Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Wayne Nocar, who was doing construction work on a house, died after falling through a stairwell opening in a floor that C&M Builders had built. Kelly Strub sued C&M on behalf of her son, alleging negligence in the death of Nocar. The trial court determined the C&M was not negligent. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court held (1) C&M owed a duty to Nocar to comply with the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA), and (2) C&M's motion for judgment asserting the evidence showed that Nocar assumed the risk of his fatal injury as a matter of law was properly denied by the lower court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) an employer does not owe a duty under MOSHA to provide a safe workplace to a person who is not his employee after the employer has left the worksite and has no control over worksite conditions, and (2) where it is clear that any person in Nocar's position must have understood the danger of falling, the issue of assumption of the risk may be decided by the court rather than the jury. Thus the issue should have been decided in C&M's favor by the lower court on C&M's motion.

Petitioner sued the owners of her childhood home alleging injuries from lead paint on the premises. At issue was the trial court's instruction regarding the joint responsibilities of landlords and tenants in keeping the property in good condition. The court held that the inclusion of the instruction was error because neither plaintiff's contributory negligence nor negligence of her family members were at issue in the case. The court also held that the error was prejudicial because it introduced into the jury deliberations the idea that plaintiff, or her family, could have also been to blame for the injuries and such an argument was not only irrelevant to the case but prohibited by law and policy. The court further held that the inclusion of the argument could have permitted the jury to speculate or precluded a finding of liability where it was otherwise appropriate.

Petitioner, a police officer, filed a complaint against respondent under the theory of respondeat superior and alleged negligent hiring/supervision and negligence in supervising 911 dispatch protocols when he suffered severe injuries from a car accident that occurred while he was pursuing a suspect from an "armed robbery." At issue was whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that a police officer injured during a high-speed pursuit was barred by the common-law firefighter's rule from recovering in a tort action alleging negligence by a police dispatcher in giving the police officer faulty information that led to the commencement of the high-speed chase. Also at issue was whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in declining to address whether a "special duty" exception to the firefighter's rule should be recognized in Maryland. The court held that the firefighter's rule barred petitioner's claim where he failed to show the court a reason, based either in law or policy, to limit application of the firefighter's rule and where adopting such a limitation on the rule ran counter to its undergirding public policy, which recognized that the very nature of the firefighter's or police officer's occupation limits the public safety officer's ability to recover in tort for work-related injuries. The court also held that petitioner's general opposition to the application of the firefighter's rule was not sufficient to allow the circuit court the opportunity to decide the issue and therefore, the court also declined to decide the issue.

Petitioner Stephen Norman and two others owned equal shares in Sussex Title Company. Respondents Scott Borison and the Legg Law Firm filed on behalf of their clients a proposed class action lawsuit against multiple defendants-companies, including Sussex, for their alleged participation in âthe single largest mortgage scam in Maryland history.â Respondents did not name Petitioner as a defendant in any version of their original complaint. However, in the second amended complaint, Petitioner was mentioned in certain allegations. Petitioner claims that respondents defamed him by republishing the pleadings to the press and on the internet, and by making verbal comments to the press about the lawsuit. The Supreme Court found that an absolute privilege applies to Respondentsâ challenged statements contained in the pleadings because they âreasonably contemplated [the] proceedingsâ of the class action suit. The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs judgment dismissing Petitionerâs defamation action.