Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff gave birth to a son, she filed a complaint against Merck & Co., Inc. and the United States, alleging that a community health center physician negligently failed to insert into her arm an implant manufactured by Merck that was designed to prevent pregnancy as a result of Merck’s defective applicator. The federal court certified questions of state law to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Court answered (1) the protection of Maine’s Wrongful Birth statute extends to Merck as a drug manufacturer and distributor; and (2) pursuant to the Wrongful Birth statute, Plaintiff may not recover any damages on her claims against either defendant because of the nature of the procedure she underwent. View "Doherty v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Philip Barnard was significantly injured when a deck attached to an apartment owed by William Condon collapsed while Barnard was standing on it. Barnard and his wife, Jaime Wilson, filed a complaint against Condon, alleging negligence and seeking damages for, among other things, Wilson’s loss of consortium. Barnard and Wilson divorced during the pendency of the lawsuit. After a trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Barnard on his complaint but awarded no damages on Wilson’s derivative claim for loss of consortium. Wilson appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in denying Wilson’s motion for additur or a new trial on the grounds that the jury’s verdict was manifestly inadequate and internally inconsistent because Wilson failed to meet her burden of demonstrating any of the available grounds for overturning the jury’s verdict. View "Wilson v. Condon" on Justia Law

Harris Management and JJR Associates filed a complaint against Paul Coulombe and two LLCs under his control (collectively, Defendants), alleging seven causes of action arising from allegations that Coulombe had misrepresented his commitment to hire Harris Management to manage a golf course, which Coulombe was preparing to purchase, in an effort to obtain nearby property from JJR Associates at a discount and to prevent Harris from purchasing the golf club. During discovery, the court entered an order providing that Coulombe must permit Harris to discover the communications among Coulombe, his counsel, and a third party, concluding that those communications were either not subject to the attorney-client privilege or were discoverable because the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment except with respect to one communication that the Court concluded the trial court must consider further on remand, holding that, with the exception of those pages, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the release of specific communications between Coulombe and his attorneys. View "Harris Management, Inc. v. Coulombe" on Justia Law

Jon Haddow, an attorney, represented and Frank and Beverly Pawlendzio in personal bankruptcy proceedings. Following the proceedings, the Pawlendzios filed a complaint against Haddow, asserting claims of legal malpractice and seeking damages for economic loss and extreme emotional distress. The Pawlendzios based their claims on the fact that, contrary to Haddow’s advice, loans made to them by friends and relatives lost their protected status as a result of the bankruptcy proceedings. The superior court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Haddow. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Pawlendzios failed to produce expert-based evidence that Haddow breached his duty owed to the Pawlendzios. View "Pawlendzio v. Haddow" on Justia Law

Drilling Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc. (DBRS) filed a complaint against Paul Rheaume, asserting that Rheaume should be held personally liable for intentionally and negligently misrepresenting that there were no encumbrances on property DBRS purchased. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Rheaume, concluding that DBRS’s negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the trial court (1) correctly granted summary judgment against DBRS on the negligent misrepresentation claim; but (2) erred in granting summary judgment on the intentional misrepresentation claim, as there exists a factual dispute regard the commencement of the limitations period applicable to this claim. Remanded. View "Drilling & Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc. v. Rheaume" on Justia Law

Day’s Auto Body, Inc. (Day’s Auto) filed a complaint alleging that Town of Medway and Emery Lee and Sons, Inc. (ELS) negligently used vehicles, machinery, and equipment in the course of their response to a fire at Day’s Auto’s shop. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the Town and ELS were immune from Day’s Auto’s claims pursuant to the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err when it entered a summary judgment in favor of both the Town and ELS. View "Day's Auto Body, Inc. v. Town of Medway" on Justia Law

In 2011, Dennis Kay was driving a van owned by Budget Truck Rental when the van slid off an icy road. Kay was ejected from the vehicle and died as a result of the accident. Kay was driving the vehicle during the course of his employment with Douglas Wiggins, who died in 2013 of unrelated causes. Kay’s estate brought a wrongful death action against Wiggins’s estate and Budget Truck. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Wiggins and Budget Truck, concluding (1) Kay’s claim was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), and (2) Budget Truck did not proximately cause Kay’s injuries. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in granting summary judgment for Wiggins on the ground that Kay’s claim was barred by the Act; and (2) the court did not err in granting summary judgment for Budget Truck. View "Estate of Kay v. Estate of Wiggins" on Justia Law

Camden National Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Ilene Weintraub. Weintraub brought several counterclaims against the bank, including violations of the Maine Consumer Credit Code, breach of contract, and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that she suffered injuries as a direct and proximate result of the abuse conduct of the Bank’s collections department and an accusation of criminal conduct. The Bank filed a special motion to dismiss requesting dismissal of several claims based on Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, but failing to request dismissal of the breach of contract claim. The superior court concluded that the anti-SLAPP statute prohibits selective dismissal of claims and that Weintraub met her burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of actual injury and causation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in holding that the anti-SLAPP statute did not allow for selective dismissal of some, but not all, of Weintraub’s counterclaims, but the error was harmless; and (2) did not err in concluding that Weintraub met her burden of showing prima facie evidence of causation. View "Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint for negligence and wrongful death against Defendant, who owned and operated a guesthouse at which Plaintiff’s wife died. Plaintiff alleged that the guesthouse premises were unreasonably dangerous and that defects in the staircase of a bedroom were a proximate cause of his wife’s fatal injuries. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case that Defendant’s alleged negligence was a proximate cause of his wife’s fatal injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by disregarding certain statements in Plaintiff’s affidavit and the affidavit of his expert witness; and (2) the evidence could not not support a finding that Defendant’s allegedly unsafe premises bore a causal connection to Plaintiff’s wife’s injuries. View "Estate of Smith v. Salvesen" on Justia Law

Grant worked for Bath Iron Works from 1964-1970, and again from 1978-1994. During Grant’s first period of employment, asbestos was a common component of the insulation and other materials used at Bath, including for the construction and renovation of ships. Grant worked in a variety of positions, including as a ship cleaner. Cleaning included sweeping up debris— sometimes including asbestos. In 2011, Grant died of lung cancer, caused by exposure to asbestos. The trial court rejected, on summary judgment, Grant’s estate’s complaint, alleging negligence, violation of 14 M.R.S. 221 (defective or unreasonably dangerous goods), and loss of consortium. The complaint named 15 defendants, including Bath’s suppliers. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The trial court required the estate to show “[t]hat the defendant’s asbestos-containing product was at the site where the plaintiff worked or was present, and that the plaintiff was in proximity to that product at the time it was being used.” The estate was unable to produce evidence to establish a prima facie case that any of the named defendants’ products were a proximate cause of the injuries View "Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC" on Justia Law