Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The issues before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the services provided by plaintiff's wife constituted services "for an injured person's care," whether the Court of Appeals properly remanded this case to the circuit court for findings of fact regarding the extent to which expenses for services for plaintiff's care were actually incurred, and whether the circuit court erred by awarding an hourly rate that corporate agencies charge for rendering services, rather than an hourly rate that individual caregivers receive for those services. Upon review, the Court held that "allowable expenses" must be "for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation." Because the Michigan no-fault act does not create different standards depending on who provides the services, this requirement applies equally to services that a family member provides and services that an unrelated caregiver provides. For this case, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that plaintiff may recover "allowable expenses" to the extent that they encompass services that are reasonably necessary for plaintiff's care when the care is "related to [plaintiff's] injuries." However, because the circuit court erred by awarding damages for allowable expenses without requiring proof that the underlying charges were actually incurred, the Court agreed with the decision of the Court of Appeals to remand this case to the circuit court for a determination whether charges for allowable expenses were actually incurred. In determining the hourly rate for attendant care services, the circuit court "clearly erred" by ruling that plaintiff was entitled to an hourly rate of $40 for attendant care services because that rate was entirely inconsistent with the evidence of an individual's rate of compensation, including the compensation that plaintiff's wife, actually received as an employee hired to care for plaintiff. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

In July 2004, while walking through a gas station parking lot, plaintiff was struck by a motor vehicle driven by defendant, who was insured by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company. At the time, plaintiff lived with Harrietta Johnson, her ex-mother-in-law. Neither woman owned a vehicle, and neither was insured. Plaintiff filed a third-party tort claim against defendant, seeking damages for replacement services pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c). The trial court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor, concluding that plaintiff could not recover damages for replacement services pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c).The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether, in a third-party tort action, damages for replacement services are recoverable pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c). Because "replacement services" is not among the categories listed in MCL 500.3135(3)(c), damages for replacement services are not recoverable in such an action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary disposition in defendant's favor on plaintiff's economic damages claim for replacement services expenses.

Plaintiff Cedroni Associates, Inc. was the lowest bidder on a public contract. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Plaintiff had a valid business expectancy for the purpose of sustaining a claim of tortious interference with business expectancy. The trial court held that Plaintiff did not have such an expectancy, but a divided appellate court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed in that regard. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and the Court of Appeals dissent that Plaintiff did not have a valid business expectancy, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

In this joint and several liability medical malpractice case, Defendant Dr. Martin Tuma sought a reduction of the final judgment rendered against him by the amount of his codefendants' settlement. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the common-law "setoff rule," whereby a jointly and severally liable tortfeasor is entitled to a setoff from any adverse verdict in the amount of the cotortfeasor's settlement, and the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, which limits a medical malpractice plaintiff's recovery of noneconomic damages. Both the circuit court and Court of Appeals held pursuant to "Markley v Oak Health Care Investors of Coldwater, Inc." that the common-law setoff rule applied and that the setoff must be applied to the jury's verdict before application of the cap on noneconomic damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that "Markley" was correctly decided and thus held that the Legislature did not abolish the common-law setoff rule in the context of joint and several liability medical malpractice cases. "[The Court affirmed] the Court of Appeals in this regard and further clarif[ed] that where the Legislature has retained principles of joint and several liability, the common-law setoff rule applie[d]. The lower courts' sequencing of the setoff and the noneconomic damages cap, however, result[ed]in an outcome contrary to the Legislature's requirement that medical malpractice plaintiffs 'shall not' recover more noneconomic losses than the amount determined by MCL 600.1483. . . . Because application of the setoff to the jury's verdict can result in a recovery beyond those statutorily mandated damages limitations," the Court held further that a joint tortfeasor's settlement must be set off from the final judgment after application of the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, as well as the collateral source rule.

Defendant-Appellee McKinley Hyten obtained a provisional driver's license in April 2004. In January 2007, Defendant's driver's license was suspended because of multiple moving violations and two minor traffic accidents. In light of what she perceived as assurances from her probation officer, Defendant anticipated that her license would be restored at a district court hearing scheduled for later that year. Defendant's mother Anne Johnson gave Defendant a vehicle, and given the anticipated restoration of the driver's license, sought to obtain automobile insurance for Defendant. Johnson telephoned an independent insurance agent who, after being told that the license had been suspended, informed Johnson that Defendant could not be insured until her license had been restored. Nonetheless, an application for insurance from Titan Insurance Company was filled out on Defendant's behalf, postdated to August 24, 2007. August 22, 2007, Defendant signed the application for insurance. At an August 24, 2007, hearing, Defendant's driver's license was not restored. Plaintiff-Appellee Titan Insurance Company was not informed of this fact. Subsequently, in February 2008, Defendant was driving the insured vehicle and collided with the vehicle of Howard and Martha Holmes, causing injuries to both. Titan then learned Defendant did not have a valid driver's license when the policy was issued. In anticipation that the Holmeses would be filing claims against Defendant for their injuries, Titan filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, asserting that once an insurable event occurred and a third party (the Holmeses) possessed a claim against the insured arising out of that event, the insurer was not entitled to reform the policy to avoid paying the third party. Titan appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: in accordance with the Supreme Court's precedent in "Keys v Pace,"(99 NW2d 547 (1959)), the Court found "nothing in the law to warrant the establishment of an 'easily ascertainable' rule." The Court overruled "State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Kurylowicz," (242 NW2d 530 (1976)) and its progeny, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellee Candice Johnson suffered a lost pregnancy at 20 weeks’ gestation, and on behalf of herself and the deceased fetus, Baby Johnson, sued Defendant-Appellant Rajan Pastoriza, M.D. and his professional corporation alleging negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment; the circuit court refused to grant the motion, but ordered Plaintiff to appoint a personal representative for the estate of the baby and to amend the complaint to bring the negligence claim that had been brought on behalf of the baby through Michigan's wrongful-death statute. Defendant appealed. The appellate court held that the wrongful-death statute as amended in 2005, applied retroactively to Plaintiff's claim for wrongful death. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the 2005 amendment to the wrongful-death statute did not apply to claims arising before the effective date of the amendment. Further, because Defendant would be subjected to liability that did not exist at the time the cause of action arose, the amendment was not remedial, and therefore could not be deemed retroactive. The case was remanded to the circuit court for entry of summary judgment in favor of Denfendant on the wrongful-death claim.

This case involved a policy for uninsured-motorist (UM) coverage issued by Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company which contained a 30-day notice provision regarding hit-and-run motor vehicle claims. Upon review, the Court held that an unambiguous notice-of-claim provision setting forth a specified period within which notice must be provided is enforceable without a showing that the failure to comply with the provision prejudiced the insurer. Therefore, State Farm properly denied the claim for UM benefits sought in the instant case because it did not receive timely notice, a condition precedent to the policy's enforcement. In this case, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in favor of State Farm.

The Supreme Court granted Defendant Auto Club Insurance Association's bypass application for leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) applied to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) of the no-fault act. Plaintiff Doreen Joseph sought to recover no-fault benefits for losses dating back 32 years before she brought her action. In denying Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, the circuit court relied on "Univ. of Mich. Regents v Titan Ins Co." to hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule. The Court once again held that the minority/insanity tolling provision, which addresses only when an action may be brought, does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule, which separately limits the amount of benefits that can be recovered: "We recognize the necessity for, and value of, stability in the law and take no pleasure in overruling a precedent of recent vintage by this Court. But 'Regents' itself simply failed to apply our then recent decision in 'Cameron,' resulting in a decision that patently failed to enforce the requirements of the statutes that it interpreted. Because the holding in Regents contravened the Legislature's clear and unambiguous language in MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1), Regents is overruled and we reinstate 'Cameron.'" The case was remanded back to the circuit court for further proceedings.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned whether insurer Defendant-Appellant Allstate Insurance Company was liable to Plaintiff Mona Lisa Frazier for personal protection benefits under the state no-fault act. Plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice while closing the passenger door of her car. She placed a few items inside, and fell when she closed the door. The Court concluded Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the no-fault act because her injury did not arise out of the use of a parked vehicle under MCL 500.3106(1). "Before her injury, plaintiff had been standing with both feet planted firmly on the ground outside of the vehicle; she was entirely in control of her body’s movement, and she was in no way reliant upon the vehicle itself. Therefore, she was not in the process of 'alighting from' the vehicle." Because of these circumstances, Defendant did not owe benefits to Plaintiff, and its refusal to pay them was not unreasonable. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

In this medical malpractice action, the issue before the Supreme Court pertained to whether Plaintiffs Willie and Beverly Driver were entitled to amend their original notice of intent (NOI) when adding a nonparty defendant to their pending litigation in order that the NOI related back to the original filing for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. Upon review of the NOI at issue and the Court's decision in "Bush v. Shabahang," the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is not entitled to amend an original NOI to add nonparty defendants so that the amended NOI relates back to the original filing. The Court affirmed the result reached by the Court of Appeals on this issue, and reversed the case in all other aspects.