Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Meiko Prevo was arrested in April 2000 in East Baton Rouge Parish for felony crime against nature. Plaintiff ultimately pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of criminal mischief, a misdemeanor. She was sentenced to ninety days in jail, suspended, and placed on probation for a period of one year, which she successfully completed. Plaintiff was not required to register as a sex offender based on her conviction for misdemeanor criminal mischief. In September 2008, plaintiff was again arrested and charged with distribution of cocaine. She pleaded guilty, received a hard labor suspended sentence, and was placed probation for a period of five years with the State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety Division of Probation and Parole. Thereafter, plaintiff reported to her probation officer, David Phillips. Officer Phillips reviewed plaintiff’s criminal history which identified her as a sex offender based on a disposition for crime against nature in April 2000. He also relied on an East Baton Rouge Parish “conviction notification” which showed she was convicted of crime against nature. Based on this information, Officer Phillips advised plaintiff that she was required to register as a sex offender based on what he understood to be her earlier 2000 conviction, and if she failed to do so, she would be sent to jail to serve her five-year sentence. Plaintiff objected to being required to register as a sex offender. Plaintiff registered as a sex offender. On several occasions after registering, plaintiff continued to ask Officer Phillips to further investigate her case, claiming each time that she was not a sex offender and should not have to be registered. According to plaintiff, Officer Phillips took no action on her requests. Plaintiff obtained a copy of her criminal records, confirming she had been convicted of criminal mischief. Assigned a new probation officer, Mike Ware, plaintiff informed him that she had not been convicted of crime against nature and was erroneously required to register as a sex offender. Officer Ware investigated plaintiff’s allegations and obtained information from the East Baton Rouge Parish Clerk of Court showing plaintiff’s guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge of criminal mischief. Officer Ware informed plaintiff of his findings and began the process of having her removed from the sex offender registry. Plaintiff thereafter filed suit against several defendants, including the State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections Division of Probation and Parole, alleging that she was "coerced" to register as a sex offender and suffered significant injury as a result. After discovery, the State filed a peremptory exception arguing plaintiff’s petition sounded in tort and was subject to a one-year prescriptive period. A five-judge panel of the court of appeal, with two judges dissenting, reversed the judgment of the district court insofar as it granted the State’s exception of prescription. The State appealed and reversed, finding that the district court was correct in its judgment. View "Prevo v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Patricia Thompson was injured when she slipped and fell in a puddle of water while shopping at a Winn-Dixie store. Plaintiff filed suit against Winn-Dixie, which in turn filed a third party demand against Southern Cleaning Services, Inc. (“SCSI”) which was contracted to provide floor care and janitorial services to Winn-Dixie. SCSI filed a third party claim against its subcontractor for those services, KAP Cleaning Services, Inc. (“KAP”). Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, finding KAP 70% at fault and Winn-Dixie 30% at fault. On appeal, the court amended the district court’s judgment holding that Winn-Dixie was statutorily 100% at fault. Winn-Dixie appealed. After a review of the law and record, the Supreme Court found the court of appeal erred in amending the trial court’s judgment to assign 100% fault to Winn-Dixie. The Court found the jury’s allocation of 30% fault to Winn-Dixie and 70% fault to KAP to be supported by the record. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal as to apportionment of liability and reinstated the district court’s judgment on the jury’s allocation of fault. View "Thompson v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to answer the question of whether a one-year time period for instituting a survival action pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1, particularly as amended by Acts 1986, No. 211, section 2, was prescriptive, within the meaning of La. Civ. Code art. 3447, or is peremptive, within the meaning of La. Civ. Code art. 3458. The trial court granted the defendants’ peremptory exceptions of peremption and no cause of action. The trial court found the plaintiff’s survival action was extinguished because it was perempted, having been filed more than one year from the date of the decedent’s death. The court of appeal reversed, finding the one-year period for bringing the survival action is a period of liberative prescription rather than a period of peremption. The court of appeal then remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal’s decision. View "Watkins v. Exxon Mobil Corporation" on Justia Law

The question before the Supreme Court was whether La. R.S. 23:1203.1 applied to requests for medical treatment and/or disputes arising out of requests for medical treatment in cases in which the compensable accident or injury occurred prior to the effective date of the medical treatment schedule. The Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) ruled that the medical treatment schedule applied to all requests for medical treatment submitted after its effective date, regardless of the date of injury or accident. The court of appeal reversed, holding that La. R.S. 23:1203.1 was substantive in nature and could not be applied retroactively to rights acquired by a claimant whose work-related accident antedated the promulgation of the medical treatment schedule. The Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusion of the court of appeal and found that La. R.S. 23:1203.1 was a procedural statute and, thus, did not operate retroactively to divest a claimant of vested rights. As a result, the statute applied to all requests for medical treatment and/or all disputes emanating from requests for medical treatment after the effective date of the medical treatment schedule, regardless of the date of the work-related injury or accident. View "Church Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dardar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether La. R.S. 23:1203.1 applied to a dispute arising out of a request for medical treatment where the request for treatment was submitted after the effective date of the statute and the medical treatment schedule, but the compensable accident and injury that necessitated the request occurred prior to that date. Both the Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) and the court of appeal ruled that La. R.S. 23:1203.1 applied to all requests for medical treatment submitted after the statute’s effective date, regardless of the date of accident and injury. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cook v. Family Care Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the Patient’s Compensation Fund (PCF) could be bound by summary judgment rendered solely against a defendant physician in the underlying malpractice proceeding on the issue of causation. Plaintiffs, Majdi Khammash and his wife and children, filed suit against various defendants, including Dr. Gray Barrow. After approving plaintiff’s settlement with Dr. Barrow for the $100,000 Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) cap, the District Court granted partial summary judgment, finding plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the fault of Dr. Barrow. The case then proceeded to jury trial against the PCF for the remaining $400,000 MMA cap. The jury returned a verdict in the PCF’s favor, finding Dr. Barrow’s malpractice did not cause plaintiff damage. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding as a result of the partial summary judgment, the issue of causation was not properly before the jury, and remanded for a new trial on damages only. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the extent, if any, the PCF was bound by the partial summary judgment on causation. The Court found, in accordance with La. Rev. Stat. 40:1299.44(C)(5)(a) and its holding in "Graham v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr.," (699 So.2d 365), the partial summary judgment against Dr. Barrow on the issue of causation was not binding on the PCF in plaintiff’s claim for damages exceeding the $100,000 MMA cap. Furthermore, the Court found no manifest error in the jury’s factual findings on causation. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and reinstated the District Court’s judgment in its entirety. View "Khammash v. Clark" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ashley Hoffman was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by defendant Travelers Indemnity Company of America. Following an automobile accident, plaintiff received medical treatment at Baton Rouge General Medical Center and sought reimbursement for the hospital bill under her Travelers' medical payments coverage. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Travelers’ policy, which provided for payment of medical expenses "incurred," allowed plaintiff to be reimbursed for the full, nondiscounted amount of the hospital bill when the charges were contractually reduced pursuant to the hospital’s agreement with plaintiff's health insurer, AETNA Insurance Company. The Court answered that question in the negative and reversed the rulings of the lower courts. View "Hoffman v. Travelers Indemnity Company of America" on Justia Law

Dustin Watkins suffered an in utero stroke approximately two days before he was born (in 1990), allegedly arising out of the medical malpractice of the treating obstetrician, Dr. Richard Barry, which resulted in a brain injury. This medical malpractice action followed, and a November 2003 trial resulted in multiple damage awards. At issue in this case was the extent to which the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund (PCF) continued to be obligated to make advance payments for custodial/attendant care for a medical malpractice victim, after receiving information indicating that such care may no longer be needed, and whether the PCF had the right to unilaterally terminate such payments, without prior court approval, when a judgment was previously rendered ordering it to make said payments. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that when the PCF denies a claim for payment of a future medical or related expense and the district court thereafter exercises its continuing jurisdiction and issues a ruling as to that matter, the PCF is obligated to comply with the district court's ruling, order, or judgment unless it modified or set aside by the court. View "Watkins v. Lake Charles Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

This case arose from a collision between an automobile and school bus which took place in the curve of a narrow portion of a road in rural Grant Parish. Plaintiff Shenan Smith Purvis and her passenger, Jessica Thomisee, were traveling southbound, and Jana Lashley, a school bus driver, was traveling northbound. The road had no striped centerline of demarcation. As the drivers entered the curve, the left-front portions of the two vehicles collided. Defendants, Grant Parish School Board and Jana Lashley, appealed the court of appeal's ruling that amended the district court's allocation of fault, and increased plaintiff's damage award. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court's decision amending the district court's order was made in error. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "Purvis v. Grant Parish School Board" on Justia Law

Benjamin and Keri Fidelak filed a petition for damages in Caddo Parish district court (a court of proper venue) against Foreign & Classic Auto Centre, Inc., a small, independent repair shop in Shreveport, which specialized in the repair of high end foreign automobiles. The Fidelaks claimed that Foreign & Classic sold them a defective engine for their 2004 Land Rover. In response, Foreign & Classic raised numerous defenses and asserted a third party demand against British Parts International (BPI) for reimbursement and indemnification because BPI sold the engine to Foreign & Classic. BPI is headquartered in Houston, Texas, and conducts business nationwide. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on the enforceability of a forum selection clause. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and held that the forum selection clause at issue here was not enforceable because a third party defendant may not object to venue where the principal action has been instituted in the proper venue. View "Fidelak v. Holmes European Motors, LLC" on Justia Law