Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

While attending a group-therapy session at St. Dominic’s Hospital (SDH) in 2005, Plaintiff Elizabeth Martin slipped and fell on a floor while it was being waxed. She alleged she received injury to both knees and sued SDH for negligence regarding her injuries allegedly caused by the fall. At the conclusion of the trial, SDH moved for a directed verdict, claiming that Plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to establish the proximate cause of her injury. The circuit court granted SDH's motion for a directed verdict, and Plaintiff timely filed an appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and remanded the case for a new trial, finding that Plaintiff had provided enough evidence to create a question of fact for the jury to make a determination based on the totality of the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and found that the circuit court correctly granted SDH's motion for a directed verdict.

A circuit court dismissed Plaintiff Jimmy Steven Fowler Jr.'s wrongful-death action for failing to timely serve presuit notice on the defendants as required by Mississippi Code Section 15-1-36(15) (Rev. 2003). The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that: (1) he presented evidence which raised a presumption of timely presuit notice; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for reconsideration; and (3) the defendants, John Paul White, M.D., Marilyn Lehman, R.N., and The Sanctuary Hospice House, Inc. (collectively, Sanctuary), waived the affirmative defense of lack of presuit notice because they failed to timely pursue the defense while actively participating in the litigation. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding the trial court's finding that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a presumption of presuit notice was supported by substantial evidence. The trial court was within its discretion in denying Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. And Plaintiff's waiver argument was procedurally barred because he raised it for the first time on appeal.

This Mississippi Tort Claims Act case arose from an accident that occurred in Wayne County, Mississippi, between a school bus and a four-door passenger car. Following the accident, the driver of the car Ernestine Worsham, brought suit alleging negligence and negligence per se on behalf of the driver of the school bus, and negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence on behalf of Wayne County School District. After a bench trial, the driver of the school bus Natasha Middleton, was dismissed from the suit. And despite evidence that a local county supervisor unilaterally had placed the speed-limit signs on County Farm Road, without a traffic investigation, approval by the Board, or passage of an ordinance, the trial court found Middleton's actions constituted negligence per se, and thus awarded judgment in favor of Worsham. Wayne County timely appealed. Because Mississippi Code 63-3-511 (Rev. 2004) requires that "[w]henever local authorities, including boards of supervisors . . . determine and declare, by ordinance, a reasonable and safe speed limit," that such determinations be made "upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this product liability/breach of warranty case was whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the defendants' motion to transfer venue when the plaintiff sued in the county where the product was located when the alleged defects first appeared and not where the product was purchased or repaired. Finding that the general venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a) (Rev. 2004), requires that the case be brought in the county where the product was purchased and/or repaired, the Court reversed and remanded the case for transfer to the proper venue.

In 2004, Marvin Rhoda and Edith Weathers were involved in an automobile collision in Southaven. Rhoda sued Weathers alleging negligence, and the jury returned a verdict for Weathers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict, but reversed and remanded the trial court's refusal to assess sanctions against Weathers for failing to admit to certain requests made by Rhoda in discovery. The Supreme Court granted Weathers's petition for writ of certiorari to address only the issue of sanctions against Weathers. Upon review, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue and affirmed the circuit court's denial of Rhoda's request for sanctions.

Defendant Sylvia Montgomery filed suit against the Mississippi Transportation Commission (Commission) in the Circuit Court of Yazoo County after she was injured when her car struck a pothole in the northbound lane of Interstate 55 near Vaughan. The Commission filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming it was exempt from liability under several provisions of the Mississippi Torts Claim Act (MTCA). The court denied the Commission's motion. A three-justice panel of the Supreme Court granted the Commission's petition for interlocutory appeal. Upon review of the parties' briefs and the record, the Court found the trial court erred by not determining whether the duty to warn of a dangerous condition on the highway is a discretionary duty under the "public-function" test. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's denial of the Commission's motion for summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendants Arvind Kumar, individually and d/b/a Holiday Inn of Columbus, Tony Savage, and Tracey Savage appealed a circuit court's denial of their motion to set aside a default judgment which was entered against them based on a complaint filed by Plaintiff Shanna Loper. Before the complaint was filed, Defendants' attorney, Ed Pleasants, had written a letter to Plaintiff's attorney denying her claims. However, once the complaint was filed in circuit court, Defendants did not file a formal answer to the complaint. The only further communication Loper’s counsel received from Pleasants was a phone call stating that he would no longer be representing Defendants. After a default judgment as to liability was entered, without notice to Defendants, the circuit court set a date for a hearing to assess damages, again without notice to Defendants. The Court of Appeals found that, since Defendants clearly expressed their intent to defend against Plaintiff's claims, they were entitled to notice prior to the entry of the default judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari. Finding that the circuit court's denial of Defendants' motion to set aside the default was an abuse of discretion, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Pursuant to 42 United States Code Sections 2000e-5 and 1983, Appellee Shirley Johnson brought suit against Defendants the City of Belzoni, Police Chief Mickey Foxworth, and Officer David James. Appellee claimed she was sexually harassed at work by James for approximately a year. She reported the harassment to her supervisor Foxworth, but claimed insufficient action was taken to remedy the situation. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a unanimous verdict of $150,000–$50,000 against each Defendant, in favor of Appellee. Aggrieved, Defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial. The motion was denied and the defendants appealed. Finding that the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

In 2008, Rehab Solutions, PLLC (Rehab) received notice of tax liens assessed against its property. Thereafter, Chad Willis and Renee Willis (collectively, the Owners) employed the Nail McKinney Accounting firm to assess the financial viability of their business. As a result, numerous financial shortcomings of Rehab’s in-house accountant became apparent. When the inspection of Rehab’s finances began, the accountant left work and did not return. Rehab eventually sued the accountant in tort and in contract, seeking the return of one-half of his wages while employed by Rehab, as well as punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Rehab and awarded Rehab $133,543.17 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. The accountant appealed the jury’s award, asserting that it was not supported by the evidence and that unjust enrichment was not the proper measure of damages. Additionally, the accountant contended that the trial court erred in finding that Rehab’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations and for submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court determined that there was not a viable cause of action against the accountant in this matter. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2009, Plaintiff Charles McGraw filed a personal-injury action against four sand suppliers: Clark Sand Company, Inc.; Mississippi Valley Silica Co. Inc.; Precision Packaging, Inc.; and Custom Aggregates and Grinding, Inc. Plaintiff alleged the four defendants’ sand caused his lung disease. On the day of the trial, after the jury heard the parties’ opening statements, the court recessed, and the parties reached a settlement agreement. A few months later, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add his wife as a plaintiff and to add additional defendants. In early 2010, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s amended motion and allowed him to add the five new defendants to the complaint. However, shortly after the court granted his leave to amend, Plaintiff added a sixth defendant without the court’s permission. All six defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal concerning the trial court’s order that denied the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint and Dismiss First Amended Complaint. The defendants argued that, because the original parties settled with Plaintiff prior to his motions for leave to amend, the trial court improperly allowed the filing of the First Amended Complaint to add new parties. The defendants also argued that because Plaintiff did not seek court approval in filing his Second Amended Complaint, that complaint should be struck. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Plaintiff to file his Second Amended Complaint, because he was required to obtain court approval. However, the trial court did comply with procedural rules when it allowed Plaintiff to file his First Amended Complaint, because McGraw filed his motion before all of the original parties were dismissed with prejudice.