Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around an incident that occurred during the 2018 Kentucky Derby. Joi Denise Roby and her husband were invited by Kyle McGinty to the backside stable area of Churchill Downs, a restricted area not open to the public. Roby, who had experience with horses, interacted with the horses in their stalls, including a stable pony named Henry. Henry, owned by Bradley Racing Stables and William Buff Bradley, was used to escort racehorses to and from the track, but was not actively engaged in this activity on the day of the incident. As Roby approached Henry in his stall, he lunged and bit her. Roby subsequently sued Bradley and Churchill Downs for breaching their duty to maintain a safe premises.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Bradley and Churchill Downs, holding that the Farm Animals Activity Act (FAAA) exemption did not apply to Churchill Downs because the stabling of a horse was a farm animal activity, not a horse racing activity. The court also ruled that Roby was a licensee because she conferred no benefit to Churchill Downs and no evidence in the record supported a breach of duty. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court orders granting summary judgment for Bradley and Churchill Downs, finding that the horse racing exemption applied because live racing was occurring, Roby was injured after being bitten by a horse located on the premises, and the horse was used to escort racehorses to and from the track.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the FAAA horse racing exemption did not apply to Roby's injuries. The court reasoned that while horse racing activities were occurring at Churchill Downs during the Kentucky Derby, neither Bradley, Churchill Downs, nor Roby were engaged in horse racing activities at the time Roby was bitten. The court also held that Louisville Metro Code of Ordinances § 91.028(A), which imposes liability for any personal injury caused by an animal, did not apply to Roby's injuries due to the FAAA's limitation of liability. View "Bradley Racing Stables, LLC v. Roby" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a car accident that occurred on November 4, 2015, involving Donna Powers and Fendol Carruthers, Jr. Carruthers was charged and pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Powers claimed to have sustained serious, permanent injuries from the crash. Carruthers was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) with a policy limit of $50,000. Powers began receiving Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits from her own insurance carrier, Kentucky Farm Bureau (KFB). The Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) imposes a two-year statute of limitations for tort actions arising from motor vehicle accidents. Powers received her last PIP payment on August 4, 2016, meaning any tort claim she wished to assert arising from her accident with Carruthers must have been filed by August 4, 2018.Powers filed a complaint in McCracken Circuit Court on April 3, 2018, asserting a negligence claim against Carruthers and an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim against KFB. However, Carruthers had died two years earlier in March 2016, unbeknownst to Powers or her attorneys. The case remained stagnant for the next year, with Powers failing to take any action to rectify the portion of her complaint that was a nullity against Carruthers. It wasn't until August 2019 that Powers successfully moved the district court to appoint the Public Administrator to act as Administrator of Carruthers’s Estate.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, which had dismissed Powers’s negligence claim against Carruthers, denied Powers’s motions for substitution and revival, denied Powers’s motion for leave to amend her complaint to raise a new claim, and granted summary judgment in favor of KFB. The court held that Powers’s claim against Carruthers was null, and her attempted claim against the Estate was untimely. Furthermore, Powers’s inability to recover from Carruthers or the Estate foreclosed her underinsured motorist claim against KFB. View "Powers v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case heard before the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the primary issue was whether the Breathitt Circuit Court correctly dismissed Teresa Spicer's lawsuit against James Combs for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Spicer's suit arose from damages linked to Combs' actions, following a fatal ATV accident which resulted in the death of Tiara Combs, James Combs’ wife and Spicer's daughter. Prior to the lawsuit, Combs and Spicer, as co-administrators of Tiara's estate, had signed a release settlement with Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, effectively absolving both Combs and Progressive of any further liability relating to the accident.After learning that Combs was intoxicated at the time of the accident, a fact he allegedly hid from her, Spicer sought to sue Combs personally for IIED. Combs moved to dismiss Spicer's complaint on the grounds that the previous release signed by Spicer barred her claim, and that her complaint did not meet the standard for an IIED claim. The circuit court dismissed the action, holding that the release was intentionally broad and included all potential claims, including IIED.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, ruling that the release did not prevent Spicer from asserting a personal cause of action against Combs. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court ruled that the language of the release only covered claims possessed by the estate and not Spicer's individual claims. Furthermore, the Court held that Spicer's complaint was sufficient to proceed under a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leaving it to the circuit court to resolve whether Spicer can sufficiently establish her claim at a later time. View "COMBS V. SPICER" on Justia Law

In 2019, Keith McWhorter and his wife, Carol, filed a lawsuit against Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., alleging medical negligence and loss of consortium. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs failed to file a certificate of merit as required by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 411.167, a law enacted to reduce meritless lawsuits against medical providers. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice due to this omission. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing they had complied with the requirements of KRS 411.167(7) and that the defendant had waived the certificate of merit argument by not including it in their initial answer. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that none of the issues the plaintiffs raised were properly preserved for appellate review, as they did not call these errors to the attention of the trial court. However, the court did note that had the claim of compliance under KRS 411.167(7) been properly before the court, they would have held that a plaintiff must file this information with the complaint. As a result, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, dismissing the case with prejudice. View "MCWHORTER V. BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC." on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky analyzed KRS 411.167, a law requiring claimants to file a certificate of merit alongside their complaint. The plaintiff, Mario Sanchez, had filed a suit against doctors and the medical facility, but without a certificate of merit. The trial court dismissed the case because Sanchez failed to comply with KRS 411.167. Sanchez appealed, arguing that the certificate requirement only applied to parties representing themselves, and that his responses to the defendant's discovery requests effectively complied with the statute. The Court of Appeals disagreed with Sanchez's interpretation but remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if Sanchez's failure to file a certificate of merit was due to excusable neglect under CR 6.02.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed that KRS 411.167 applies to all claimants, whether represented by counsel or not, and rejected Sanchez's argument that he technically and substantively complied with the statute. The court ruled that strict compliance with the statute was required, rendering the statute effectively meaningless if only substantial compliance was necessary. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to remand the case back to the trial court, stating that Sanchez's failure to adequately request relief under CR 6.02 at the trial court level should not benefit him now. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice due to Sanchez's failure to file a certificate of merit. View "MCMILLIN, M.D. V. SANCHEZ" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Kentucky dealt with a case regarding a patient, Ronald N. Arnsperger, Jr., who claimed he suffered injuries due to the negligent actions of a hospital staffer at Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc. Arnsperger had undergone surgery for his left ankle and later claimed that his injuries were caused by an incident in which his left ankle made contact with a desk while being transported in a wheelchair by a hospital staffer. The Boone Circuit Court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, agreeing with its argument that expert medical testimony was needed to establish causation. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that this was a simple negligence case and no expert medical testimony was required.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the summary judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court's decision hinged on the question of whether the injuries Arnsperger claimed to have suffered were caused by the allegedly negligent actions of the hospital staffer. Given Arnsperger's extensive medical history involving his left ankle, the Court held that the question of causation was not within the common knowledge of the jury and thus, expert medical testimony was necessary. The Court concluded that Arnsperger had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and under no circumstances could his claim succeed due to the lack of expert testimony on causation. View "Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc. v. Arnsperger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board determining that Richard Lane's notice to his former employer, Tennco Energy, Inc., that he was asserting a subsequent claim against it was timely, holding that there was no error.In 2019, Lane filed a coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP) claim against Tennco Energy, Inc. An administrative law judge dismissed the claim after determining that Lane had failed to give timely notice of the claim pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.316(2). The Board reversed, concluding that a prior CWP claim that Lane had previously settled against a former employer had no bearing on Lane's duty to notice Tennco when he asserted a subsequent claim against it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that remand was required for additional findings of fact under this opinion. View "Tennco Energy, Inc. v. Lane" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the ruling of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the denial of Francisco Rodarte's motion to reopen and reversing the ruling that Rodarte's shoulder claim was barred due to failure to join, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Rodarte sustained two work-related injuries while working for BlueLinx Corporation - a knee and ankle injury in 2016 and a shoulder injury in 2018. In Rodarte and BlueLinx ultimately entered into a settlement agreement for Rodarte's knee and ankle injuries. BlueLinx denied Rodarte's shoulder claim, however, concluding it was barred pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.270 due to Rodarte's failure to join it to the 2016 claim. Rodarte moved to reopen the 2016 claim, which the chief administrative law judge denied. Thereafter, an administrative law judge dismissed the shoulder claim. The Board affirmed the denial of the motion to reopen and reversed the dismissal of the shoulder claim. The court of appeals affirmed the Board's ruling on the motion to reopen but reversed its determination that Rodarte's shoulder claim was not barred for failure to join. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in its rulings. View "Rodarte v. Bluelinx Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the underlying complaint filed by Port of Louisville for defamation and professional malfeasance, holding that Port of Louisville had no legally recognized relationship with R. Wayne Stratton, CPA and Jones, Nale & Mattingly PLC (collectively, Stratton), and therefore, Stratton did not owe the Port of Louisville any duty.Louisville and Jefferson County Riverport Authority filed a lawsuit seeking to terminate Port of Louisville's lease based on allegations that Port of Louisville breached the parties' lease The action was stayed while the claims were referred to an arbitrator, who found that Port of Louisville had not breached the lease. Based on what occurred during the arbitration the Port of Louisville brought a complaint against Stratton for defamation and professional malfeasance. The trial court granted Stratton's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Port of Louisville had no legally recognized relationship with Stratton that would cause Stratton to owe it a duty. View "New Albany Main Street Properties, LLC v. R. Wayne Stratton, CPA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the administrative law judge's (ALJ) conclusion that medical providers did not have to submit their medical billing statements until after a determination of liability, holding that the statute is unambiguous.At issue was whether P&P Construction, Inc. and, by extension, the company's insurer, Kentucky Employers Mutual Insurance (KEMI), was responsible for payment of medical billings statements submitted outside of the forty-five-day period set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.020(4). The ALJ and Board determined that medical providers do not have to submit their billings until after a determination of liability. The court of appeals reversed, holding that medical providers are required to submit their billings within forty-five days of service, regardless of whether a determination of liability has been made, and therefore, employers and their insurance carriers are not responsible for payment of billings submitted after the forty-five day period. The Supreme Court, holding that under the unambiguous language of the statute, medical service providers must submit their billings within forty-five days of treatment, and such requirement applies both pre- and post-award. View "Farley v. P&P Construction, Inc." on Justia Law