Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a writ application to determine whether a school board had tort liability for expelling a high school student after a fifth-sized bottle of whiskey fell from the student's backpack and broke on the classroom floor. The student claimed he was denied due process in the disciplinary proceedings that resulted in his expulsion. The district court agreed and awarded the student $50,000. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the student presented no evidence whatsoever of being denied due process at the school board hearing. Finding the student failed to carry his burden of proof to show a denial of due process by the school board, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this lawsuit to determine whether the lower courts correctly applied the standards for analyzing class action certification set forth in La. C.C.P. arts. 591, et seq. In February 2003, five individuals residing and owning property in Alexandria, Louisiana, in the vicinity of the Dura-Wood Treating Company, filed on their own behalf and as representatives of a class of persons who allegedly suffered damages as a result of operations at the wood-treating facility, a "Class Action Petition for Damages." The petition, which was amended several times, alleged that the Dura-Wood facility was primarily engaged in the production of creosote-treated railroad ties, and that significant quantities of creosote sludge were deposited into the canal and ponds. The appellate court ultimately found no reversible error in the district court’s judgment certifying the class, although it candidly acknowledged “a number of potential problems with the class as it had been defined." After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court found the lower courts erred in concluding that common questions of law or fact existed, that questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominated over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action was superior to other available methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of this matter. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court which granted Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

In 1999, four employees of a Domino Sugar refinery sued parent company Tate & Lyle North America Sugars, Inc. (T&L) for damages from noise exposure during their employment with T&L between 1947 and 1994. Continental Casualty Insurance Company insured T&L with eight general liability policies. Each of the policies contained exclusions for bodily injury to employees arising out of the course and scope of their employees. In one of the eight policies, the exclusion was deleted by a special endorsement effective in 1975. After T&L notified Continental of the lawsuit, Continental retained defense counsel to defend T&L. In 2001, 125 new plaintiffs were added to the suit, and the complaint was amended to allege noise exposure from 1947 to 2001. At some point, trial was continued to allow for settlement. In 2003, without Continental's consent, T&L settled with 1 of 15 "flights" of plaintiffs for $35,000 per plaintiff. After that settlement, Continental was notified. One month later, Continental withdrew from the defense, disclaiming its liability based on a mistaken belief that all of its policies contained the exclusions for injuries to employees. In the subsequent years following the first settlement, additional plaintiffs were added. In 2004, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to T&L, finding that Continental had waived its right to rely on its policy exclusion defenses for "first flight" plaintiffs. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on Continental's exclusions and its disclaiming liability for subsequent plaintiffs. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Court held that an insurer's breach of the duty to defend does not result in a waiver of all coverage defenses when the insured seeks indemnity under the policy. In this case, Continental had disclaimed coverage at the time more plaintiffs were added to the lawsuit, and did not provide a defense to those claims. Therefore, waiver principles did not apply. Continental was only liable to T&L in indemnity on a pro rata basis for the exposures that took place during the coverage period. The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether twelve remaining plaintiff-flights met the settlement criteria.

In 2005, Jesse Brooks, Jr. an operating engineer for the Department of Transportation and Development's (DOTD) Industrial Plant and Maintenance was driving a backhoe along the shoulder of a highway to deliver the backhoe to another company. He made a sharp turn into a driveway and the backhoe tipped over, falling on top and killing him. His family filed a wrongful death suit against DOTD, alleging that a depression in the asphalt on the shoulder where the highway met the driveway caused the backhoe to flip over. After trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Brooks' family and awarded them damages. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed. The specific issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether DOTD's duty to maintain the shoulder encompassed the risk that a driver of a backhoe would make a sharp turn, hit the depression in the road, tip over and be crushed by the backhoe. After a review of the record and applicable law, the Supreme Court found that DOTD's duty did not encompass that risk. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and rendered judgment in favor of DOTD.

Central to this case was the issue of whether it is sufficient to serve only the attorney general or whether it is necessary to also serve other entities/individuals when a tort action is brought against the State Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). Plaintiff Shawn Burnett fax-filed a suit seeking damages from an automobile accident against several defendants, including the State through the DOTD. DOTD filed a motion for involuntary dismissal and exception of insufficiency of service of process because Plaintiff had not also requested service on the secretary of DOTD. After a hearing, the trial court denied DOTD's motion to dismiss and overruled its exception of insufficiency of service of process, stating, "it would be absurd that you have to serve two people with the State of Louisiana." The appellate court granted DOTD's application for supervisory writs from that judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that service of citation only on the attorney general was sufficient. Consequently, the Court found that the trial court's judgment that denied DOTD's motion to dismiss was correct, and that the appellate court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's suit. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

At issue in this case was whether La. Rev. Stat 40:1299.47(H) mandated the admission of a medical review panel when the panel exceeded its statutory authority and rendered an opinion based on Plaintiffs' credibility and not on a medical standard. After submitting their medical malpractice complaint to a medical review panel and the panel rendered an opinion, Plaintiffs Margie and John McGlothlin filed suit against Defendant Christus St. Patrick Hospital. Over both parties' objections, the district court admitted the medical panel's opinion, subject to its redaction of all credibility language. The appellate court reversed, finding the lower court erred in admitting an edited version of the opinion. The court concluded that Plaintiffs proved the hospital's malpractice caused the injury, and awarded Plaintiffs general and special damages. Upon consideration of the vel non of the appellate court's reversal, the Supreme Court found that the medical review panel's opinion was inadmissible, but that the admission was nevertheless harmless. Finding no manifest error in the jury's verdict, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the district court's judgment.

Central to this case was the issue of whether it is sufficient to serve only the head of a state agency or to also serve the attorney general and the office of risk management when a tort action is brought against the agency. In May 2003, Plaintiff Regina Whitley was five months pregnant when she was in an automobile accident. In July 2003, she delivered a stillborn infant. She filed a medical malpractice suit against the state hospital that treated her immediately following the accident. At the time of filing, Plaintiff requested service of process only on the hospital's chairman. Two and a half years later, the attorney general and the office of risk management received faxed-copies of the complaint. The hospital moved to dismiss, citing insufficiency of service of process. After a hearing, the trial court denied the hospital's motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the initial service on only the hospital was sufficient and that the subsequent service on the attorney general and office of risk management cured the hospital's exception of insufficiency of service. The Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions.

In September 2007, Petitioner Mitchell Glasgow was severely burned from a fire at an oil well at which he worked. At the time, Therral Story Well Service (TSWS) directly employed Mr. Glasgow. The mineral owners contracted with another company, PAR Minerals, Inc., to produce oil and gas. In turn, PAR Minerals contracted with TSWS to drill a well. The well penetrated into formations that were pressurized with hydrocarbons. Mr. Glasgow was circulating water trough the well while waiting for heavier drilling mud to be pumped into the well to control the pressure. A TSWS employee told Mr. Glasgow to stand away from the well because the pressure was dangerous, but a PAR Minerals "on-site supervisor" ordered Mr. Glasgow to get on his station at the pump, and jump away only if gas escaped from the well. Gas escaped, ignited, and severely burned Mr. Glasgow. Mr. Glasgow filed suit against PAR Minerals and its insurer. PAR Minerals would receive service of process one year later. PAR Minerals moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was Mr. Glasgow's "statutory employer" and therefore immune to lawsuits like his. The district court granted PAR Minerals' motion, holding that because of the year delay in getting PAR Minerals notice of the lawsuit, Mr. Glasgow's suit was prescribed and untimely. A split appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal, and Mr. Glasgow appealed. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts erred in dismissing Mr. Glasgow's claims as prescribed. The Court reversed the lower courts' holdings and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A jury found that Morehouse General Hospital (Morehouse) committed four acts of malpractice that caused an injury to the son of Jonathon and Belinda Johnson. The jury apportioned 80% of the fault to Morehouse, and 20% to the treating physician. The appellate court found the jury was wrong in finding Morehouse liable for three of the four acts, and reversed those figures (20% to Morehouse; 80% to the physician). The Supreme Court was asked to review whether the appellate court properly modified the jury verdict. After considering the record and the law, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court was correct in finding Morehouse was only liable for one act of negligence, but it disagreed with its apportionment of fault. The Court split the fault between the parties 50%-50%.