Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

These two consolidated appeals concerned two appellants who separately sued the Housing Authority for Baltimore County (HABC) for negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (CPA) for injuries arising out of Appellants' alleged exposure to lead paint in properties that HABC owned and operated. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of HABC, finding that Appellants in both cases did not substantially comply with the notice requirement of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly concluded that Appellants did not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellants did not show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement; and (3) the LGTCA notice requirement, as applied to a minor plaintiff in a lead paint action against HABC, does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. View "Ellis v. Housing Auth of Baltimore County" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against multiple defendants alleging negligence and violations of Maryland's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) for injuries resulting from his exposure to lead-based paint when he lived at two properties in Baltimore City while he was an infant. At the close of discovery, Defendants filed several dispositive and evidentiary motions, which the trial court granted. The court of special appeals affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was the exclusion of a lead test report, the exclusion of testimony by Petitioner's medical expert, and the grant of summary judgment as to Petitioner's CPA cause of action. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the court of special appeals erred in holding that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the lead test report and the testimony by Petitioner's medical expert; and (2) the court of special appeals did not err in affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment as to Petitioner's cause of action under the CPA. Remanded. View "Butler v. S&S P'ship" on Justia Law

After Mr. Greenfield unsuccessfully filed criminal charges against Petitioner, Petitioner filed a complaint against Mr. and Mrs. Greenfield (Respondents) alleging, inter alia, defamation and false light/invasion of privacy. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents as to all claims. Respondents subsequently moved for an award of attorney's fees and costs while acknowledging that their attorney's fees and costs had been paid by their insurance carrier (Insurer). The circuit court denied the motion as to Mr. Greenfield but granted it as to Mrs. Greenfield, finding that she had been joined in the action without substantial justification and that she had "incurred" the costs of her defense within the meaning of Maryland Rule 1-341, even though Insurer had paid the costs of litigation on her behalf. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a party compelled to defend him or herself against abusive litigation may recover the costs associated with that litigation under Rule 1-341, regardless of the individual or entity that actually pays such expenses. View "Worsham v. Greenfield" on Justia Law

Decedent died from colorectal cancer that spread to her spine. Decedent had sought treatment for several years from Defendant, who failed to diagnose the cancer. Plaintiffs, Decedent's surviving husband and children, filed wrongful death claims against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims were precluded because Decedent had not brought a timely personal injury lawsuit against Defendant, nor could she have at the time of her death as it would have been barred by the statute of limitations applicable to medical negligence claims. The circuit court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a wrongful death beneficiary's right to file a lawsuit is not contingent upon the decedent's ability to bring a timely negligence claim on the date of her death; and (2) Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-109 does not apply directly to a wrongful death action arising out of alleged medical malpractice, and thus it does not bar Appellants' wrongful death action. View "Mummert v. Alizadeh" on Justia Law

Petitioner owned land in the Town of Goldsboro in Caroline County. Lake Bonnie provided the water source for the property, on which Petitioner operated a campground. In the mid-1990s, the Maryland Department of Environment (MDE) reported water quality impacts on Lake Bonnie due to failing septic systems in the Town and ordered the Town to take action regarding the septic systems. As of 2010, however, the Town had failed to comply with the order, and MDE had failed to enforce the order. Consequently, Lake Bonnie was polluted, the campground was destroyed, and the bank foreclosed on Petitioner's property. Petitioner sued the Town, County, MDE, and State, alleging several causes of action. All counts were dismissed against the Town, County, and State. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) because it was not clear from the face of her complaint that Petitioner's causes of action for negligence, trespass, and inverse condemnation were barred by limitations, the court of special appeals erred in affirming the motion to dismiss on those counts; and (2) Petitioner's causes of action for nuisance were barred by limitations, and the court of appeals correctly affirmed the motion to dismiss. View "Litz v. Md. Dep't of Env't" on Justia Law

This case arose when six employees of the Baltimore Washington Conference of the United Methodist Church filed workers' compensation claims, claiming they had sustained physical injury as a result of exposure to mold in the Conference's office. The employees profferred Dr. Ritchie Shoemaker as their expert to prove causation. Defendant moved to exclude Shoemaker under Frye-Reed on the grounds that his methodology to determine causation was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. On remand, after a Frye-Reed hearing, the circuit court determined that Shoemaker's methodology was generally accepted by the relevant scientific community and satisfied the Frye-Reed test. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Shoemaker's technique and theory were not shown to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. View "Chesson v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the Association of Maryland Pilots as a launch boat operator. Plaintiff was later promoted to assistant station manager. In 2008, Plaintiff was diagnosed with silicosis. Plaintiff sued the Association pursuant to the Jones Act, alleging negligence in regard to injuries he suffered from exposure to free silica during his employment. Whether Plaintiff's claim was properly made under the Jones Act depended on whether Plaintiff was a "seaman" at the time of the alleged negligence. To distinguish seamen from land-based workers, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a seaman must ordinarily have spent at least thirty percent of work time in service of a vessel in navigation. The lower courts concluded Plaintiff was not a seaman at the time of his injury and therefore granted summary judgment for the Association. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not spend at least thirty percent of his work time performing sea-based duties, and therefore, Plaintiff was not a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act. View "Dize v. Ass'n of Md. Pilots" on Justia Law

After a botched surgery, Plaintiff sued the two doctors who performed the surgery. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. One of the doctors, Dr. Schneider, appealed. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred (1) in allowing Plaintiff to question Schneider about his lack of board certification, and (2) by prohibiting Schneider from testifying about a CAT scan, from an unrelated hospital visit, that Schneider did not use in his treatment of Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in (1) allowing Plaintiff to discuss Schneider's lack of board certification where (i) Schneider testified only as a fact witness instead of an expert witness, and (ii) Schneider's witness accreditation exceeded the reasonable limits for accreditation of a fact witness because it inquired extensively into his professional accomplishments; and (2) excluding the CAT scan, as Schneider's testimony would have gone beyond the legitimate testimony of a fact witness because Schneider had no personal knowledge of the scan. View "Little v. Schneider" on Justia Law

Petitioner, which operated an animal crematory, filed an action against Respondent, a planning and engineering firm, alleging breach of contract and professional negligence. The complaint failed to attribute Respondent's alleged failings to a licensed engineer and was not accompanied by a certificate of a qualified expert. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to file a certificate within the required time period. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where the allegations of Petitioner's complaint did not fault a licensed engineer, it was premature to conclude that an expert certificate was required, as the certificate requirement applies only to a cause of action based on a licensed engineer's negligent act or omission in rendering engineering services within the scope of the engineer's license. View "Heavenly Days Crematorium, LLC v. Harris, Smariga & Assocs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were the parents of a daughter who died and another daughter who received injuries after Michael Eaton struck the Plaintiffs' car. Plaintiffs filed suit against the owner of the Dogfish Head Alehouse (Dogfish Head), claiming that Dogfish Head had served alcohol to Eaton while he was "clearly intoxicated" and thus breached its duty to them not to furnish alcohol to intoxicated persons. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Dogfish Head, concluding that the court was bound by the Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Hatfield and Fedler v. Butler in which dram shop liability was not recognized as a cause of action in the state. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether it should recognize dram shop liability. The Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) Maryland does not recognize a cause of action against a tavern for harm caused off premises by an intoxicated person in the absence of a special relationship between the tavern and the person harmed or the actor who caused the harm; and (2) absent such a relationship in this case, Dogfish Head did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs, as members of the general public, to prevent the harm caused by Eaton. View "Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC" on Justia Law