Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In each of these two consolidated cases, plaintiffs brought a negligence action against landlords to recover for injuries resulting from lead paint poisoning. Both plaintiffs relied on circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence that lead paint in the subject properties was a substantial contributor to the injuries. In both cases, the trial judges granted summary judgment to the landlords, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie negligence case with regard to the causation element. The Court of Appeals affirmed after setting forth principles under which a lead-paint poisoned plaintiff may establish through circumstantial evidence a prima facie negligence case for lead paint poisoning, holding that plaintiffs in this case failed to meet their initial burden of proving circumstantially a prima facie negligence case. View "Hamilton v. Kirson" on Justia Law

Jai Medical Systems Managed Care Organization, Inc. (JaiMCO) is an entity that contracts with health care providers to provide health care services to patients enrolled in the State Medicaid program. Dr. Steven Bennett participated as a specialty care provider in the network of JaiMCO. Petitioner chose Dr. Bennett to treat a bunion on her foot that was causing her pain. After Dr. Bennett performed surgery to remove the bunion Petitioner developed gangrene, and her foot had to be partially amputated. Petitioner sought to hold JaiMCO liable for Dr. Bennett’s negligence on a theory of apparent agency, asserting that JaiMCO created the appearance that Dr. Bennett was its agent and that she reasonably relied on that appearance. A jury returned a verdict in Petitioner’s favor. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a managed care organization may be vicariously liable for the negligence of a network physician under a theory of apparent agency; but (2) even if Petitioner subjectively believed Dr. Bennett was an employee of JaiMCO, the belief was not reasonable under the facts of this case. View "Bradford v. Jai Med. Sys. Managed Care Org., Inc." on Justia Law

Three-year-old Christopher Paul suffered severe injuries after nearly drowning in a pool at an apartment complex near his parents’ home. Christopher’s mother filed a complaint against the owner and manager of the apartments and the operator of the pool (collectively, Petitioners), alleging that Petitioners breached a duty to maintain the pool in a reasonably safe condition and breached statutory and regulatory duties by failing to comply with pool regulations set forth in state and county codes. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Petitioners based in part on Christopher’s status as a trespasser when he entered the pool area. The court of special appeals reversed, holding (1) Petitioners were required to comply with the relevant regulations and statutory provisions concerning pool barriers, which were “designed to create a cause of action in tort for the protection of the swimming public”; and (2) a defendant need not owe a common-law duty to a plaintiff before violation of a statute can be used as evidence of negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ alleged violation of the Code of Maryland Regulations, if proven, would demonstrate the breach of a duty from Petitioners to Christopher; and (2) such a duty, derived from statute, would apply irrespective of Christopher’s legal status on the property when the incident occurred. View "Blackburn Ltd. P'ship v. Paul" on Justia Law

Respondents, the estate of Anthony Fusco and Anthony's surviving children and widow, filed survival and wrongful death actions against Petitioners, Dr. Kevin Shannon and his medical practice (together, “Dr. Shannon”) for failing to obtain informed consent for the administration of radiation therapy and a drug, Amifostine, to Anthony, Dr. Shannon’s patient. After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Dr. Shannon. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that the trial judge erred in excluding that testimony of Dr. James Trovato, a pharmacist, as Dr. Trovato may have been qualified to offer an opinion due to his substantial experience studying and advising patients regarding oncology medications, including Amifostine. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial judge did not err in excluding Dr. Trovato’s testimony because, in his written proffer, Dr. Trovato simply enumerated the risks associated with Amifostine and did not opine about the likelihood and severity of the risks implicated in the administration of the drug. View "Shannon v. Fusco" on Justia Law

Amafica Woodland lived in a residence owned and managed by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (“HABC”) from her birth in 1995 until her mother and grandmother vacated the residence in 1997. In 2009, Woodland sued HABC, claiming injury from her exposure to lead paint at the residence and asserting compliance with the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). The trial court allowed the case to proceed to trial, finding substantial compliance and good cause for Woodland’s failure to provide written notice of her intent to sue within 180 days of injury. A jury subsequently found in favor of Woodland. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in finding that Woodland had substantially complied with the LGTCA’s notice requirements, but the court’s alternate finding that Woodland had good cause for failing to comply made this error moot; and (2) erred in considering material not in evidence as part of its ruling that Woodland met the good cause exception for non-compliance with the LGTCA notice requirement, but this error was harmless. View "Housing Auth. of Baltimore City v. Woodland" on Justia Law

Ember Buckley was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Harvey Betts when the vehicle was involved in an accident. Buckley, who sustained injuries in the accident, settled with GEICO, Betts’ insurer, for the full policy limits and signed a full release of all claims against Betts and a hold harmless agreement in favor of GEICO. Buckley then attempted to recover for the remainder of her outstanding medical bills under her uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) policy with The Brethren Mutual Insurance Company (“Brethren”), which denied coverage. Buckley filed suit, alleging breach of contract and seeking the policy limit in compensatory damages. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Brethren, concluding that the release was a general release, and thus released all entities from future claims, regardless of whether they were a party to the release. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the general release did not prejudice Buckley’s claim against Brethren. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the broad, all-inclusive language of the release must be read with an eye toward the parties’ overall intent; and (2) that the court of special appeals correctly held that the release did not waive Buckley’s UM claim against Brethren. View "Brethren Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buckley" on Justia Law

After she was injured in a motor vehicle accident, Petitioner filed suit against Charles Serio, the tortfeasor. Petitioner’s motor vehicle insurer, GEICO, with whom Petitioner had underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage, intervened as a defendant to protect its possible interest in the litigation. At trial, the parties stipulated that Serio was at fault for the accident, and the only issues before the jury were causation and damages. Petitioner’s counsel offered a proposed jury instruction on the nature of UM coverage, but the trial court refused the instruction, noting that insurance was not the issue at trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Petitioner for the amount of her medical bills but did not award damages for future medical expenses or pain and suffering. Petitioner unsuccessfully filed a motion for a new trial, arguing in not giving an instruction about the nature of UM coverage, the trial court confused the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury about the reason Plaintiff’s UM carrier was a party to the tort suit because the issue of UM coverage was not before the jury. View "Keller v. Serio" on Justia Law

Defendant was assigned the serving rights to Plaintiff's mortgage on a piece of property. Plaintiff sued Defendant, claiming that Defendant attempted to collect more than was due on the loan. The parties settled. Plaintiff then filed this action against Defendant, alleging breach of the settlement agreement, defamation, and violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. An order of default was later entered against Defendant. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment, requesting that the default judgments be set aside because Plaintiff's claims were legally deficient. The trial court denied the motion. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a defaulting party who does not file a motion to vacate the order of default after a default judgment has been entered cannot file a Maryland Rule 2-534 motion to alter or amend a judgment to contest liability, and the defaulting party cannot appeal that judgment in order to contest liability. View "Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nefflen" on Justia Law

BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., a commercial wholesale retail center, offered a free supervised play area called the "Incredible Kids' Club" for children to use while their parents shopped. To use the Kids' Club, BJ's required parents to sign an agreement containing an exculpatory clause and an indemnification clause. Russell Rosen executed the agreement on behalf of his three minor children. Rosen's son, Ephraim, was allegedly injured in the Kids' Club. Rosen and his wife (the Rosens) filed a negligence action against BJ's, and BJ's filed a counterclaim against the Rosens alleging breach of contract for failing to indemnify, defend, and hold BJ's harmless pursuant to the indemnification clause. The circuit court granted summary judgment for BJ's. The court of special appeals struck down the exculpation and indemnification clauses and reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the court of special appeals erred by invoking the State's parens patriae authority to invalidate the exculpatory clause in the Kids' Club agreement. Remanded. View "BJ's Wholesale Club v. Rosen" on Justia Law

After Petitioner sold certain properties, he used the proceeds to purchase fractional interests in commercial office buildings. The fractional interests were called Tenants in Common Interests (TICs), and each of the TICs was promoted by a company called DBSI, Inc. DBSI later filed a petition for bankruptcy, and the properties underlying Petitioner's TICs became the subject of foreclosure proceedings. The bankruptcy court determined that many of DBSI's transactions were fraudulent. Petitioner filed a complaint against Cassidy Turley Maryland (Defendant), under whose advice Petitioner acted in purchasing the TICs, alleging that Defendant failed to disclose material facts regarding the investment. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioner's investment in this case was a "security" for purposes of the Maryland Securities Act; (2) the circuit court erred in determining that Petitioner's claims under the Act relating to fraud and misrepresentation by Defendant were barred by limitations; (3) the court erred in concluding that Petitioner's common law tort claims were time-barred as a matter of law; and (4) the court did not err in deciding to reserve judgment on the admissibility of a bankruptcy examiner's report until it had further information. View "Mathews v. Cassidy Turley Md., Inc." on Justia Law