Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company's obligations under an "Insurance for Non-Trucking Use" policy issued to Drielick Trucking. The policy contained a business-use exclusion, which included two clauses that Empire argued precluded coverage in this case. The Court of Appeals agreed that the first clause precluded coverage when the covered vehicle was not carrying property at the time of the accident, was in this case. Thus, the Court of Appeals expressly declined to address the second clause relating to leased covered vehicles. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the first clause. The case to the trial court for further fact-finding to determine whether Drielick Trucking and Great Lakes Carriers Corporation (GLC) entered into a leasing agreement for the use of Drielick Trucking’s semi-tractors as was contemplated under the policy's clause related to a leased covered vehicle. View "Estate of Eugene Hunt v. Drielick" on Justia Law

Terri Sholberg died when the car she was driving hit a horse standing in the road. Diane Sholberg, as personal representative of her estate, sued Daniel Truman (the owner of the horse, which had escaped from its stall) and Robert and Marilyn Truman (the title owners of the farm that Daniel Truman operated). Other than being the title owners, defendants Robert and Marilyn Truman had nothing to do with the farm or the animals on it. The circuit court entered a default judgment against Daniel Truman, but granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor, concluding that they could not be held liable for a public nuisance because they were not in possession of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed with regard to the public nuisance claim, holding that defendants’ ownership of the property from which the alleged nuisance arose was sufficient to allow a nuisance action against them. Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal with respect to an issue concerning violations of the Equine Activity Liability Act, and defendants filed a separate application for leave to appeal on the nuisance claim. The Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s application, and granted defendant's application, reversing reversed in part the Court of Appeals' judgment with respect to the public nuisance claim: defendants merely owned the property. Defendants never possessed or exercised any control over the property and had not even visited it in more than a decade. There was no evidence that defendants knew or had reason to know that Daniel Truman’s animals had been escaping the property when the accident happened. Because defendants did not control or possess the property or the horse, there was no basis for imposing tort liability on them for a public nuisance. "Daniel Truman was the person best able to prevent any harm to others, and given that defendants had resigned all charge and control over the property to him, he was the person exclusively responsible for the alleged public nuisance he created on the property."View "Estate of Sholberg v. Truman" on Justia Law

Lejuan Rambin sued Allstate Insurance Company and Titan Insurance Company, seeking payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act. Rambin had been injured while riding a motorcycle owned by and registered to Scott Hertzog. At the time of the accident, Rambin did not own a motor vehicle. The car involved in the accident was uninsured, but Rambin averred that Hertzog owned a car that Allstate insured. Allstate denied Rambin’s claim for PIP benefits. Rambin alternatively alleged that if Allstate was not the responsible insurer, he was entitled to PIP benefits from Titan, the insurer to which the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility had assigned his claim. Titan and Allstate moved for summary judgment, arguing that Rambin took the motorcycle unlawfully and was therefore barred from recovering PIP benefits. Rambin also moved for summary judgment, arguing: (1) that he had joined a motorcycle club even though he did not own a motorcycle; (2) that Hertzog’s motorcycle was subsequently stolen; (3) that Rambin needed a motorcycle to participate in a club ride; (4) that a colleague offered to loan him a motorcycle; and (5) that during the ride he collided with the uninsured automobile while riding the motorcycle. The trial court granted both insurance companies' motion and Rambin appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Rambin had not taken the motorcycle unlawfully. Allstate appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision insofar as it held that plaintiff was entitled to PIP benefits if the evidence established he did not know the motorcycle he had taken was stolen. The Court disagreed, however, with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that plaintiff was entitled to a finding as a matter of law that he did not take the motorcycle unlawfully, given the circumstantial evidence presented in this case. "The Court of Appeals improperly made findings in regard to the facts of this case that were still very much in dispute." The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Rambin v. Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Devon Bailey sued Steven Schaaf, T.J. Realty, Inc. (doing business as Hi-Tech Protection), Evergreen Regency Townhomes, Ltd., Radney Management & Investments, and others for injuries suffered while at a friend's apartment in a complex owned and operated by Radney. Hi-Tech security guards William Baker and Chris Campbell were on duty and patrolling the complex on the night Bailey was injured. A resident had informed Baker and Campbell that Schaaf was threatening people with a gun at an outdoor gathering. Bailey alleged that Baker and Campbell ignored the warning. Sometime later they heard two gunshots; Schaaf shot Bailey twice in the back, rendering Bailey a paraplegic. Bailey alleged that Baker and Campbell were agents of Hi-Tech, and that Hi-Tech was an agent of Radney and Evergreen. Bailey asserted multiple claims against all defendants under theories of premises liability, negligent hiring and supervising, ordinary negligence, vicarious liability, and breach of contract. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to defendants; Bailey appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part concluding in part that Evergreen and Radney owed Bailey a duty to call the police in response to an ongoing situation on the premises, extending the Supreme Court's decision in MacDonald v. PKT, Inc., (628 NW2d 33 (2001)) to the landlord-tenant context. In addition, the appellate court rejected Bailey's argument that he was a third-party beneficiary of the provision-of-security contract between Hi-Tech and Evergreen and that Hi-Tech did not owe Bailey a duty that was separate and distinct from Hi-Tech's duties under the Hi-Tech / Evergreen contract in effect at the time of Bailey's injuries. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly held that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because, accepting Bailey's allegation as true, defendants had a duty to call the police. Bailey also alleged sufficient facts involving the existence of a contract for security services between the security company and the landlord, creating an agency relationship, and putting defendants on notice that their invitees and tenants faced a specific and imminent harm. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of vicarious liability and negligence issues. View "Bailey v. Schaff" on Justia Law

Grange Insurance Company of Michigan sought a declaratory judgment regarding its responsibility under a no-fault insurance policy issued to Edward Lawrence to reimburse Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits it paid after the death of his daughter Josalyn Lawrence following an automobile accident. The accident occurred while Josalyn's mother, Laura Rosinski, was driving a vehicle insured by Farm Bureau. Lawrence and Rosinski were divorced at the time of the accident but shared joint legal custody of the child. Rosinski had primary physical custody. Farm Bureau sought partial reimbursement of the PIP benefits it paid, arguing that Grange was in the same order of priority because Josalyn was domiciled in both parents' homes under MCL 500.3114(1). Farm Bureau counterclaimed. The circuit court granted Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment; Grange appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Automobile Club Insurance Association (ACIA) also sought a declaratory judgment to recover PIP benefits from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company under similar circumstances as in "Lawrence." Sarah Campanelli, the daughter of Francis Campaneli and Tina Taylor, died following an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, Sarah's parents, Francis Campanelli and Tina Taylor, were divorced and shared joint legal custody of Sarah; Campanelli had physical custody. Soon after the divorce, the family court modified the divorce judgment, allowing Campanelli to move and to change Sarah's domicile to Tennessee. When the accident occurred eleven years later, Sarah was staying in Michigan to attend school after a summer visit with her mother. ACIA claimed that State Farm was the responsible insurer and that that Sarah was not domiciled in Michigan, therefore it was not responsible for Sarah's PIP benefits. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm; the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that there was a question of fact as to the child's domicile. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the "Grange" case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Grange; the Court reversed and remanded the "ACIA" case for entry of summary judgment in favor of ACIA. View "Grange Insurance Company of Michigan v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Brent Harris sued Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA), seeking to recover a duplicate payment for medical expenses incurred as the result of a motorcycle-motor vehicle accident, which had been paid directly to providers by his health insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM). Harris claimed ACIA was required to pay him directly the same amounts paid by BCBSM to any healthcare provider for the medical expenses. ACIA filed a third-party complaint against BCBSM and Harris filed an amended complaint naming BCBSM as a defendant. The circuit court granted summary judgment to BCBSM and ACIA, concluding that because ACIA's policy was uncoordinated, ACIA was the primary insurer, and that the BCBSM certificate coordinated benefits with the no-fault policy. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, concluding that the BCBSM certificate did not coordinate with ACIA's no-fault policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and reinstated the trial court's judgment: In this case, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Harris was entitled to double recovery; Harris was not obligated to pay his medical expenses because, as a matter of law, ACIA was liable for Harris's PIP benefits. ACIA was liable regardless of when the expenses were incurred and BCBSM's certificate that stated it would not cover those services for which Harris legally did not have to pay precluded Harris from receiving double recovery for those medical expenses. View "Harris v. Auto Club Insurance Association" on Justia Law

Nancy Mick, as personal representative of the estate of Stephen Bradley, sought to have the Kent County Sheriff's Department held in contempt of court. She obtained an order from the probate court to take Stephen Bradley into custody for a psychiatric evaluation. The sheriff's department did not arrive, and Mr. Bradley shot and killed himself. Mick originally filed a wrongful-death action against the sheriff's department, but the department was granted governmental immunity from suit. Mick then filed her contempt action, arguing the estate of Mr. Bradley suffered damages as a result of the sheriff department's failure to show. The department again moved for dismissal on immunity grounds, but the probate court denied that motion. The department then appealed the probate court's decision at circuit court, which reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, finding that the governmental tort liability act (GTLA) did not apply in this case. The department appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court the department was entitled to dismissal on an immunity basis, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "In re Bradley Estate" on Justia Law

Thomas Petipren sued the police chief of Port Sanilac Rodney Jaskowski and the Village itself alleging Jaskowski assaulted and wrongfully arrested him for resisting, obstructing and disorderly conduct. Jaskowski filed a separate suit against Petipren alleging assault and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Petipren's band had been scheduled to perform at a fundraiser hosted by the Village. Attendees complained about the before Petipren's took the stage. A decision was made to stop the music; Petipren, claimed he was unaware of the decision to stop the performances, and was warming up on his drum set when Jaskowski approached him. Jaskowski arrested Petipren. The parties' respective versions of the facts surrounding the arrest were completely different. Petipren alleged that he did not resist arrest, but that Jaskowski barged through the drum set and then pushed him off his seat and into a pole before pushing him off the stage and onto the grass where he was handcuffed. Jaskowski alleged that Petipren refused to stop playing, swore at him, struck him in the jaw, and then resisted arrest. Jaskowski moved for summary judgment on Petipren's claims on the grounds of governmental immunity. The trial court denied that motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Jaskowski. View "Petipren v. Jaskowski" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Smitter applied for workers' compensation benefits after being injured on the job working as a firefighter for Thornapple Township. At the time of his injury, Petitioner also worked for General Motors. He earned eleven percent of his income from the township and 89 from GM. The township did not reduce its workers’ compensation obligation by coordinating Petitioner's benefits with his disability benefits under MCL 418.354(1)(b). The township sought reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund under the dual-employment provisions for the entirety of Petitioner's wage-loss benefits. The fund agreed to pay the amount it would have owed if the township had coordinated Petitioner's benefits. The township filed an application for a hearing with the Worker’s Compensation Board of Magistrates, seeking reimbursement from the fund for the uncoordinated amount. The magistrate ordered the fund to reimburse the township for 89 percent of Petitioner's uncoordinated benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied the fund’s application for leave to appeal. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that when the injury employment provided less than 80 percent of the employee’s wages, the fund is required to reimburse its portion of the coordinated amount of benefits. Because the Township did not coordinate in this case, the appellate court erred in its analysis. Accordingly the appellate court was reversed and the case remanded to the magistrate for further proceedings. View "Smitter v. Thornapple Township" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kenneth Admire was seriously injured when the motorcycle he was riding collided with a car being operated by an insured of Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Following the accident, Kenneth required wheelchair-accessible transportation. Through his guardian Russ Admire, brought an action against Auto-Owners Insurance Company, seeking payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act. Auto-Owners had agreed to pay the full cost of purchasing a van modified to accommodate Kenneth’s wheelchair. Kenneth’s guardian gave Auto-Owners notice of his intent to purchase a new van. In response, Auto-Owners stated that it was not obligated to pay the base purchase price of a new van, but that it would pay for the necessary modifications if Kenneth’s guardian purchased a new vehicle for him. Kenneth’s guardian purchased the new van for Kenneth, and after the cost of the modifications was reimbursed and the trade-in value was applied, Kenneth was left with $18,388.50 in out-of-pocket expenses for the modified van. Kenneth brought suit seeking reimbursement for the out-of-pocket expenses. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Kenneth, but the Supreme Court reversed: Auto-Owners met its statutory obligation to pay for the transportation expenses recoverable under the statute, by paying for the van’s modifications and reimbursing him for mileage to and from his medical appointments. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the base price of the van was compensable. View "Admire v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. " on Justia Law