Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Kentucky Supreme Court

by
In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Paul Wesley Lewis and Ashland Hospital Corporation (KDMC) after finding that David Shackelford could not establish a prima facie case of negligence, holding that, contrary to the decision of the court of appeals, expert opinion evidence was required to establish causation. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Dr. Lewis and KDMC after determining that Shackelford could not establish a prima facie case of negligence. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the issue of causation in this case did not require expert medical testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the res ipsa loquitor exception did not apply to this case, and expert testimony was necessary; and (2) the proffered expert opinion evidence failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of causation. View "Ashland Hospital Corp. v. Lewis" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals in this interlocutory appeal from the denial of a judicial statements privilege in litigation between two physicians, holding that the matter at issue was beyond the parameters of appellate interlocutory jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct intended to damage Plaintiff's reputation and lure her patients to Defendant's medical practice. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting the protections of the judicial statements privilege for absolute immunity based on a previous medical malpractice action that both physicians were involved in. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals concluded that Defendant was immune from some, but not all, of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision, holding (1) the collateral order doctrine is a narrowly circumscribed exception to the final judgment rule; and (2) the judicial statements privilege is not a form of immunity, the denial of which allows for an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. View "Maggard v. Kinney" on Justia Law

by
In this wrongful death suit, the Supreme Court overruled Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1952), insofar as it holds a police officer cannot be the proximate or legal cause of damage inflicted on a third party by a fleeing suspect and adopted the majority rule that will allow juries to determine whether a pursuing officer's actions were a substantial factor in causing injury to a third party and apportion fault accordingly. Luiz Gonzales was killed when a criminal suspect crashed into Gonzales' vehicle during a high-speed chase initiated by a Scott County deputy sheriff. Gonzales' estate filed a wrongful death suit against the deputy sheriff and the county sheriff. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants based on Chambers and its per se no proximate cause rule. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that, applying the new standard announced today, the factual allegations in this case were sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the deputy sheriff negligently conducted his pursuit of the criminal suspect. View "Gonzalez v. Johnson" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court accepted the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky's request for certification of law on the following issue, holding that a pre-injury liability waiver signed by a parent on behalf of a minor child is unenforceable under the specific facts of this case. Mother purchased tickets at a for-profit trampoline park (Park) for her eleven-year-old daughter. Mother checked a box indicating that she had read the Park's waiver of liability. The daughter proceeded to participate in the Park's activities but was injured. Mother, as next friend of Daughter, sued the Park for the injury. The Park moved for summary judgment based on Mother's legal power to waive the rights of her daughter via the release. The district court then requested certification from the Supreme Court as to this novel issue of state law. The Supreme Court held (1) under the common law of this Commonwealth, absent special circumstances, a parent has no authority to enter into contracts on a child’s behalf; and (2) there is no relevant public policy to justify abrogating the common law to enforce an exculpatory agreement between a for-profit entity and a parent on behalf of her minor child. View "Miller v. House of Boom Kentucky, LLC" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the ALJ's determination that Appellant was not entitled to benefits pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342 in connection with his injury while working as a bus driver for Transit Authority of River City (TARC), holding that the ALJ's decision denying Appellant benefits was supported by substantial evidence. While operating a TARC bus Appellant was assaulted by a passenger, resulting in injuries. TARC denied Appellant's claim for benefits pursuant to the special defense provided in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.610(3), asserting that Appellant was the aggressor in the altercation and that he acted outside of the scope of his employment. After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ denied Appellant benefits. The Board and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination to deny benefits. View "Trevino v. Transit Authority of River City" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) affirming the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) denial of Appellant’s claim for benefits pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342, holding that the ALJ’s decision denying Appellant benefits was supported by substantial evidence. Appellant was injured while working as a bus driver for Transit Authority of River City (TARC). TARC denied Appellant’s claim for benefits pursuant to the special defense provided in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.610(3). TARC argued that Appellant’s injuries was the result of Appellant acting as the aggressor in an altercation with a passenger and that Appellant acted outside the scope of his employment. The ALJ denied benefits pursuant to section 341.610(3). The Board and the court of appeals determined that there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination to deny benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in denying benefits. View "Trevino v. Transit Authority of River City" on Justia Law

by
In this negligence action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court and court of appeals that Defendants were protected by the immunity doctrine, holding that Louisville Metro Housing Authority (LMHA) was a state agency entitled to the protection of governmental immunity and that LMHA’s employee performing discretionary acts was shielded by qualified official immunity. A three-year-old was shot and killed when his mother took him to visit Terrah Love at her apartment building and someone involved in a fued with Love came to the complex and began shooting. A stray bullet hit and killed the child. The mother sued LMHA, the owner and property management company of the apartments, and Juanita Mitchell, the property manager, for their failure to evict Love, alleging that they negligently caused the child’s death. The lower courts concluded that LMHA was shielded by governmental immunity and Mitchell was shielded by qualified official immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that both defendants were entitled to immunity. View "Bryant v. Louisville Metro Housing Authority" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff’s claim against the heirs of the Decedent seeking to enforce a judgment lien against real property owned by the Decedent at his death, holding that Plaintiff’s tort claim, which accrued prior to the date of death, made Plaintiff a creditor of the Decedent and his Estate. Plaintiff filed a tort action against the Decedent, who subsequently died, and judgment was entered for Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a judgment lien against the Estate’s property. In a separate action, Bank filed a foreclosure action seeking to enforce its mortgages against the Decedent’s real property. Plaintiff sought to intervene in the foreclosure action. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a claim because at the time of death, the Decedent’s real property immediately passed to his heirs at law, subject only to the claims of creditors, and that Plaintiff’s tort claim did not qualify him as a creditor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff became a creditor of the Decedent when the tort occurred, and the fact that the claim was reduced to judgment and a judgment lien filed postmortem had no impact on Plaintiff’s status as a creditor of the estate. View "Gregory v. Hardgrove" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court rendering a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on her tort action against Defendant, holding that the circuit court erred in giving jury instructions that failed to account for Plaintiff’s status and misstated the duty of care owed by Defendant. Plaintiff was Defendant’s mother and was injured while at Defendant’s house. Plaintiff slipped and fell on Defendant’s back deck, which was soapy and slick after Plaintiff mopped it. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and apportioned 100 percent of the fault upon Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s “ordinary care” instruction misstated the law of premises liability, and the error was not harmless because the instruction effectively removed the step of establishing the scope of the duty owed to Plaintiff as either a licensee or invitee and whether, based on her classification, Defendant breached her duty of care. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff’s personal injury action, holding that the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in their respective analyses of the matter as to whether Plaintiff’s status as a trespasser was mitigated by the attractive nuisance option. Plaintiff, who was sixteen years old at the time, was injured while a trespasser on Defendant’s construction site. Plaintiff, through his parents as next friends and natural guardians, filed this action alleging negligence based on attractive nuisance. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, noting Plaintiff’s age and his awareness of the dangers inherent in heavy construction equipment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of attractive nuisance was inapplicable to this situation, where Plaintiff, a minor trespasser, occupied the same position as an adult; and (2) the record contained no evidence that Defendants intentionally inflicted Plaintiff’s injuries by willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. View "Hayes v. D.C.I. Properties-D KY, LLC" on Justia Law