Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Kristine Malouf took the drug Depakote to control her seizures both before and during her pregnancy. While Kristine gave birth to a seemingly healthy child in March 1997, she and her husband eventually discovered the child had brain damage. In 2002, the Maloufs filed a complaint in Hinds County against Dr. Ruth Fredericks, a neurologist; and in 2006, they filed an amended complaint adding Dr. J. Martin Tucker, Jr., an obstetrician-gynecologist (Defendants) alleging Kristine's treating physicians negligently caused their child's brain damage and other injuries. After the Maloufs joined Dr. Tucker, the Defendants moved to transfer venue to Rankin County. The trial court denied the motion to change venue, finding the Defendants had abandoned it. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' interlocutory appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in its ruling on venue. Upon review, the Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Defendants abandoned their right to contest venue.

Plaintiffs Brian and David Knight each filed separate complaints against their uncle Defendant Benny Knight, alleging assault and battery. The trial court dismissed these cases without prejudice for want of prosecution nearly ten years later. Neither Plaintiff appealed the dismissal. In 2010, Brian and David refiled separate actions, but the trial court granted Benny's motions to dismiss both cases, finding that the one-year statute of limitations had run on both actions. Plaintiffs retained new counsel and tried to refile the cases. The court clerks' office notified counsel for Plaintiffs that per a local rule, separate complaints must be filed for each plaintiff. Plaintiffs then refiled their cases separately. In response, counsel for Benny argued that the statute of limitations should not toll for ten years and permit a plaintiff to refile a lawsuit after its dismissal for failure to prosecute, even if dismissed without prejudice. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the local rule that required Plaintiffs to refile their cases separately to be in error, and also found that the statute of limitations was not tolled since the case was dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, but on alternate grounds.

A fire destroyed a cotton-picking machine owned by Arcadia Farms Partnership. Though insurance coverage initially was denied, Audubon Insurance Company eventually paid Arcadia for the loss. Arcadia then filed suit against Audubon, asserting that Audubon's failure to submit prompt payment constituted a "bad faith breach of the policy terms." Audubon filed a motion for summary judgment. Audubon asserted that, since Arcadia had been paid on its claim prior to filing suit, Arcadia's only potential form of compensatory damages would be prejudgment interest. Yet according to Audubon, Section 75-17-7 of the Mississippi Code prohibited Arcadia from recovering prejudgment interest prior to the filing of the complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment for Audubon and denied Arcadia's motion for reconsideration or in the alternative, motion to amend its complaint to plead specifically for prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Arcadia could seek prejudgment interest from the date of breach, prior to the filing of the complaint, and that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Arcadia's motion to amend. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, but granted certiorari to address some uncertainty in the law surrounding Section 75-17-7. The Supreme Court clarified that in contract cases, Section 75-17-7 does not restrict prejudgment interest to the post-complaint period; prevailing parties in a breach-of-contract suit may seek interest from the date of breach.

Following the destruction of their home in Hurricane Katrina, Michael and Mary Robichaux filed suit in October, 2006, in the circuit court against their insurers, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Nationwide) and their agent, Jay Fletcher Insurance (Fletcher Insurance). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including indemnity under the insurance contract, compensatory and punitive damages, specific performance of the insurance contract, attorneys' fees, and court costs and expenses for what they alleged were uncompensated, covered losses under their homeowners' policy. Also included in the complaint were claims of fraud and bad faith by the insurer and its agent. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Nationwide and Fletcher Insurance based on the Plaintiffs' failure to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the home was damaged by wind, which was covered by the subject policy, rather than its having been destroyed by flood, which the trial court found was excluded under the policy. Alternatively, the trial court found that Plaintiffs failed to show they had suffered uncompensated losses due to their having received compensation under their flood policy. Upon review of Plaintiffs' appeal, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiffs suffered uncompensated, wind damage to structures other than their dwelling, and to personal property. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2006, a fire consumed an apartment building rented by Plaintiffs Paul Whittington, Jr. and Westbrook Cooper. Mr. Whittington died from injuries he sustained in the fire, while Mr. Cooper was injured but survived. The building was owned by Defendant William Lipscomb, and it was located on the same property as Mr. Lipscomb's residence. Plaintiffs sued Mr. Lipscomb and amended their complaint to seek declaratory judgment against Lipscomb's insurer, the Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut (AIC), on the issue of coverage. AIC filed a motion to sever and a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. AIC filed two separate petitions for interlocutory appeal and requested that the Court consolidate the two issues raised in the separate petitions. After reviewing the complaint, together with the insurance policy and the relevant deposition testimony, the Supreme Court determined there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the issue of coverage, and that AIC’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. AIC was dismissed from the case with prejudice.

Petitioner Sylvia Montgomery filed suit against the Mississippi Transportation Commission (Commission) after she was injured when her car struck a pothole in the northbound lane of Interstate 55 near Vaughan. The Commission filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming it was exempt from liability under several provisions of the Mississippi Torts Claim Act (MTCA). The circuit court denied the Commissionâs motion. A three-justice panel of the Supreme Court granted the Commissionâs petition for interlocutory appeal. Upon review of the partiesâ briefs and the record, the Court found the trial court erred by not determining whether the duty to warn of a dangerous condition on the highway is a discretionary duty under the "public-function test." Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial courtâs denial of the Commissionâs motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Richard Compere appealed a trial courtâs dismissal with prejudice and its imposition of monetary sanctions for his filing a second medical-malpractice action against Dr. Bryan Lantrip and St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital. The Hinds County Circuit Court imposed these sanctions because Compere previously had filed the same action, and it was pending at the time Compere filed his second complaint. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred in dismissing the second complaint with prejudice and imposing monetary sanctions. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Jules Corbin, Tammy Louis, and James Henry, Jr. were involved in an automobile wreck that left Louis dead and Henry severely injured. Corbin was indicted for capital murder, aggravated assault, and felony fleeing the scene of an accident. However, he was convicted by a jury on the lesser-included offense of murder, as well as aggravated assault and felony fleeing the scene. Corbin was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, ten years for aggravated assault, and three years for felony fleeing. Corbin appealed, and claimed among other things, that his Sixth-Amendment right to confrontation was violated. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed that Corbin's constitutional rights were violated, and that the error was not harmless as to the charges of murder and aggravated assault, but that it was harmless as to the charge of felony fleeing the scene of an accident. Thus, the Court reversed and remanded part, and affirmed part of the trial court's decision.

This was an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to sever and transfer venue. Plaintiffs Hattie Douglas, Kevin Hamlin, and the victimâs five siblings (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a complaint in circuit court against Sunshine Medical Clinic; Dr. Vibha Vig, in her official and personal capacities and Lisa Hoehn, nurse practitioner, in her official and personal capacities (collectively Defendants). The Plaintiffs alleged a medical-negligence and negligent-hiring cause of action against Defendants concerning the treatment and care of their minor son and brother, Kaddarius Douglas (Kaddarius) received before he died. Plaintiffs, in the same complaint, also brought claims against the Mississippi Crime Laboratory; Mississippi State Medical Examiners; Dr. Steven Hayne, in his official and personal capacities; Expertox, Inc.; and MedScreens, Inc. (Wrongful Incarceration Defendants) asserting that their acts and omissions in performing a postmortem examination and toxicological tests on Kaddarius's body, as well as in storing and handling blood and urine samples, caused the wrongful incarceration of Hattie Douglas for the murder of Kaddarius. All Defendants moved to have the trial court sever the claims and to transfer the claims against the Wrongful-Incarceration Defendants and to transfer the claims against the medical-negligence Defendants to another county court. The trial court denied the motion. All Defendants brought an interlocutory appeal to severe the two claims and transfer venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in not severing and transferring the claims to their proper venues. The Court the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for severance and transfer.

The Bank of Commerce (Bank) brought an action against SouthGroup Insurance and Financial Services, LLC (SouthGroup) and Norman White, an agent of SouthGroup, for negligent misrepresentations made by White regarding the type of liability insurance coverage they would need to purchase. The trial court granted summary judgment for SouthGroup and White on two grounds: (1) that the Bankâs claims are barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) that the damages sought by the Bank constituted a voluntary payment which may not be recovered under Mississippiâs voluntary payment doctrine. The Bank appealed the trial courtâs decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the three-year statute of limitations began to run when the Bank first received notice that it did not have entity coverage on January 18, 2005. When the Bank filed its claim against Defendants on July 17, 2008, the statute of limitations already had run, therefore barring the Bankâs claims against them. The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the Bank's case.