Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

John Gieseke, on behalf of Diversified Water Diversion, Inc., filed a complaint against IDCA, Inc., asserting claims for, inter alia, tortious interference with Diversified’s prospective economic advantage. The district court found for Diversified on the tortious interference claim and awarded $220,000 in damages. IDCA filed motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial or remittitur, asserting (1) Minnesota does not recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage; (2) even if such a tort were available, Diversified failed to show a reasonable expectation of economic advantage; and (3) the damages awarded in this case were excessive. The district court denied the post-trial motions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the judgment on the tortious interference claim, holding (1) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage is a viable claim in Minnesota; but (2) Diversified’s claim failed as a matter of law because Diversified failed to specifically identify any third parties with whom it had a reasonable expectation of a future economic relationship and failed to prove damages caused by the wrongful interference with such a relationship. Remanded. View "Gieseke, on behalf of Diversified Water Diversion, Inc., v. IDCA, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent was injured when Hennepin County Sheriff’s Deputy Jason Lee Majeski’s emergency vehicle struck Respondent’s vehicle as Majeski was responding to an emergency call. Respondent commenced a personal injury lawsuit against Majeski and Hennepin County, alleging negligence by Majeski and vicarious liability on the part of the County. The district court held that because Majeski was responding to an emergency at the time of the accident, Majeski’s conduct was protected by official immunity as a matter of law, and accordingly, the County was protected by vicarious official immunity. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial, concluding that a jury must determine whether Majeski proceeded cautiously through the intersection as required by public safety. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Majeski did not, as a matter of law, violate a ministerial duty in his conduct while traveling through the intersection, and Majeski’s conduct was not willful or malicious; and (2) therefore, Majeski was entitled to official immunity and the County was entitled to vicarious official immunity. Remanded. View "Vassallo v. Majeski" on Justia Law

A snowplow driver for the City of Alexandria collided with Donald Fernow's vehicle. Fernow brought a personal injury action against the City. At the same time, Fernow's insurance company (Insurer) sought arbitration against the City, seeking repayment in basic economic loss benefits paid to Fernow. In the personal injury action, the district court denied the City's motion for summary judgment on the basis that Fernow's claim was barred by statutory discretionary immunity, common law official immunity, and statutory snow and ice immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. Meanwhile, the arbitrator awarded Insurer basic economic loss benefits, concluding that the defense of governmental statutory immunity did not apply to the matter because of the denial of the City's motion for summary judgment. The district court confirmed the award. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded her authority when she determined that the defense of governmental statutory immunity did not apply to the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that claims of immunity, including necessary questions of fact, should be determined by the district court prior to arbitration on the merits under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. Remanded. View "Fernow v. Gould" on Justia Law

Appellant was discharged after testing positive to a drug test. Nearly three years after being discharged, Appellant filed an action against Respondents, his former employers, alleging that Respondents violated various provisions of the Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act, namely Minn. Stat. 181.953. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Appellant's claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. 451.07(1) for, inter alia, libel, slander, "or other tort resulting in personal injury." The district court granted the motion, concluding that a claim under section 181.953(10) was a "tort resulting in personal injury." The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant's claim was subject to the six-year statute of limitations under Minn. Stat. 541.05(1)(2) as a cause of action "upon liability created by statute"; and (2) therefore, Appellant's complaint was not time-barred. Remanded. View "Sipe v. STS Mfg., Inc." on Justia Law

Respondents, on behalf of their six-year-old daughter, Jocelyn, alleged that Appellants, a medical doctor and medical center, negligently failed to diagnose Jocelyn's cancer and that if they had timely diagnosed Jocelyn's cancer, her cancer would have been curable. But, Respondents asserted, because of the delayed diagnosis, it was likely Jocelyn's cancer would be fatal. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, concluding (1) Minnesota law does not permit a patient to recover damages when a physician's negligence causes the patient to lose only a chance of recovery or survival; and (2) Respondents' proof of causation failed as a matter of law. The court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Minnesota law permits recovery for "loss of chance" in a medical malpractice action; and (2) Respondents created a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of causation. View "Dickhoff v. Green" on Justia Law

In 1995, Katelyn Janson was severely injured in an automobile accident. A lawsuit ended with a settlement in which two annuities were established, both of which guaranteed payments to Katelyn starting in 2001 and established that, if Katelyn died before fifteen years expired, annuity payments would be made to her estate. Katelyn's mother and conservator, Candy Bradison, moved Katelyn to Wyoming in 2001 and to Minnesota in 2003. In 2006, Katelyn died. In 2010, Bradison sought, on behalf of Katelyn's estate, a refund of the amount the estate previously paid to the Minnesota Department of Revenue, arguing (1) the annuity payments were not includable in Katelyn's estate because Katelyn did not own the annuities; and (2) Katelyn was a Wyoming domiciliary at the time of her death. The tax court concluded (1) Katelyn was a Minnesota domiciliary at the time of her death; and (2) the annuity payments were includable in Katelyn's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Katelyn's intangible property had a situs in Minnesota at the time of her death and could be taxed in accordance with Minnesota's estate tax provisions; and (2) Katelyn was the beneficial owner of the annuity payments, and the value of the payments was properly included in her estate. View "Bradison vs. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

After David McKee, a physician, acted in a manner Dennis Laurion considered rule and insensitive, Laurion posted critical comments about McKee on various "rate-your-doctor" websites and also sent letters to several medically-affiliated institutions complaining about McKee's conduct. McKee commenced this action against Laurion, asserting claims for defamation per se and interference with business. The district court granted summary judgment for Laurion, concluding that the individual statements were either protected opinion, substantially true, or lacked defamatory meaning. The court of appeals reversed with respect to six of the alleged defamatory statements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that none of the six statements was actionable either because (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of the statements, or (2) the statements were not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning that would harm McKee's reputation and lower him in the estimation of the community. View "McKee v. Laurion" on Justia Law

Respondent sued Appellants for negligence and resulting injuries sustained in a car accident. The parties entered into a tentative settlement subject to Respondent giving her underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier notice under Schmidt v. Clothier to preserve her potential UIM claim. The UIM carrier elected to substitute its check for the tortfeasor's check pursuant to Schmidt-Clothier. Respondent accepted the substitute check. The negligence claim proceeded to trial, where a jury found Appellants negligent. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondent and the UIM carrier. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for Respondent but reversed for the UIM carrier. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the judgment in favor of the UIM carrier but reversed the court of appeals' decision affirming the judgment for Respondent, holding that an injured party may not continue to pursue a negligence claim against the tortfeasor after she has agreed to settle the negligence action under the Schmidt-Clothier procedure and has accepted the substituted check from the UIM carrier. View "Isaac v. Ho" on Justia Law

L.H. Bolduc Company, Inc. (Bolduc) was the subcontractor of Engineering and Construction Innovations, Inc. (ECI). Bolduc damaged a sewer pipe while working on a construction project. ECI repaired the damage and sought reimbursement from Bolduc's insurer, The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut (Travelers) under an endorsement to Bolduc's policy naming ECI as an additional insured for liability caused by acts or omissions of Bolduc. Travelers denied coverage. ECI subsequently sued Bolduc and Travelers (collectively, Appellants) for negligence and breach of contract. A jury found that Bolduc was not negligent, and the district court granted summary judgment for Appellants on ECI's breach of contract claims, concluding that Appellants had no obligation to reimburse ECI for damages not caused by Bolduc. The court of appeals reversed, determining (1) ECI was entitled to coverage as an additional insured without regard to Bolduc's fault; and (2) Bolduc was required to indemnity ECI. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) ECI did not qualify as an additional insured with respect to the pipe damage; and (2) Bolduc could not be required to indemnify ECI without violating Minn. Stat. 337.02, which prohibits indemnification for the fault of others in construction contracts. View "Eng'g & Constr. Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute over a mortgage was whether statutes of limitations apply to actions for declaratory judgment. The court of appeals reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant based on the applicable statute of limitations, holding that to the extent Plaintiff's complaint sought declaratory relief, it was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is a procedural device through which parties may vindicate substantive legal rights, an action for declaratory judgment is barred by an applicable statute of limitations to the same extent that the same cause of action would be barred in a nondeclaratory proceeding. Remanded. View "Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Invs., LLC" on Justia Law