Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a complaint against the State of Maryland alleging negligence and malfeasance of an unspecified clerk of the district court. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that she was injured as the direct and proximate result of the issuance of a body attachment. The State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of absolute judicial immunity. The circuit court denied the motion, questioning whether the clerk was acting at the direction or under the supervision of a judge in generating the body attachment. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the issuance of arrest warrants is a judicial act. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner’s claims were barred by absolute judicial immunity because the clerk’s role in transmitting the application for a body attachment to the judge for signature was not the proximate cause of Petitioner’s wrongful arrest, but, rather, the judge’s act of signing the body attachment caused Petitioner’s injury. View "Keller-Bee v. State" on Justia Law

Moran Perry was injured when he was struck by a dump truck operated by William Johnson and owned by Higher Power Trucking, LLC. Asphalt Concrete Services, Inc. (ACS) had hired High Power to perform services at the time of the accident. Perry filed suit against Higher Power, Johnson, and ACS, alleging negligence and negligent hiring. ACS sought to exclude evidence that Johnson had a suspended license and that the truck was uninsured at the time of the accident. The circuit court allowed into evidence witness testimony regarding Johnson’s lack of liability insurance coverage at the time of the accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Perry. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of Johnson’s lack of insurance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s admission into evidence of irrelevant evidence of lack of insurance was error, and the admission of this evidence prejudiced the jury’s verdict. Remanded for a new trial. View "Perry v. Asphalt & Concrete Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that she was injured as a child by lead-based paint at a property owned and managed by Defendant. By the time that Plaintiff filed the complaint, the property at issue had been demolished, and there was no direct evidence that the property contained lead-based paint. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to both Plaintiff’s negligence claim and Maryland Consumer Protection Act claim. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment as to negligence, concluding that there was sufficient admissible circumstantial evidence to show the presence of lead-based paint at the subject property while Plaintiff was residing there. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was sufficient admissible circumstantial evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the property was a reasonable probable source of Plaintiff’s lead exposure and that there were no other reasonably probable sources of lead exposure. View "Rowhouses, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who operated a dairy farm and maintained a herd of nearly 100 head of cattle, filed suit against Respondents, alleging that a church-sponsored fireworks display that took place on property adjacent to his dairy operation caused a stampede inside his dairy barn, resulting in the death of four dairy cows. Petitioner filed claims for negligence, nuisance, and strict liability. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondents, and the circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the doctrine of strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity does not apply to the noise of a fireworks discharge based on the facts of this case. View "Toms v. Calvary Assembly of God, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner operated a lake-front recreational campground on her property in Caroline County. The lake was contaminated allegedly by run-off from failed septic systems serving homes and businesses in the Town of Goldsboro. Unable to operate the campground because of the pollution to the lake, Petitioner lost the property through foreclosure. Petitioner filed a complaint for Caroline County against the State and several of its entities, alleging inverse condemnation against all Respondents and trespass against the Town. The circuit court dismissed the complaint as to all Respondents. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded, concluding that the court of special appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of Petitioner’s causes of action for negligence, trespass, and inverse condemnation on the grounds of limitations. On remand, the court of special appeals concluded that the circuit court properly dismissed the State and its agencies but erred in dismissing the three claims against the Town. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that Petitioner adequately alleged a facial claim for inverse condemnation against all Respondents and that a claim for inverse condemnation is not covered by the notice provisions of either the Local Government Tort Claims Act or the Maryland Tort Claims Act. View "Litz v. Dep’t of Env’t" on Justia Law

Respondent, on her own behalf and as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased son, brought a wrongful death suit against Petitioner, a Baltimore City police officer, alleging negligence and gross negligence, among other causes of action. Petitioner sought both compensatory and punitive damages. The circuit court granted Petitioner’s motion for judgment in part, allowing only the question of whether Respondent was negligent and what amount of compensatory damages should be awarded. The jury returned a verdict for compensatory damages for Respondent, which amount was reduced by the trial judge to comply with the damages cap of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA). The court of special appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that there was sufficient evidence for each of Petitioner’s claims to have been submitted to the jury, that Petitioner’s claims could qualify as predicates for punitive damages, and that the LGTCA cap applied. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence as to the counts for which the trial court gave judgment in favor of Respondent and on the LGTCA question; but (2) Respondent was not entitled to punitive damages, and therefore, a new trial was not warranted. View "Beall v. Holloway-Johnson" on Justia Law

Respondents manufactured steam pumps that were sold to the United States Navy. Although Respondents’ pumps contained asbestos gaskets and packing when they were delivered to the Navy, Respondents’ manuals did not contain any warnings regarding the danger of inhaling asbestos dust or directions to wear protective gear. Petitioner was the widow of a machinist mate who served on active duty in the Navy from 1956 until 1976. Petitioner’s husband was only exposed to asbestos after other Navy mechanics, who performed maintenance on Respondents’ pumps, replaced Respondents’ gaskets and packing with new components also containing asbestos that were acquired from third parties. Petitioner filed suit against Respondents, alleging negligence. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents, concluding that Respondents had no duty to warn of the dangers of the asbestos-containing replacement parts that they neither manufactured nor placed into the stream of commerce. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) summary judgment on Petitioner’s negligent failure to warn claims was inappropriate; and (2) Petitioner supplied sufficient evidence to survive Respondents’ motion for summary judgment on her strict liability claim. View "May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner, through his mother, filed this negligence suit against the landlord and owners (collectively, Respondents) of a rental dwelling where Petitioner had resided with his mother for alleged personal injuries resulting from lead-based paint poisoning. Petitioner identified two expert witnesses to testify both as to the source of his lead exposure, but only one of them as to the medical causation of the injuries suffered by Petitioner. Respondents filed a motion to exclude Petitioner’s experts and a companion motion for summary judgment. The circuit court granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Petitioner’s medical expert was not qualified to provide an expert opinion as to source of lead exposure or to medical causation, and that without the testimony of the medical expert, there was no dispute of material fact and Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the medical expert was competent to testify as a medical causation expert; and (2) with the presence of the second expert to speak to the source of lead, it was improper for the circuit court to grant summary judgment when it did. View "Roy v. Dackman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the owner and operator of a used car business, filed an action against two Baltimore City police officers, claiming that the two officers, along with several other officers, had entered private property without a warrant or court order and towed Plaintiff’s vehicles. Plaintiff alleged that the warrantless towing of the vehicles without a prior hearing violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights as well as 42 U.S.C. 1983. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the State constitutional claims were barred by the Local Government Tort Claims Act and that, in regard to the federal constitutional claims, the two officers had qualified immunity because they were acting pursuant to various provisions of the Baltimore City Code. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s state law claims were barred by the Local Government Tort Claims Act and that the two officers were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims. View "Dehn Motor Sales v. Schultz" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether apportionment of damages is appropriate in the wrongful death and asbestos litigation context and whether a “use plaintiff” - a plaintiff for whom an action is brought in another’s name and does not join in the action - is precluded from recovering damages by not formally joining in the proceedings. In four asbestos cases, plaintiffs and use plaintiffs were separately awarded damages for their wrongful death claims against Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust (WGAST). The court of special appeals concluded (1) the failure of the use plaintiffs to join the action as party plaintiffs before the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations precluded the use plaintiffs from recovering damages; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on apportionment of damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) apportionment of damages is appropriate only where the injury in question is reasonably divisible among multiple causes, and in this case, the resulting injury was not reasonably divisible; and (2) the use plaintiffs in this case were part of the action for purposes of the trial resulting in jury verdicts and money judgments entered in their favor. View "Carter v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust" on Justia Law