Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Edwin Mitchell, a lobster fisherman, was sued by Victor Ames, who alleged that a group of lobster fishermen had conspired to prevent him from fishing for lobster in the area. The Ames complaint alleged that Mitchell had, among other things, converted Ames's personal property. Mitchell held a homeowners policy with Allstate Insurance Company. By the policy's terms, Allstate agreed to provide a defense if the policyholder was sued for such damages. Allstate, however, declined to provide coverage to Mitchell on the Ames litigation, after which Mitchell sued Allstate for breach of contract. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate, concluding that Allstate had no contractual duty to defend Mitchell because a policy exclusion for certain intentional acts applied. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding that Allstate did have a duty to defend because the liability alleged in the Ames complaint had the potential to result in covered liability.

Larry Hilderbrand, a law enforcement officer employed by the police department, was working with the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency (MDEA) when the county sheriff received a video of Hilderbrand behaving crassly. The sheriff then publicly announced that his department would discontinue working with the MDEA because Hilderbrand was assigned to it and stated that his decision was based on the video. Hilderbrand subsequently filed a three-count complaint against the county commissioners and the sheriff alleging slander per se, invasion of privacy, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the commissioners and sheriff, concluding that the sheriff had discretionary function immunity and the commissioners could not be liable for the sheriff's conduct because he was not their employee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that application of the factors set forth in Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst. to the undisputed facts indicated the sheriff's allegedly tortious activities were within the Maine Tort Claim Act's discretionary function immunity provision, and the superior court did not err in dismissing the suit against him on that basis.

Employer, an employment agency, hired Employee and assigned him to work at a facility owned by a client company (Client). Employer paid Employee's salary, and Client paid Employer a fee for his services. Employee was injured while working at the Client plant, after which Client ended Employee's assignment at its facility. Employee filed petitions to remedy discrimination against Employer and Client. A workers' compensation board hearing officer denied the petitions to remedy discrimination against Employer and Client. Employee appealed, contending that the hearing officer erred by denying the petition against Client on the ground that Employee was not in an employer-employee relationship with Client. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing officer did not misconceive the legal standard when focusing on whether a contract for hire existed between Employee and Client; (2) the hearing officer did not err in concluding that Employee had a contract for hire only with Employer; and (3) therefore, Employee did not have a right of action for discrimination pursuant to 39-A Me. Rev. Stat. 353 against Client.

While away for a competition in a school-supported event, students caused damage to a motel where they were lodging. The motel's property insurer paid to repair the damage then exercised its right of subrogation pursuant to its insurance contract with the motel to seek to recover compensation for those responsible for the loss. The insurer filed a complaint against the school district, alleging it was liable for breach of contract based on its failure to protect and safeguard the property from damage during the period of occupancy and to refrain from activities that would damage the property. The superior court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the school district did not undertake to be responsible to pay damages in a subrogation action, the insurer's action against the school board was barred.

Sarah Graham filed a complaint against Shyam Brown, alleging physical, emotional, and mental abuse, and seeking damages. Brown did not file an answer, and the district court entered a default against him. After a hearing on damages, the court awarded Graham compensatory damages of $50,000 and punitive damages of $5,000. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to set aside the entry of default; (2) the district court did not err by holding that Brown was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress and entering a default judgment accordingly; and (3) the district court did not err in its determination of compensatory damages, and the punitive damages award was not excessive.

Paul Davis was struck and seriously injured by a truck driven by Edwin Rodriguez. Rodriguez was driving while intoxicated soon after he and Davis exited a chartered bus at the conclusion of a business promotion trip. Rodriguez later pleaded guilty to reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and DUI. Davis filed claims against the business that organized the trip, its employee, the chartered bus company, and its employee (Defendants) for common law negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. At issue on appeal was whether Defendants owed Davis a common law duty of care. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the chartered bus company and the employee who drove the bus did not owe Davis a duty to ensure his safety by preventing Rodriguez from driving his truck after the bus trip ended, and (2) the business that organized the trip and its employee did not have a fiduciary duty to Davis because the employee organized and led the excursion.

After being diagnosed with prostate cancer, Philip Baker filed a notice of claim in accordance with the Health Security Act, alleging that his primary care physician violated the applicable standard of care by failing to refer him to a urologist earlier, thus delaying his diagnosis. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to the doctor, finding that the three-year statute of limitations barred Baker's claims for negligent acts or omissions occurring more than three years before he filed his notice. In so ruling, the court declined to recognize the continuing negligent treatment doctrine, which allows a patient to assert a cause of action for professional negligence based upon two or more related negligent acts or omissions by a health care provider or practitioner if some, but not all, of the acts or omissions occurred outside of the statute of limitations period. The Supreme Court vacated the partial summary judgment, holding that the language of the Health Security Act authorizes claims of continuing negligent treatment. Remanded.

Appellants Samantha Young and Rebekah Alley were injured while riding in a vehicle driven by Joshua Weeks. Appellants appealed from a judgment entered in the superior court in which the court held Weeks liable but permitted North East Insurance Company to rescind its automobile insurance policy on the vehicle Weeks was driving. Specifically, Young and Alley challenged the court's entry of summary judgment in favor of North East on its complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the driver because Weeks' mother had made material, fraudulent misrepresentations in applying for the automobile insurance. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Weeks' mother made a material, fraudulent misrepresentation to North East in obtaining the insurance policy. Remanded.

Marilyn Davis, a hospital employee, was injured when she slipped and fell in the hospital parking lot. The hospital had contracted with Defendants R C & Sons to plow and sand all of its parking areas. At the time Davis was injured, Defendants had not sanded the parking lot. Davis brought suit against Defendants, alleging negligence. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming it did not owe Davis a duty of care because Davis was not a third party beneficiary or intended beneficiary of the snow removal agreement. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding (1) because Davis was not seeking to enforce the snow removal agreement between the hospital and Defendants, Davis's status as a third-party beneficiary of the agreement was immaterial; and (2) because Davis failed to generate a genuine issue of fact demonstrating the Defendants negligently created a dangerous condition, and because Davis alleged no other grounds to support the imposition of a duty of care, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Defendants.

Peter Miller injured his lower back in 1992, 1995, and 1996 while working for S.D. Warren and in 1999 while working for Spinnaker Coating. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer awarded Miller sixty-five percent partial incapacity benefits apportioned equally among the four dates of injury. Later, the hearing officer (1) granted S.D. Warren's petition for review requesting permission to cease payment for the 1992 injury because it had made all payments to which Miller was entitled for that injury; (2) granted Spinnaker's petition to reduce its benefit payment accordingly; and (3) denied Miller's petition for review seeking an increase to total incapacity benefits, determining that Miller had not demonstrated a change in medical or economic circumstances. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing officer did not improperly expand the Court's holding in Cust v. University of Maine to allow for a reduction in benefits when the durational limit has expired on the first of multiple injuries.