Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Kevin Strong and Defendants Rebecca Brakeley and Jonathan Bausman were all physicians licensed to practice medicine in Maine. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging that certain negative statements made by them on a credentials verification system’s questionnaires caused St. Mary’s Regional Medical Center to deny him staff privileges. Plaintiff asserted claims for defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship and sought punitive damages. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were entitled to absolute immunity for their statements pursuant to 24 Me. Rev. Stat. 2511. The superior court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendants’ answers to the questionnaires “constituted eligible reports by eligible reporters made for the purpose of assisting a board, authority, or committee in carrying out its statutory duties as a matter of law within the plain meaning of section 2511(3).” View "Strong v. Brakeley" on Justia Law

On February 17, 2012, John Deschenes fell down stairs at Sanford City Hall. On August 13, 2012, 178 days after his fall, Deschenes appeared at City Hall and spoke to the Finance Assistant and the Finance Director regarding his fall and medical treatment. On September 1, 2012, 197 days after his accident, Deschenes provided the City Manager with written notice of a claim against the City based on his fall. On January 28, 2014, Deschenes filed a complaint with the superior court. The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that Deschenes’s written notice was sent after the Maine Tort Claims Act’s 180-day deadline for submitting a written notice of claim against a governmental entity. The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Deschenes failed to substantially comply with the notice requirement of the Act. Deschenes appealed, arguing that he substantially complied with the statute because the City was aware of his accident and was not prejudiced by his failure to file a written notice before the 180-day deadline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person cannot substantially comply with the Act if he provides only oral notice of his claim. View "Deschenes v. City of Sanford" on Justia Law

Arthur Murdock, then a lieutenant with the Maine State Police, was injured when his cruiser was struck by another vehicle after Martin Thorne indicated that Murdock could turn in front of him into an intersection. Murdock filed a four-count complaint alleging negligence against Castigliola and Thorne and seeking uninsured motorist coverage from the Maine Department of Public Safety (DPS). The superior court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by both DPS and Thorne. Murdock appealed, and DPS cross-appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the superior court improvidently granted Murdock’s motion to enter final judgment on Murdock’s claims against Thorne and DPS pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1). View "Murdock v. Thorne" on Justia Law

After Sloan’s Cove, LLC executed a power of sale foreclosure on Armand Vachon’s property, Vachon and Oceanic Inn, Inc. (collectively, Oceanic) filed suit claiming that Sloan’s Cove improperly conducted the sale. The trial court (1) dismissed Oceanic’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (2) granted summary judgment against Oceanic on its claims for breach of contract and accounting and in favor of Sloan’s Cove on its counterclaim seeking a declaration that its foreclosure by sale of the Oceanic Inn property was legal and effective. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed as amended, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment, but that the judgment must be amended to correct a clerical error. View "Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan's Cove, LLC" on Justia Law

William Googins committed an intentional assault of Eric Benson, which resulted in Benson’s death. Benson’s estate sued Googins in tort. Googins consented to a judgment in favor of the Estate and assigned to the Estate all rights he may have had against Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, whose potential liability stemmed from a homeowner’s policy it issued to Goggins’s grandmother that was active at the time of the assault. Pursuant to the agreement, the superior court entered a judgment against Googins, after which the Estate filed a reach-and-apply action against Metropolitan. Metropolitan filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a determination as to its obligation to indemnify Googins. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan, declaring that it had no contractual obligation to indemnify Googins. Specifically, the court found that the claim was precluded by an intentional loss exclusion because Googins intentionally assaulted Benson. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in determining that Googins’s conduct was within the scope of the intentional loss exclusion. View "Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Benson" on Justia Law

Paul Gagnon was helping his neighbor, Keith Anthony, to fell a rotted tree at Anthony’s residence when the tree “exploded,” causing Gagnon to sustain several injuries. Gagnon filed a complaint against Anthony, alleging negligence. After a trial, the jury found that both Anthony and Gagnon were negligent and that Gagnon was at least as negligent as Anthony in causing his injuries. Gagnon’s Estate appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient credible evidence to support the jury’s finding that Gagnon was at least as negligent as Anthony; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion for a new trial. View "Estate of Gagnon v. Anthony" on Justia Law

Wife was a passenger on a motorcycle operated by Husband when she was injured in an accident. At the time, Wife and Husband were named insureds on a motorcycle insurance policy from Insurer. Wife filed a complaint against Husband alleging negligence in connection with the accident. A jury found Husband negligent and awarded Wife $50,000 in damages. Husband moved to amend the judgment to obtain a credit for the amount in prejudgment payments that the Insurer had made to Wife. The superior court granted Husband’s motion to amend the judgment. Wife appealed, arguing that the court erred in interpreting Me. Rev. Stat. 24-A, 2426 to allow Husband a credit against the judgment for the medical payments maximum coverage of what Insurer had already paid to Wife’s medical providers before this action was commenced. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order amending judgment, as the court did not determine whether the payments Insurer paid Wife’s medical providers were medical or liability payments. Remanded for a factual determination of the type of prepayments Insurer made, whether liability payments pursuant to Husband’s policy, medical payments pursuant to Wife’s policy, or some other type of payment. View "Wood v. Wood" on Justia Law