Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of homeowners in this complaint brought against them and their attorneys for wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process, holding that the case must be remanded for reinstatement of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.At issue was the proposed development by Bardstown Capital Corporation of Jefferson County residential property into a commercial center. The proposed development was ultimately approved, despite opposition by neighboring homeowners. The homeowners appealed, arguing that the rezoning ordinance was invalid due to, among other things, inadequacy of notice of the various zoning hearings. After the appeal was denied, Bardstown Capital brought this action against the homeowners. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the homeowners. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Noerr-Pennington doctrine afforded the homeowners immunity from claims of wrongful use of civil proceedings; and (2) the trial court properly applied the Doerr-Pennington doctrine and, therefore, did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Seiller Waterman, LLC v. Bardstown Capital Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the opinion of the court of appeals vacating the administrative law judge's (ALJ) award of temporarily total disability (TTD) benefits and affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' opinion vacating the award of permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits insofar as it applied to the enhancement, holding that the court of appeals erred in part.Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury while working for Defendant. An ALJ awarded Plaintiff TTD benefits, PPD benefits, and medical benefits. The ALJ applied the two-times multiplier from Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)2 to Plaintiff's PPD benefits. The court of appeals vacated the ALJ's award of TTD benefits and vacated the award of PPD benefits insofar as it applied to the enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the ALJ did not err in awarding Plaintiff TTD benefits; and (2) the ALJ erred in enhancing Plaintiff's PPD benefits by the two-times multiplier. View "French v. Rev-A-Shelf" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) granting Austin Ellison's workers' compensation claim and awarding him disability benefits, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusions.Ellison, who was employed by Dee Whitaker Concrete as a general laborer, was leaving a job site and traveling back to Whitaker Concrete's premises when he was injured in an automobile accident. Whitaker Concrete denied Ellison's workers' compensation claim on the ground that injuries sustained while going to or returning from the workplace are not compensable. The ALJ ruled that Ellison's injuries were compensable, finding that Ellison fell within the traveling employee and the service to the employer exceptions to the going and coming rule. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ellison's status as a traveling employee qualified as an exception to the going and coming rule. View "Dee Whitaker Concrete v. Ellison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the Board vacating an order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) and remanding the claim back to him to enter an award terminating Michael O'Bryan's benefits at age seventy, holding that the court of appeals did not err.O'Bryan received a work-related injury at age sixty-five, leading to his disability. The ALJ found O'Bryan to be permanently totally disabled and awarded him benefits that would continue as long as he remained disabled. On appeal, the Board held that newly-amended version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(4) applied to O'Bryan's benefits and that they should terminate when he reached the age of seventy. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the statute was constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that O'Bryan's challenges to the amendment to section 342.730(4) were unavailing. View "O'Bryan v. Zip Express" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals finding that Plaintiff was an invitee when she was injured while visiting the monument marking her son's grave at a cemetery maintained by the City of Versailles, holding that the cemetery was not obligated to inspect and repair the monument, regardless of Plaintiff's status.Plaintiff was injured when the headstone marking the grave of her son dislodged from the base and toppled onto Plaintiff's foot. Plaintiff brought this suit against the City for negligence in maintaining her son's monument. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, finding that Plaintiff had failed to establish that the City owed her a duty to maintain or repair the headstone. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Plaintiff was a business invitee and that the City owed her an affirmative duty to inspect and repair the monument. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City did not owe Plaintiff a duty with regard to the monument. View "City of Versailles v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's conclusion that the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) and two of its divisions were entitled to sovereign immunity in this action and dismissing all claims against them, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff was injured in a collision between his bicycle and a police cruiser driver by a LFUCG employee. Plaintiff brought this negligence action, arguing that LFUCG's purchase of a retained-limit insurance policy, purchased for coverage beyond the limits of its self insurance policy, waived LFUCG's sovereign immunity up to policy limits. The trial court concluded that the LFUCG defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly held that the LFUCG defendants were immune from suit. View "Independence Bank v. Welch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision affirming the opinion, workers' compensation award, and order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) determining that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled, holding that there was no error.Appellee was injured during the course and scope of his employment. An ALJ determined that Appellee was permanently, totally disabled. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellee's testimony regarding his psychological medical conditions was competent evidence; (2) the ALJ did not rely solely upon psychological testimony to find Appellee was permanently, totally disabled; and (3) there was substantial evidence in the record to sustain the ALJ's opinion and award. View "Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board reversing the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) granting permanent partial disability benefits (PPD) to Richard Russell but finding that certain medical expenses were submitted untimely and were therefore non-compensable, holding that there was no error.Russell sustained a work-related injury to his right arm and sought workers' compensation benefits. The ALJ found that Russell did not timely submit his medical bills, so they were not compensable, but otherwise granted PPD benefits. The Board reversed, concluding that the medical bills were not submitted untimely. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Russell timely submitted his medical expenses. View "Wonderfoil, Inc. v. Russell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this action alleging negligent operation of a resident swimming pool, negligent supervision, and gross negligence, holding that a property owner owes a reasonable duty of care to a guest whom the owner invites onto the owner's property to participate in an activity.Defendants hosted a pool party and cookout at their home for a baseball team made up of seven and eight-year-old boys. Plaintiff's son drowned in the pool during the party. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging negligence resulting in the wrongful death of their son. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was the applicability of the common law distinctions of licensee and invitee in identifying the scope of duty owed by Defendants owed to the child. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Defendants owed a duty of reasonable care to the child, and the determination of breach of such duty should be left to a jury's discretion. View "Bramlett v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals remanding this case to the trial court and reinstated the circuit court's domestic violence protective order in this case, holding that the trial court's factual findings were readily apparent upon review of the record and, therefore, remand was not required.The circuit court issued a domestic protective order against Jason McCoy restraining him from having contact with E.S., the daughter of McCoy's girlfriend. The trial court made oral findings of fact and conclusions of law and filled out Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) Form 275.3, order of protection. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case, concluding that the trial court failed to make written factual findings as required by Ky. R. Civ. P. 52.01. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that family courts are not required to transcribe their clear oral findings in protective order cases when they also completely and accurately fill out AOC Form 275.3 and issue a written order explicitly incorporating their clear oral factual findings. View "Smith v. McCoy" on Justia Law