Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Dustin Watkins suffered an in utero stroke approximately two days before he was born (in 1990), allegedly arising out of the medical malpractice of the treating obstetrician, Dr. Richard Barry, which resulted in a brain injury. This medical malpractice action followed, and a November 2003 trial resulted in multiple damage awards. At issue in this case was the extent to which the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund (PCF) continued to be obligated to make advance payments for custodial/attendant care for a medical malpractice victim, after receiving information indicating that such care may no longer be needed, and whether the PCF had the right to unilaterally terminate such payments, without prior court approval, when a judgment was previously rendered ordering it to make said payments. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that when the PCF denies a claim for payment of a future medical or related expense and the district court thereafter exercises its continuing jurisdiction and issues a ruling as to that matter, the PCF is obligated to comply with the district court's ruling, order, or judgment unless it modified or set aside by the court. View "Watkins v. Lake Charles Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

This case arose from a collision between an automobile and school bus which took place in the curve of a narrow portion of a road in rural Grant Parish. Plaintiff Shenan Smith Purvis and her passenger, Jessica Thomisee, were traveling southbound, and Jana Lashley, a school bus driver, was traveling northbound. The road had no striped centerline of demarcation. As the drivers entered the curve, the left-front portions of the two vehicles collided. Defendants, Grant Parish School Board and Jana Lashley, appealed the court of appeal's ruling that amended the district court's allocation of fault, and increased plaintiff's damage award. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court's decision amending the district court's order was made in error. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "Purvis v. Grant Parish School Board" on Justia Law

Benjamin and Keri Fidelak filed a petition for damages in Caddo Parish district court (a court of proper venue) against Foreign & Classic Auto Centre, Inc., a small, independent repair shop in Shreveport, which specialized in the repair of high end foreign automobiles. The Fidelaks claimed that Foreign & Classic sold them a defective engine for their 2004 Land Rover. In response, Foreign & Classic raised numerous defenses and asserted a third party demand against British Parts International (BPI) for reimbursement and indemnification because BPI sold the engine to Foreign & Classic. BPI is headquartered in Houston, Texas, and conducts business nationwide. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on the enforceability of a forum selection clause. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and held that the forum selection clause at issue here was not enforceable because a third party defendant may not object to venue where the principal action has been instituted in the proper venue. View "Fidelak v. Holmes European Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Within days of his twenty-seventh birthday, Clyde Snider, Jr., was hospitalized for a suspected myocardial infarction. A few months later, after complaining of chest pains, he went to a second doctor and different hospital facility. He would later receive a pacemaker. Snider sustained an unrelated injury to the area of his pacemaker, when on his return home from the hospital, his two-year-old daughter ran to greet him, jumped into his arms, and struck his chest which caused an injury to the surgical site. Returning to the hospital where he was first treated for cardiac troubles, Snider's treating physician recommended that the pacemaker be removed when he found symptoms of infection at the pacemaker site. The next day the pacemaker was removed. Subsequently, Snider sued Dr. Robin Yue, the physician who recommended he receive the pacemaker. The medical review panel concluded that Dr. Yue had failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care and that his conduct was a factor in the "minor resultant damage." The case was tried before a jury, which ruled in favor of Dr. Yue, finding that Snider had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Yue breached the applicable standard of care. Snider's subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for new trial was denied by the district court judge, who stated that the jury verdict was not clearly contrary to the law and evidence. The appellate court reversed and ruled in favor of Snider and against the doctor on the issue of liability and remanded the matter to the district court to allow the parties an opportunity to complete the record as to damages. The doctor contended on appeal that the appellate court erred: in failing to adhere to the proper standard of review; in substituting its judgment on the weight of evidence, evaluation of facts, and determinations of credibility for those of the jury; in reversing the jury verdict on liability; and in its interpretation and application of the Uniform Consent Law. After its review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that because the jury concluded Snider gave informed consent in this matter, Dr. Yue did not breach the standard of care. The appellate court attributed legal error to the jury's finding because Dr. Yue did not comply with Subsection (E) of LSA-R.S. 40:1299.40. However, as compliance with the requirement of informed consent was alternatively attainable under Subsection (A) or (C), the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred. The appellate court should have applied a manifest error standard of review to the jury's factual finding that informed consent was given in this case. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court decision, and remanded the case back to that court with instructions to consider and rule upon Snider's assignments of error. . View "Snider v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a non-health care provider could be a joint tortfeasor with a health care provider being sued for medical malpractice. The non-health care provider in this case was an answering service tasked with relaying calls from a patient to their doctor after office hours. The patient learned that the service failed to convey his messages to his doctor despite the doctor giving the service explicit instructions to call. The patient sued the doctor for malpractice, and included the answering service. The service moved to dismiss, claiming that it could not be considered a joint tortfeasor under the statute under which the doctor had been sued. Finding that the clear language of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) applied to filing suit against the non-health care provider, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court rulings which granted and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the non-health care provider. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Milbert v. Answering Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mary Soileau was injured while working for the Town of Mamou when a front-end loader detached from a tractor and struck her in the leg. She named the tractor manufacturer, the Town, Smith's Hardware (where the Town rented the tractor for employees' use), the hardware store's owners and their insurance company. Trial began with only the owners and their insurer as the remaining defendants in the suit. On the third day, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the owners and their company in the presence of the jury, stating that she did not seek any damages personally against them. Hearing no objections, the trial court granted the request, but made no written (and therefore signed) judgment of dismissal. On day four, the insurer moved for a directed verdict, based on contract language that it was obligated to pay only if its insureds were legally obligated to pay. The insurer's motion was denied, and ultimately over $9 million in damages were awarded to Plaintiff. Concluding that the trial court erred in denying the insurer's motion, the appellate court reversed, dismissing the insurance company. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the effect Plaintiff's in-court dismissal of the insured parties was during her personal injury action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred in its analysis, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Solieau v. Smith True Value & Rental" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, the trial court refused to qualify an expert witness for the plaintiffs, finding he did not satisfy the requirements for expert witnesses under the Medical Malpractice Act. The trial court subsequently granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict based on plaintiffs’ failure to present expert testimony to support their case. The court of appeal reversed these rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the lower court erred in its interpretation of the Act; the expert in question was not licensed to practice medicine at the time he was to be qualified as an expert. The Court reinstated the trial court's rulings. View "Benjamin v. Zeichner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Paul Broussard sued the State for damages he sustained from an accident caused by a misaligned elevator. After a three-day trial, a jury returned a verdict in Broussard’s favor, finding the offset between the elevator and lobby floors presented an unreasonable risk of harm. The district court reduced Broussard’s damages in proportion to his assigned percentage of fault. The court of appeal held the jury’s factual determination that the elevator’s defective condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm was manifestly erroneous because the defect was open and obvious, and reversed. The Supreme Court granted Broussard’s writ to further examine, under the manifest error doctrine, whether a defective condition is more properly considered an open and obvious hazard where no duty is owed, rather than an unreasonably dangerous condition where comparative fault is applicable. After reviewing the applicable law and the record in its entirety, the Court found the jury’s unreasonable risk of harm determination was not manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the District Court's judgment in its entirety. View "Broussard v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiff Jane Doe was contacted by detectives in the Baton Rouge Police Department and asked to identify whether she was the subject of a photograph, obtained from a video, captured by a pen camera which had been surreptitiously placed in the women’s shower/changing room of a fitness center in downtown Baton Rouge. Plaintiff was a member of a gym called “Anytime Fitness,” a fitness center owned by Southern Gyms, LLC. Further investigation by police revealed that an assistant manager and trainer at the fitness center secretly videotaped the plaintiff and other women in the women’s shower/changing room of the gym. The police told the plaintiff her image was one of four women discovered on the pen camera when the pen camera was turned over to police. Telschow was arrested and prosecuted for video voyeurism. He ultimately pleaded guilty to four counts of video voyeurism and sentenced to a nine month term of imprisonment. Ultimately the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts correctly applied the standards for analyzing class action certification set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 591, et seq. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court found the lower courts erred in concluding the plaintiff satisfied the threshold requirement of numerosity, necessary for class certification. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment which granted plaintiff’s motion for class certification. View "Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression: whether the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law (specifically La. R.S. 23:1036) as the exclusive remedy for a volunteer firefighter in claims for personal injury against the "fire company," similarly applies to claims for personal injury against fellow volunteer members. After reviewing the record and the law, the Court found the defendant failed to establish that the Workers’ Compensation Law granted immunity to fellow volunteer members of a volunteer fire company from suits in tort. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts in denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Champagne v. American Alternative Ins. Corp." on Justia Law