Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Edris Ligons underwent a colonoscopy. Four days later, she developed vomiting, diarrhea, chills and fever. She was admitted to the emergency room at Defendant Crittenton Hospital. Ms. Ligons refused to be admitted to the hospital. The hospital discharged her after giving her antibiotics, treating her for dehydration and giving her instructions to follow up with her treating physician the next day. Tests and exploratory surgery would reveal that Ms. Ligons suffered from a perforated colon, inflamed pelvic mass and an abscess. She had advanced liver failure brought in part by 30 years of alcoholism. Removal of the colon was impossible due to Ms. Ligons' preexisting conditions. Ms. Ligons never recovered from the surgery and died in early 2002. Plaintiff was the personal representative of Ms. Ligons' estate. He delivered a notice of intent (NOI) to sue to the Hospital and the doctors involved ("Defendants"). Plaintiff delivered a supplemental NOI providing more detail regarding proximate cause. Plaintiff then filed suit accompanied by two affidavits of merit (AOM). Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the NOIs and AOM did not comply with the governing statutes. The trial court denied Defendant's motions, and the Court of Appeals found that the AOMs were insufficient. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the AOMs at issue in this case were filed after both the limitations and saving periods had expired. The Court held in such cases, dismissal with prejudice must follow because "allowing amendment of the deficient AOM would directly conflict with the statutory scheme governing medical malpractice actions, the clear language of the court rules and precedent of this Court." The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals which dismissed Plaintiff's case with prejudice.

Plaintiff Beverly Duffy was injured while riding an off-road vehicle on a trail owned by the State and maintained by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Plaintiff sued both entities, and throughout the litigation brought various theories in an attempt to avoid the grant of governmental immunity to Defendants under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). In the lower courts, Plaintiff argued that Defendant ad a duty to keep the trail in reasonable repair under the "highway exception" to governmental immunity because the trial falls within the statutory definition of "highway." On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that the Court should rule that the trail is either a "forest road" or "road" under the GTLA and that the trail falls under the "highway exception." The Court noted that the issue that belies this case is one of first impression. Upon review of state case law and the case record from the lower courts, the Supreme Court concluded that the trail is not a "highway" under Michigan law. Instead, the Court classified it as a "trailway": "all roads, forest roads, trails, trailways and highways in this case lead to the conclusion that Plaintiff's claim is barred by governmental immunity." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that dismissed Plaintiff's case.

At issue in this case is the scope of an employer's vicarious liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether Wayne County and its sheriff's department could be held vicariously liable for a civil rights claim under state law based on the criminal act of a deputy sheriff committed during working hours but plainly beyond the scope of his employment. In 2001, Plaintiff Tara Hamed was arrested for unpaid child support. Because she had outstanding warrants for probation violations in Wayne County, she was transferred to the Wayne County jail. When she arrived, the deputy sheriff subjected her to sexually charged comments and offers for better treatment in exchange for sexual favors. Plaintiff resisted these advances, but she was transferred into an area of the jail not subject to surveillance cameras where she was sexually assaulted. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's harassment claim on the basis that Defendants were not vicariously liable for the criminal acts of sheriff's department employees. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had established a viable quid pro quo harassment claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Defendants could not be held vicariously liable under the traditional principles of respondeat superior because Defendants had no prior knowledge of the deputy's sexually harassing conduct. The Court reversed the appellate court.

Plaintiff Kevin Krohn suffered a severe spinal fracture that left him a paraplegic. Plaintiff brought suit under the state no-fault act seeking personal protection insurance benefits from Defendant Home-Owners Insurance Company to cover costs incurred for a surgical procedure performed in Portugal. The procedure was experimental and was not considered a generally accepted treatment for Plaintiff's injury. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the experimental procedure was a reasonably necessary service for Plaintiff's care, recovery or rehabilitation under state law. Upon review of the record below, the Court concluded that if a medical treatment is experimental and not generally accepted within the medical community, an insured seeking reimbursement for the treatment must present objective and verifiable medical evidence to establish that the treatment was efficacious. In this case, the Court found the procedure was an "understandable" personal decision that offered Plaintiff only a medically unproved "possibility" for an efficacious result. The Court held the procedure was not an allowable expense for insurance reimbursement. The Court affirmed the appellate court that ruled in favor of Defendant.

Plaintiff Richard Loweke was an employee of an electrical subcontractor. Defendant Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Company was also a subcontractor. Both parties were hired for work on a construction project at the Detroit Metro Airport. Plaintiff was injured at the site when several cement boards fell on him. Defendant's employees placed the boards against the wall. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed Plaintiff no duty that was "separate and distinct" from the contractual duties it owed to the general contractor. The trial court granted Defendant's motion, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that Defendant had a common-law duty to avoid physical harm to others from its own actions. Upon consideration of the parties' briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the trial and appeals courts misinterpreted Michigan law with respect to "duty." The Court held that the assumption of contractual obligations does not limit the common law tort duties owed to others in the performance of the contract. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.