Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Anthony Stapleton committed suicide while he was incarcerated in the Shawnee County Adult Detention Center. Plaintiffs, including the administratrix of Stapleton's estate, filed suit against Defendants, Shawnee County, a detention center guard, and an assistant shift supervisor at the detention center, alleging negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants breached a duty of care, and (2) even if Defendants breached their duty of care, they were immune from suit under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA). The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the guard and shift supervisor were not entitled to summary judgment, and (2) Defendants were not entitled to KTCA immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment as (i) the guard and supervisor owed a duty of reasonable care to Stapleton and breached that duty, and (ii) the County was alleged to be vicariously liable for the guard's and supervisor's negligence; and (2) the discretionary function under KTCA was not applicable to immunize Defendants from liability for negligence in this lawsuit.

In 2004, Plaintiff sued Defendant, a doctor, alleging negligence. Attorney Scott Mann represented Plaintiff, and an attorney from Bretz Law Offices allegedly agreed to assist as co-counsel. The district court judge granted Defendant's motion to disqualify the Bretz firm and Mann from continued representation of Plaintiff because an associate at Defendant's attorney's firm had left there and gone to work for the Bretz firm. In 2009, Mann entered his appearance for Plaintiff in district court. The district judge granted Defendant's motion to disqualify Mann. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district judge abused his discretion in extending the 2004 imputed disqualification of the Bretz firm to Mann because (a) there was no substantial competent evidence to support the legal conclusion that Mann must also be subject to imputed disqualification, and (b) the district judge failed to conduct an appropriate legal analysis of whether Mann was part of the Bretz firm; (2) the district judge's imputed disqualification of the Bretz firm in 2004 exerted no preclusive effect in the 2009 dispute over Mann's status; and (3) Mann was not subject to disqualification in 2009 because he was not likely to be a necessary witness on causation.

Progressive Products, Inc. (PPI) filed a four-count complaint in district court against Defendants, former employees of PPI, on various theories alleging Defendants misappropriated protected trade secrets. The trade secrets at issue were a formula, computerized customer lists, and a computerized pricing program. The district court entered judgment for PPI, holding that Defendants misappropriated protected trade secrets possessed by PPI. The court then imposed a royalty injunction on Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) PPI owned protected trade secrets relating to the formula, (2) the price lists were not trade secrets as a matter of law, (3) no evidence supported a finding the customer lists were a trade secret, and (4) the royalty injunction was not supported by the district court's factual findings and did not comport with the available statutory remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment regarding the protected trade secrets but reversed the court of appeals' opinion reversing the remedy the district court ordered, holding that because the district court's findings were incomplete, they did not permit meaningful appellate review. Remanded.

At issue here was a reserved question in Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators of whether Kansas would recognize the tort of intentional interference with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence if a defendant or potential defendant in an underlying case destroyed evidence to their own advantage. Plaintiff Superior Boiler Works brought suit against Defendants, a company and two individuals, for intentional and negligent interference with actual and prospective actions by destruction of evidence. Defendants had destroyed company records after Superior sought information for use in asbestos-related litigation regarding asbestos content in materials Superior supplied to Defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, finding (1) Defendants had no duty to preserve the records, and (2) the reserved question in Koplin did not apply to spoliation claims between those who are potential codefendants in the underlying action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) simply being in the chain of distribution of a product or in the stream of commerce, without more, is not a special relationship that gives rise to a duty to preserve evidence, and (2) an independent tort of spoliation will not be recognized in Kansas for claims by a defendant against codefendants or potential codefendants.

Shelly Herrell filed suit against National Beef Packing Company to recover for a knee injury she suffered while working in its plant as an independent contractor, alleging negligence in maintaining a dangerous condition and failing to warn of a dangerous condition. The district court denied National Beef's motion for summary judgment and motion for judgment as a matter of law on the duty issue, and the jury entered a verdict in favor of Herrell. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of National Beef, holding that Herrell's remedy was limited to workers compensation because National Beef did not maintain substantial control over Herrell's employer's activities on the premises. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly denied judgment as a matter of law to National Beef because National Beef owed Herrell a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances; and (2) the inclusion in the jury instruction a description of an OSHA regulation, with no opportunity for the jury to differentiate any liability based upon it in the general verdict form, polluted the trial of the case and necessitated reversal. Remanded.

Plaintiff Gabriel Gaumer filed suit against Rossville Truck and Tractor Company, alleging negligence and strict liability for injuries caused by a used hay baler purchased from Rossville. The district court granted Rossville's motion for summary judgment on both the negligence and strict liability claims. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision regarding Gaumer's negligence claim but reversed on his strict liability claim. Rossville petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court granted the petition on the single issue of whether strict liability can be applied to a seller of used goods. After analyzing both the state's common law and the Kansas Product Liability Act, the Court held that sellers of used product are subject to strict liability in Kansas. The decision of the district court was therefore reversed, and the decision of the court of appeals was affirmed. Remanded.

Judith Berry brought negligence and consumer protection claims against defendants National Medical Services and Compass Vision after her urinalysis tests conducted as part of Berry's participation in the Kansas Nurses Assistance Program (KNAP) showed positive results, which meant Berry tested positive for substance abuse in violation of Berry's KNAP agreement. Berry claimed Defendants were negligent in designing, implementing, promoting, and managing their testing protocol and that Defendants knew that because she was a participant in KNAP, her nursing license would be in jeopardy if she tested positive. The district court dismissed Berry's petition with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court of appeals reversed on the negligence claim, finding that Berry was a foreseeable plaintiff, that the probability of harm was foreseeable, and that there was no public policy against imposing a duty on Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Berry was a foreseeable plaintiff and the probability of harm was foreseeable; and (2) there was no public policy to extend protection to Defendants simply because they contracted with a government agency. Remanded.

Twenty years before the current dispute arose, Cory Saylor, who worked for Westar Energy, injured his left knee on the job. More recently, Saylor underwent knee replacement surgery. On March 28, 2006, after the surgery, Saylor served a notice of intent and written claim on Westar seeking workers compensation benefits. The ALJ awarded Saylor seventy-four weeks of permanent partial disability compensation. The Workers Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, inter alia, that Saylor's date of injury was the date he provided notice to Westar on March 28, 2006. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board and court of appeals correctly interpreted and applied Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-508(d) as it was written, which resulted in the assignment of March 28, 2006 as Saylor's date of accident; (2) there was substantial competent evidence to support the Board's finding that Westar had knowledge of Saylor's work-related injury before the surgery and that Westar refused or neglected to provide medical treatment for that injury, and therefore, the application of Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-510j(h) was triggered, rendering Westar liable for the cost of Saylor's knee replacement surgery.

Employee injured his back before beginning work as a service technician for Employer. While working for Employer, Employee experienced a sudden, severe increase of pain in his back. Employee eventually underwent surgery and, later, quit his job after several months of physical therapy. Before undergoing surgery, Employee filed an application for a hearing with the Division of Workers Compensation. The ALJ found Employee was injured during the course of his employment and entered an award for Employee. On review, the Kansas Workers Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed the ALJ and the Board, finding that Employee was precluded from compensation because his injuries were the result of the normal activities of daily living. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee was not engaged in the normal activities of day-to-day living when he reached for his tool belt or when he bent down to carry out a welding task. Accordingly, Employee's injury was covered by the Kansas workers compensation statute.