Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM) in this negligence complaint, holding that Ashley Hector and Alyaa Hector alleged sufficient facts for their claim against BNYM in its individual capacity to go to the jury.The Hectors lived as children in a row house that contained lead-based paint. The Hectors' landlord had taken out a mortgage on her interest in the property that became part of a residential mortgage backed securitization trust. When the landlord's interest in the property was sold at foreclosure BNYM as trustee as the purchaser. The Hectors filed a negligence complaint against BNYM. The circuit court granted summary judgment to BNYM, concluding that the Hectors erroneously named BNYM in its individual capacity as opposed to its fiduciary capacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a trustee may be held individually liable for a tort committed in the course of trust administration if the trustee is personally at fault; and (2) the Hectors produced facts from which a jury could find that BNYM breached a duty it owed to the Hectors as the "owner" of the property. View "Hector v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals vacating a jury award of $500,000 against Dr. Shabbir Choudhry for loss of household services, which Petitioner alleged she would have received from her adult daughter, who died after having received medical treatment by Dr. Choudhry, holding that the court of appeals did not err.In vacating the jury award, the court of appeals held that, in a wrongful death action, a parent could recover economic damages for loss of household services but that Petitioner had presented insufficient evidence to have the claim submitted to the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in order for a parent of a deceased child to recover pecuniary damages for household services under the Wrongful Death Act, Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. 3-901 to -904, the parent must present evidence not only that they reasonably expected to receive services from the adult child but that the child intended to continue providing those services. View "Fowlkes v. Choudhry" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court for $500,000 in economic damages to Petitioner under the Wrongful Death Act, Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 3-901 to 3-904, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a pecuniary damage award to compensate for loss of household services from an adult child, now deceased.The circuit court vacated the award against Respondent, a medical doctor, for loss of household services Petitioner alleged she would have received from her adult daughter who died after receiving medical treatment by Respondent. The court of special appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner had not produced sufficient evidence to have the claim submitted to the jury pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-519. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence adduced by Petitioner was insufficient to meet her burden of proof. View "Fowlkes v. Choudhry" on Justia Law

In this case stemming from a lawsuit brought by Respondent against the State and the law enforcement officers and prosecutors who were responsible for charging her with assault and juror intimidation, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the State and the two prosecutors as to any action in the complaint alleged to have been taken by the prosecutors.Specifically, the Court of Appeals held (1) there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to the prosecutors' entitlement to absolute common law immunity in the form of prosecutorial immunity; (2) the two officers were not entitled to absolute common law immunity in the form of prosecutorial immunity or absolute common law immunity in the form of judicial immunity; (3) state personnel statutory immunity under the MTCA barred Plaintiff's claims against the officers and the prosecutors in their individual capacities and, as such, the State does not have immunity under the MTCA; and (4) whether the State was liable for any actions taken by the officers was a matter to be resolved by further proceedings in the circuit court. View "State v. Rovin" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation action, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Uninsured Employers' Fund's (UEF) motion for judgment, holding that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Tyson Farms, Inc. was Mauro Garcia's co-employer as a matter of law.Mauro Jimenez Garcia sustained an occupational disease of the lungs while working on a chicken farm. The chickens were raised for and owned by Tyson. The Uninsured Employers' Fund became involved in Garcia's workers' compensation claim, and Tyson was impleaded into the claim. The Commission issued an award of compensation, determination that Garcia was a covered employee that sustained an occupational disease arising of and in the course of his employment and that Tyson was Garcia's co-employer. On judicial review, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Tyson, finding that Tyson was not Garcia's co-employer. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Tyson was not a co-employer of Garcia. View "Tyson Farms, Inc. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation action, the Court of Appeals held that the Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in calculating the deduction of decibels from Claimants' total average hearing losses under Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. (LE) 9-650(b)(3) by counting the number of years between each firefighter's fiftieth birthday and the dates that they each retired from employment with Montgomery County, Maryland.Anthony Cochran and Andrew Bowen, former firefighters, developed hearing loss, and Bowen also developed tinnitus. Both men filed a claim under LE 9-505. The Commission awarded compensation to both claimants, finding that each had sustained hearing loss arising in and out of the course of their employment and that Bowen had sustained tinnitus arising in and out of the course of his employment. The Court of Special Appeals held that the Commission correctly calculated the deduction set forth in LE 9-650(b)(3) but erred in awarding permanent partial disability benefits to Bowen for tinnitus. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission properly calculated the deduction set forth in LE 9-650(b)(3) by counting the number of years between each man's fiftieth birthday and the date of retirement; and (2) the Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing the Commission's decision as to tinnitus. View "Montgomery County v. Cochran & Bowen" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals answered certified questions asking whether Maryland recognizes an independent cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, holding that this Court recognizes an independent cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and outlining its scope and parameters.The Court of Special appeals filed a certification pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304 requesting that the Court of Appeals provide guidance concerning whether an independent cause of action exists for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court of Appeals answered (1) Maryland does recognize such a cause of action, and to establish a breach of fiduciary duty a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary relationship, breach of the duty owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary, and harm to the beneficiary; and (2) a court should consider the nature of the fiduciary relationship and possible remedies afforded for a breach on a case by case basis, and the remedy will depend upon the specific law applicable to the specific fiduciary relationship at issue. View "Plank v. Cherneski" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeals chose to adopt Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), as the governing standard by which trial courts admit or exclude expert testimony, thus replacing Maryland's "Frye-Reed Plus" standard.The Frye-Reed standard, born of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), started in Maryland and continued to be the standard for determining the reliability of expert testimony after the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert. The Frye-Reed standard eventually morphed into the Frye-Reed Plus standard, which adopted several Daubert principles. For that reason, Appellant argued that this Court should adopt the Daubert standard and apply it to this case. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed this matter for pretrial proceedings and a new trial consistent with this opinion, holding (1) this Court adopts the Daubert standard in Maryland because those factors are persuasive in interpreting Maryland Rule 5-702; and (2) this case is remanded for the circuit court to apply this new evidentiary standard. View "Rochkind v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court holding that Defendants had not breached the standard of care, holding that the trial court erred in allowing Defendants to raise and argue the issue of non-party negligence and to submit the issue to the jury.Defendant-physicians in this case denied liability but asserted, as an alternative causation theory, that the negligence of a non-party physician was a cause of Plaintiff's injuries. At issue was whether a jury may consider whether a non-party physician was negligence and caused injury to Plaintiff without the expert testimony necessary to establish medical negligence when medical negligence is raised as a defense. The Supreme Court held (1) expert testimony is required to establish medical negligence and causation when such matters are outside the common knowledge of jurors; (2) to the extent a defendant elects to raise non-party medical negligence as part of its defense, the defendant has the burden to produce admissible evidence to allow a jury to make a finding on that issue; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing Defendant to raise and argue the issue of non-party negligence under these circumstances. View "American Radiology Services, LLC v. Reiss" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals recognized the tort of intentional interference with a prospective gift or inheritance and adopted the standards set forth in Section 19 of the Third Restatement of Torts.Petitioner, the residuary beneficiary of the Estate of Peter A. Castruccio, alleged that Respondent, Peter's widow, maliciously depleted her inheritance by forcing the Estate's expenditure of attorneys' fees to defend against Respondent's groundless lawsuits and efforts to initiate criminal charges. Petitioner alleged, as relevant to this appeal, intentional interference with an expectancy. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss, ruling that the cause of action for intentional interference with an inheritance is not a cause of action under Maryland law. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) this Court recognizes the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance or gift; but (2) the allegations in Petitioner's complaint were insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Barclay v. Castruccio" on Justia Law