff Aeroflex Wichita, as the party with the ultimate burden of establishing jurisdiction and as the party responding to a motion to dismiss presented to the court without an evidentiary hearing, need only establish a prima facie basis for jurisdiction; (2) in determining if that prima facie burden has been met, a district court should view factual disputes in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and an appellate court applies the same standard de novo; and (3) in this case, the district court erred erred by weighing the evidence rather than granting all favorable inferences to Aeroflex, and Aeroflex presented a prima facie case of jurisdiction based on a conspiracy between TIC and its codefendants, over whom the court had jurisdiction.

Homeowners sued Contractor for, inter alia, breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and fraudulent concealment, claiming that Contractor negligently failed to perform contractually required work. The district court granted summary judgment in Contractor's favor on all claims. As to the negligence allegations of interest in this appeal, the district court held (1) the economic loss doctrine prevented Homeowners from bringing a tort action under circumstances governed by contract, and (2) the economic loss doctrine supplied an additional bar to Homeonwers' fraud claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal to decide whether the economic loss doctrine barred any negligence claims. The Court reversed, holding that the doctrine should not apply in this case where (1) existing caselaw establishes that homeowners' claims against residential contractors may be asserted in tort, contract, or both, depending on the nature of the duty giving rise to each claim; and (2) rationales upholding the economic loss doctrine do not support its adoption for disputes between homeowners and their contractors. Remanded.

In the garnishment action below, Plaintiffs sought to collect the consent judgments they had previously obtained in settlement of their tort actions against Americold Corporation, which was insured by Northwestern Pacific Indemnity Company (NPIC). NPIC, the garnishee in the instant action, appealed the district court's adverse rulings, contending that the underlying judgments against Americold had become dormant and extinguished, thus depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with this garnishment action. Finding in favor of NPIC on that issue, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when the district court entered its judgment against NPIC in this garnishment proceeding, Plaintiffs' underlying consent judgments against Americold had been extinguished by operation of the dormancy and revivor statutes; (2) because Americold was not legally obligated to pay an unenforceable judgment, NPIC was no longer indebted to Americold under its contract to pay the judgments for which Americold was legally liable; and (3) accordingly, without an indebtedness from NPIC to Americold, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant Plaintiffs judgment against NPIC in a garnishment proceeding. Remanded with directions to dismiss these garnishment proceedings.

The Taranto Group contracted with two outside vendors to send out advertising via facsimile transmissions on its behalf. It was later calculated that at least 5,000 transmissions were made in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). A doctor brought an action individually and as a class representative against the Taranto Group, seeking damages and injunction relief under the TCPA and tort damages for conversion. A professional corporation then sought to intervene as an additional class representative. The district court issued an order certifying the proposed class and, in an amended order, certified the order for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that class certification was appropriate in this case, holding, among other things, that the district court (1) correctly found the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating that they met the statutory requirements for class certification, (2) properly determined that a class action in this case was superior to individual small claims actions, and (3) properly concluded that a class action would avoid inconsistent adjudications.