Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In July 2001, eight-year-old Jane Doe and thirteen-year-old Lisa Roe were playing unsupervised at the Presidential Hills Park, a public park built, operated, and maintained by the City of Jackson (the City). While playing in the park, the two children were approached by Andrew Lawson, a convicted sex offender, who fondled Lisa Roe and sexually battered Jane Doe. Lawson was convicted for his criminal acts against the girls. Two girls sued the City. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from suit. The trial court denied the motion. Because the City's operation of the park was a discretionary function, the Supreme Court granted the City's petition for interlocutory appeal and reversed the trial court and rendered judgment for the City.

Bernice Conner filed a medical-negligence suit against Mid-South Retina, LLC. The County Court of Coahoma County originally granted summary judgment in favor of Mid-South, finding that Conner had failed to establish the necessary element of causation. The trial court then reversed its judgment upon reconsideration and denied Mid-South's motion for summary judgment. Aggrieved, Mid-South filed a petition for interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court. In 2003, Mid-South Retina, LLC, and Dr. Brad Priester treated Bernice Conner for age-related macular degeneration. As part of Conner's treatment, she intravenously received Visudyne, a drug that aids in cold-laser therapy for macular degeneration. During Conner's second visit to Mid-South, Visudyne infiltrated the soft tissue around the injection site in the bend of Conner's elbow. Dr. Priester determined that enough Visudyne had entered Conner's bloodstream and proceeded with the cold-laser therapy. The therapy session continued without incident. Visudyne is a photodynamic drug, and tissue containing the drug can easily burn if exposed to sunlight. Dr. Priester testified that, because of this side effect, he ensured that Conner's elbow was sufficiently bandaged and covered prior to her leaving Mid-South. Shortly after leaving, Conner called Mid-South complaining that her arm was hurting. The next day, Dr. Priester contacted Conner, and she informed him that she was still in pain. Dr. Priester instructed her to go to an emergency room. Conner went to an emergency room and was referred to a general surgeon, who prescribed pain medication and antibiotics. Conner saw the surgeon two more times in 2003, and the surgeon noted that the injury on Conner's elbow measured less than one centimeter in size. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment denying Mid-South's motion for summary judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court finding genuine issues of material fact that still existed with regard to causation of Conner's pain.

In this personal-injury products-liability case, a jury awarded plaintiff Trellvion Gaines $7 million, finding that he had been brain-damaged from exposure to lead. In an effort to convince the Supreme Court to reverse the trial judgment and to render judgment in its favor, Defendant Sherwin-Williams Company challenged the reliability of Plaintiff's causation experts and fact witnesses. In the alternative, Sherwin-Williams alleged that unreliable, unfairly prejudicial, and untimely disclosed expert testimony and a biased jury pool required a new trial. Because Plaintiff's experts' speculation was inadmissible, and because the Plaintiffs' experts did not present any scientific authority that an acute, asymptomatic ingestion of lead could lead to the alleged injuries, Plaintiff did not offer sufficient proof of causation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case on the causation issue. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects.

In 2005, Weight Watchers discovered that its bookkeeper, Dianne Belk, had embezzled nearly $1,000,000 from the business over a six-year period. Belk embezzled the money by writing checks to herself from Weight Watchers accounts. She concealed her writing of unauthorized checks by inputting legitimate vendors' names in the computerized bookkeeping system as the ostensible payees. However, Belk would type her name as payee on the paper checks. Belk then would cash the checks at local banks and casinos, including the Rainbow Casino, and she often would gamble with the embezzled money. Belk reported her winnings to the Internal Revenue Service via W-2G forms provided by the casino, and she paid taxes on those winnings. According to the complaint, Belk lost roughly $240,000 of the stolen funds to Rainbow Casino. More than three years after first learning of Belk's embezzlement activities, Weight Watchers filed suit against Belk, Robert Belk, Jr. (Dianne's husband), Rainbow Casino-Vicksburg Partnership, L.P., Bally Technologies Inc. (the casino's management company),and five John Doe defendants. Weight Watchers' claims against Rainbow Casino and Bally Technologies were based on fraud, unjust enrichment, conversion, and negligence. Rainbow moved for summary judgment, arguing that the three-year statute of limitations had begun to run in 2005 when Weight Watchers first learned that Belk had been cashing unauthorized checks at the casino. Rainbow also argued, in the alternative, that summary judgment was appropriate because the casino was a holder in due course and that it did not have a legal duty to investigate the circumstances surrounding issuance of the checks. In this appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the statute of limitations barred an action against a casino for its alleged involvement in an embezzlement scheme. Finding that the Weight Watchers failed to provide any evidence of fraudulent concealment by the casino, the Court agreed with the trial court that the statute of limitations had run at the time the suit was filed.

Petitioners Mary Gray, Peggy Pettaway, Kimberly Clausell, Lillian Byrd, and Chris Clausell filed negligence lawsuits against the City of Jackson, City of Raymond and Alice Wilson. Before trial, Raymond settled with Petitioners leaving Jackson and Ms. Wilson as Defendants. A Raymond police officer pursued Ms. Wilson who was driving erratically on a Raymond highway. Jackson officers were notified that Raymond police were in pursuit of Ms. Wilson's vehicle and assisted in the pursuit. The chase ended with Ms. Wilson striking a vehicle containing the Clausells and Ms. Byrd. Ms. Wilson died from the injuries she sustained, and Kimberly Clausell and Lillian Byrd were both injured in the crash. The trial court found that Ms. Wilson was fifty percent at fault, Raymond was thirty percent at fault and Jackson was twenty percent at fault. Jackson appealed the final judgment of the circuit court arguing that the court's apportionment of fault was made in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's judgment was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of Petitioners and rendered judgment in favor of Jackson.

Minor Petitioners Latisha Head and Ashley McCoy through their mothers Shirley Russell and Shirley McCoy (collectively Petitioners) filed a complaint against the Jackson Public School District (JPS), the City of Jackson, the Jackson Police Department and several school officials because of a skirmish that occurred at Watkins Elementary School. Petitioners' complaint alleged assault and battery against a school official as a result of an altercation with Ms. Head. Four years would pass between Petitioners' initial complaint and the discovery phase of the case for various reasons by both parties' counsel. JPS moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute. The circuit court denied the motion, and from this denial, JPS appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no inexcusable delay and that JPS suffered no actual prejudice. The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of JPS' motion, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The estate of Charles Harris filed a medical malpractice action against John Lee, M.D. and the Forest Family Practice Clinic. Days before trial, the estate tried to move the circuit court to transfer venue based on Dr. Lee's status in the community and his son's position as the local sheriff. The circuit court denied the estate's motion. In jury selection, the estate exercised only seven of its ten peremptory challenges. Ultimately the empaneled jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Lee and the clinic. On appeal, the estate argued multiple errors at trial pertaining to voir dire and to the court's jury instructions warranted a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found certain jurors' lack of candor during voir dire, and subsequent disclosures and opinions that surfaced only during jury deliberations constituted misconduct that the trial court should have considered before denying the estate's motion to set aside the verdict. Therefore, the Court reversed the circuit court's denial of the estate's motion to set aside the verdict and remanded the case for a new trial.

Appellants Bobbi Young and Linda Carter, next of kin to Clarence Young, appealed an order of the circuit court that granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent Dr. Robert Smith and Baptist Memorial Hospital. On appeal, the Youngs argued that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to grant their "motion to withdraw admissions" filed seven years after the admissions were otherwise "conclusively established." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's ruling was well within its discretion under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court further affirmed the circuit court's finding that no genuine issue of material fact remained regarding the Youngs' claims against Dr. Smith and the hospital, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the Doctor's favor.

After John Sykes died in the emergency room at Calhoun Health Services, his estate sued the hospital for wrongful death, claiming that Mr. Sykes should have been hooked up to a cardiac monitor. Mr. Sykes was admitted after complaining of chest pains. He did not appear to be in distress, was not short of breath and was not sweating. He denied having any other symptoms. Mr. Sykes would later be diagnosed with "severe cardiomegaly" and died of "sudden cardiac death" related to "severe. . . hypertensive heart disease." The trial judge held that the estate failed to prove that the hospital had deviated from an applicable standard of care, and failed to prove that use of the cardiac monitor would have made a difference for Mr. Sykes' care. The Supreme Court found that all of the estate's issues concerned factual determinations that were within the discretion of the trial court. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

In 2003, Respondent Cedric Byrd misjudged a turn along a Rankin County highway. The trailer he was towing got stuck in the highway. A car in which Jonathan Dooley was traveling with his mother collided with the trailer, killing Jonathan instantly. On behalf of Jonathan's heirs, Leah Dooley, Jonathan's mother, filed a wrongful death action against Mr. Byrd and his employer Independent Roofing Systems. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Byrd and Independent Roofing. The trial court denied Ms. Dooley's post-trial motions, and she appealed to the Supreme Court. Ms. Dooley argued that there were multiple errors at trial that ended with a verdict against the weight of the evidence presented. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed that the errors at trial warranted a new trial. Of note, the Court found that Jonathan's heirs were not allowed to fully participate in the proceedings. On this basis, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment in this case and remanded the case for further proceedings.