Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant's mother (Miller) opened a checking account with Bank. Appellant alleged that Miller added him as joint owner of the account with right of survivorship. After Miller died, Appellant withdrew all of the funds in the account. Miller's Estate brought an action against Appellant, alleging that the funds Appellant had withdrawn from the account belonged to the Estate. The probate court determined that Miller was the sole owner of the checking account and that the funds Appellant had withdrawn were the property of the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later sued the Bank, seeking damages for breach of contract and negligence for failing to retain the records that would show his ownership of the account. Appellant also sought punitive damages. The superior court dismissed the action based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, concluding that the precise issue of ownership was common to both proceedings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the breach of contract and punitive damages claims; but (2) vacated as to the negligence claim, holding that Appellant's negligence claim against the Bank was not barred by collateral estoppel, as the probate court did not adjudicate the factual issues related to this claim.

Appellant Timothy Daniels appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility and North Country Associates, Inc. Appellant contended that the court erred in concluding that Narraguagus and North Country were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his disability discrimination and retaliation claims made pursuant to Maine's Human Rights Act. Appellant suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder in 2007 and thereafter was given work restrictions by his physician that prevented him from performing all of the work duties he had previously handled. In 2008, Appellant underwent surgery and then began a leave of absence. A few months later, Appellant notified his employer that he was applying for more leave at her insistence. In that letter, Appellant also reported that he had been cleared for light duty work, accused his supervisor of refusing to accommodate his disability, and asked for light duty work. No work was afforded to Appellant as a result of that letter. Appellant suffered another work-related injury to his right shoulder in 2009, and, although he did not lose any time from work as a result of that injury, he was restricted to modified duty for the next three months. During that period Appellant was disciplined for performance issues. Early in November 2009, when Daniels no longer had any work restrictions, a new Narraguagus administrator gave Appellant a performance improvement plan for failing to complete some tasks at all and failing to complete other tasks on time. In November, 2009, in response to the complaint that he filed in 2008, the Commission issued Appellant a right-to-sue letter pursuant to the Human Rights Act. When state regulators visited Narraguagus to conduct a licensing inspection, they uncovered issues that resulted in fines to the facility. Narraguagus blamed Appellant for the negative inspection and terminated his employment on January 29, 2010. After his termination, Appellant filed a two-count complaint against Narraguagus and North Country. On appeal, Appellant advanced two theories of liability against North Country: (1) that it can be liable because it is part of an integrated enterprise with Narraguagus, and (2) that it acted in Narraguagus’s interest in discriminating against him. Finding multiple issues of disputed facts regarding North Country's involvement in the actions that Appellant claimed constituted discrimination and retaliation, the Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Michael Joyce, who was frequently exposed to airborne asbestos while working, died of lung cancer. His last documented exposure to asbestos dust was while working for Commercial Welding. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer later awarded the estate of Joyce benefits on a petition for an award of compensation and ordered benefits paid to Mary Joyce, Michael's widow, on a petition for death benefits. Commercial Welding appealed the hearing officer's decision as well as the hearing officer's determinations that (1) it had not cured a previously established violation of the Board's "fourteen-day-rule" because it had not paid interest on the required payment imposed for the violation, and (2) it was not permitted to offset the amount of the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary by the amount of the payment for the fourteen-day rule violation. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the hearing officer's decision. The Court (1) disagreed with the hearing officer's decision that interest was due on the required payment to the Estate, but (2) agreed that the required payment amount could not be used to offset the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary.

Plaintiff was seriously injured at an intersection when he lost control of his motorcycle as he was attempting to avoid a vehicle driven by former defendant Charlotte Small. At issue was whether there was prima facie evidence that the location of a sign advertising Gibson's Apple Orchard at the intersection required Small to either pull into Plaintiff's lane of traffic to see around the sign or maneuver her car in a way that made Plaintiff believe she was pulling into his lane of traffic. The superior court entered a summary judgment in favor of Gibson's, concluding that a jury would have to engage in speculation to find that the sign proximately caused Plaintiff's accident. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that a jury could rationally find that the sign proximately caused the accident. Remanded.

Kristin Cummings, a twenty-five-year-old mother of two, committed suicide in her parents' home thirty-six hours after she had been discharged from Stephens Memorial Hospital, where she was acknowledged to have severe depression. The Estate of Kristin Cummings sued Kristin's parents, James and Jadzia Davie for negligence for failing to prevent Kristin's self-injurious behavior. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Davies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no special relationship existed between Kristin and her parents such that the law would impose upon the Davies a duty to prevent or inhibit their daughter's suicide, either by virtue of those special relationships that the Court had previously recognized in its duty of care jurisprudence or by the existence of a custodial relationship.

Michael Bryant, an owner and employee of Prime Cut Meat Market, assaulted another motorist, Francis Latanowich, in an apparent incident of road rage. Prime Cut and its employees were insured by a policy issued by The Travelers Indemnity Company. Latanowich and his wife sued Bryant and Prime Cut. Prime Cut successfully moved for summary judgment, and Bryant and the Latanowiches agreed to a settlement that included Bryant assigning all of his rights related to potential insurance coverage to the Latanowiches. Travelers later filed a complaint against Bryant and the Latanowiches seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify Bryant for claims arising from the altercation because Bryant was not an insured under its policy issued to Prime Cut for purposes of that conduct. The superior court concluded that the policy language did not cover the incident, and it granted Travelers's motion for summary judgment. The Latanowiches appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to the unambiguous language of the policy, the court correctly concluded that Bryant's assault of Latanowich was not covered by the policy and properly entered summary judgment.

Employee suffered a work-related stroke, after which the Workers' Compensation Board awarded Employee 800 weeks of total incapacity benefits for the permanent and total loss of industrial use of one leg and one arm. After paying total incapacity benefits for the 800-week period, Employer filed petitions for review and for determination of offset rights. A Board hearing officer granted Employer's petitions and determined that because Employee had received 800 weeks of permanent incapacity benefits pursuant to the conclusively presumptive time period established in Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 212(2)(G), Employer could prospectively take statutory offsets against Employee's benefits pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 221. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Employee remained totally incapacitated from work, after 800 weeks, Employer was entitled to reduce the total benefit by amounts authorized by Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 221.

Christine Angell filed a complaint against Renald Hallee and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, alleging that Hallee sexually abused her during her childhood while he was a priest. Hallee and the Bishop asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The superior court granted the motions and entered judgment in Hallee's and the Bishop's favor. The Bishop was later dismissed, and Angell appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the court erred in imposing on Angell a burden to allege and prove that the statute of limitations was tolled while Hallee was absent from and resided out of state but was potentially amenable to service of process by means other than publication.

Employee suffered a gradual injury while working for Employer. After Employee retired, he underwent spinal fusion surgery. Employee subsequently filed a petition for award. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer granted him the protection of the of the Workers' Compensation Act for his gradual injury but awarded no additional incapacity benefits. Employee appealed, arguing, among other things, that the hearing officer erred when determining that Employee did not rebut the retiree presumption in Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A with evidence that he was unable to perform suitable work for a discrete period of time after retirement. The Supreme Court vacated the decision in part, holding that the hearing officer's decision provided an inadequate basis for appellate review. Remanded for further proceedings.

Fore LLC, a Maine entity, purchased a Maine business from a New Hampshire client of William Benoit, a Massachusetts-based accountant. Fore sued Benoit, alleging that Benoit fraudulently misrepresented that the tax returns he prepared for the Maine business were accurate. The superior court granted Benoit's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, concluding that Fore made the requisite prima facie showing that Benoit's contacts with Maine were related to the claims in this case and that they were sufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Remanded to determine whether it was reasonable to require Benoit to defend this action in Maine.