Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Officer Henry Volentine, a deputy of the Hardin County Office of Sheriff (HCOS), initiated a traffic stop of Maurice Green on October 14, 2014, after noticing Green's vehicle had an expired license plate belonging to a different vehicle. Green initially pulled over but then drove off, prompting Volentine to pursue him. During the pursuit, Volentine believed Green had committed assault and wanton endangerment by nearly hitting two pedestrians. The pursuit ended in a head-on collision with Susan Sheehy’s vehicle, leading to the present litigation.The Hardin Circuit Court denied Volentine’s and HCOS’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified and governmental immunity. The court found that Volentine did not have a reasonable basis to believe a violent felony had occurred to justify the pursuit and that his actions were not in good faith. The court also determined that Volentine violated ministerial duties by failing to terminate the pursuit when it posed an extreme safety hazard and by not obtaining approval from a supervisor to continue the pursuit.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Volentine was entitled to qualified official immunity and that HCOS was entitled to governmental immunity. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Volentine’s belief that he witnessed a felony was reasonable and that his actions during the pursuit were discretionary.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that Volentine was not entitled to qualified official immunity because he failed to abide by ministerial duties and lacked good faith in exercising his discretion to initiate the pursuit. Consequently, HCOS’ governmental immunity was waived by operation of KRS 70.040. The case was remanded to the Hardin Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "SHEEHY V. VOLENTINE" on Justia Law

Jaime Morales, a Sheriff’s Deputy with the Scott County Sheriff’s Office, was shot and paralyzed during a law enforcement operation to apprehend a bank robbery suspect in September 2018. Morales filed a negligence suit against several employees of the City of Georgetown and the Georgetown Police Department, alleging that their actions led to his injuries. The case centers on whether the government defendants are immune from suit.The Scott Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that they were immune from Morales’s claims. The court found that Officer Joseph Enricco and Lieutenant James Wagoner were entitled to qualified official immunity for their discretionary actions, and that the City and the Georgetown Police Department were immune from vicarious liability and negligence claims.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some of Lt. Wagoner’s actions were ministerial and not protected by qualified official immunity. The court also found that the City and the Georgetown Police Department could be held vicariously liable for Lt. Wagoner’s ministerial actions and directly liable for their own negligence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. The court held that Officer Enricco’s decision to fire his weapon was discretionary and protected by qualified official immunity. However, it found that Lt. Wagoner had a ministerial duty to formulate a plan to apprehend the suspect and to enforce certain training requirements, making him potentially liable for negligence. The court also ruled that the City and the Georgetown Police Department could be held liable for Lt. Wagoner’s ministerial actions but were immune from direct negligence claims related to training and personnel selection. View "MORALES V. CITY OF GEORGETOWN, KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

On April 25, 2018, John Crawford stopped his tanker truck on the shoulder of Interstate 71 to remove loose dogs from the roadway. Kentucky State Trooper Michael Gonterman arrived to assist, parking his cruiser with flashing lights. Shortly after, three vehicles approached: a Nissan Altima, a box truck driven by James Baumhower, and a tractor trailer driven by Teddy Seery. Traffic slowed, and Baumhower swerved into the right lane to avoid the Altima, followed by Seery, who collided with Baumhower’s truck. The collision caused the box truck to flip and slide, pinning Crawford and knocking Gonterman off the bridge, resulting in severe injuries to Gonterman and Crawford’s death.The Henry Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, applying the Firefighter’s Rule, which bars claims by public employees injured while responding to specific risks inherent in their duties. The court found all three prongs of the rule met: the defendants were similarly situated to other drivers, Gonterman was responding to a specific risk, and the accident arose from that risk. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the defendants did not meet the first and third prongs, as they had no connection to the loose dogs and the accident was independent of the specific risk.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It clarified that the Firefighter’s Rule does not extend to independent and intervening negligence unrelated to the specific risk that necessitated the public employee’s presence. The court held that the negligence of Seery and Baumhower was independent of the hazard posed by the loose dogs, thus the rule did not bar Gonterman’s claims. The case was remanded to the Henry Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "WOOSTER MOTOR WAYS, INC. V. GONTERMAN" on Justia Law

The case involves the estate of Penny Ann Simmons, who passed away on July 19, 2018. Dianna Lynn Davenport was appointed as the personal representative of Simmons' estate by the Spencer District Court on September 11, 2018, with the order entered by the Spencer County Clerk on September 21, 2018. Davenport filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against Kindred Hospitals on September 20, 2019. Kindred argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations, which they claimed began when the judge signed the appointment order.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Kindred's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the lawsuit was indeed filed outside the statute of limitations. The court found that the statute of limitations began when the judge signed the order of appointment, as per KRS 395.105. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, referencing its own precedent in Batts v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, but invited the Supreme Court of Kentucky to review the issue.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that probate proceedings, including the appointment of a personal representative, are special statutory proceedings. Therefore, the procedural requirements of KRS 395.105, which state that the appointment is effective upon the judge's signing, prevail over the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also clarified that the one-year limitation period for filing claims, as set forth in KRS 413.180(1), begins at the time of the appointment, which is when the judge signs the order. Thus, Davenport's lawsuit was filed outside the permissible time frame, and the summary judgment in favor of Kindred was affirmed. View "DAVENPORT KINDRED HOSPITALS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Dakota Miller, was injured when a vehicle crashed into a business he was patronizing, located on property owned by T & J Land Co., LLC. Miller filed a lawsuit against T & J Land nearly two years after the incident, alleging negligence and seeking punitive damages. He claimed the property owner failed to protect patrons from such accidents.The Knox Circuit Court dismissed Miller's lawsuit, ruling it was untimely under the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims as per Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 413.140(1)(a). The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the two-year statute of limitations under the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) applied, as Miller was a victim of a motor vehicle accident.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the MVRA's two-year statute of limitations did not apply to Miller's premises liability claim against T & J Land. The Court reasoned that the MVRA is intended for claims involving the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles, which was not the nature of Miller's claim. The Court emphasized that Miller's lawsuit was fundamentally about premises liability, not a motor vehicle accident, and thus fell under the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reinstated the Knox Circuit Court's order of dismissal, concluding that Miller's claims were indeed time-barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. View "T & J LAND CO., LLC V. MILLER" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an incident that occurred during the 2018 Kentucky Derby. Joi Denise Roby and her husband were invited by Kyle McGinty to the backside stable area of Churchill Downs, a restricted area not open to the public. Roby, who had experience with horses, interacted with the horses in their stalls, including a stable pony named Henry. Henry, owned by Bradley Racing Stables and William Buff Bradley, was used to escort racehorses to and from the track, but was not actively engaged in this activity on the day of the incident. As Roby approached Henry in his stall, he lunged and bit her. Roby subsequently sued Bradley and Churchill Downs for breaching their duty to maintain a safe premises.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Bradley and Churchill Downs, holding that the Farm Animals Activity Act (FAAA) exemption did not apply to Churchill Downs because the stabling of a horse was a farm animal activity, not a horse racing activity. The court also ruled that Roby was a licensee because she conferred no benefit to Churchill Downs and no evidence in the record supported a breach of duty. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court orders granting summary judgment for Bradley and Churchill Downs, finding that the horse racing exemption applied because live racing was occurring, Roby was injured after being bitten by a horse located on the premises, and the horse was used to escort racehorses to and from the track.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the FAAA horse racing exemption did not apply to Roby's injuries. The court reasoned that while horse racing activities were occurring at Churchill Downs during the Kentucky Derby, neither Bradley, Churchill Downs, nor Roby were engaged in horse racing activities at the time Roby was bitten. The court also held that Louisville Metro Code of Ordinances § 91.028(A), which imposes liability for any personal injury caused by an animal, did not apply to Roby's injuries due to the FAAA's limitation of liability. View "Bradley Racing Stables, LLC v. Roby" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a car accident that occurred on November 4, 2015, involving Donna Powers and Fendol Carruthers, Jr. Carruthers was charged and pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Powers claimed to have sustained serious, permanent injuries from the crash. Carruthers was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) with a policy limit of $50,000. Powers began receiving Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits from her own insurance carrier, Kentucky Farm Bureau (KFB). The Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) imposes a two-year statute of limitations for tort actions arising from motor vehicle accidents. Powers received her last PIP payment on August 4, 2016, meaning any tort claim she wished to assert arising from her accident with Carruthers must have been filed by August 4, 2018.Powers filed a complaint in McCracken Circuit Court on April 3, 2018, asserting a negligence claim against Carruthers and an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim against KFB. However, Carruthers had died two years earlier in March 2016, unbeknownst to Powers or her attorneys. The case remained stagnant for the next year, with Powers failing to take any action to rectify the portion of her complaint that was a nullity against Carruthers. It wasn't until August 2019 that Powers successfully moved the district court to appoint the Public Administrator to act as Administrator of Carruthers’s Estate.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, which had dismissed Powers’s negligence claim against Carruthers, denied Powers’s motions for substitution and revival, denied Powers’s motion for leave to amend her complaint to raise a new claim, and granted summary judgment in favor of KFB. The court held that Powers’s claim against Carruthers was null, and her attempted claim against the Estate was untimely. Furthermore, Powers’s inability to recover from Carruthers or the Estate foreclosed her underinsured motorist claim against KFB. View "Powers v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case heard before the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the primary issue was whether the Breathitt Circuit Court correctly dismissed Teresa Spicer's lawsuit against James Combs for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Spicer's suit arose from damages linked to Combs' actions, following a fatal ATV accident which resulted in the death of Tiara Combs, James Combs’ wife and Spicer's daughter. Prior to the lawsuit, Combs and Spicer, as co-administrators of Tiara's estate, had signed a release settlement with Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, effectively absolving both Combs and Progressive of any further liability relating to the accident.After learning that Combs was intoxicated at the time of the accident, a fact he allegedly hid from her, Spicer sought to sue Combs personally for IIED. Combs moved to dismiss Spicer's complaint on the grounds that the previous release signed by Spicer barred her claim, and that her complaint did not meet the standard for an IIED claim. The circuit court dismissed the action, holding that the release was intentionally broad and included all potential claims, including IIED.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, ruling that the release did not prevent Spicer from asserting a personal cause of action against Combs. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court ruled that the language of the release only covered claims possessed by the estate and not Spicer's individual claims. Furthermore, the Court held that Spicer's complaint was sufficient to proceed under a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leaving it to the circuit court to resolve whether Spicer can sufficiently establish her claim at a later time. View "COMBS V. SPICER" on Justia Law

In 2019, Keith McWhorter and his wife, Carol, filed a lawsuit against Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., alleging medical negligence and loss of consortium. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs failed to file a certificate of merit as required by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 411.167, a law enacted to reduce meritless lawsuits against medical providers. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice due to this omission. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing they had complied with the requirements of KRS 411.167(7) and that the defendant had waived the certificate of merit argument by not including it in their initial answer. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that none of the issues the plaintiffs raised were properly preserved for appellate review, as they did not call these errors to the attention of the trial court. However, the court did note that had the claim of compliance under KRS 411.167(7) been properly before the court, they would have held that a plaintiff must file this information with the complaint. As a result, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, dismissing the case with prejudice. View "MCWHORTER V. BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC." on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky analyzed KRS 411.167, a law requiring claimants to file a certificate of merit alongside their complaint. The plaintiff, Mario Sanchez, had filed a suit against doctors and the medical facility, but without a certificate of merit. The trial court dismissed the case because Sanchez failed to comply with KRS 411.167. Sanchez appealed, arguing that the certificate requirement only applied to parties representing themselves, and that his responses to the defendant's discovery requests effectively complied with the statute. The Court of Appeals disagreed with Sanchez's interpretation but remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if Sanchez's failure to file a certificate of merit was due to excusable neglect under CR 6.02.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed that KRS 411.167 applies to all claimants, whether represented by counsel or not, and rejected Sanchez's argument that he technically and substantively complied with the statute. The court ruled that strict compliance with the statute was required, rendering the statute effectively meaningless if only substantial compliance was necessary. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to remand the case back to the trial court, stating that Sanchez's failure to adequately request relief under CR 6.02 at the trial court level should not benefit him now. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice due to Sanchez's failure to file a certificate of merit. View "MCMILLIN, M.D. V. SANCHEZ" on Justia Law