Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Barry Gregg challenged a Workersâ Compensation Commission (Commission) holding that denied him permanent partial disability benefits. Petitioner was injured on the job for Respondent Natchez Trace Electric Power (Natchez) and was unable to satisfactorily return to his job nor earn on-call compensation. Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed the Commissionâs decision to the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the Commission erred in reaching its decision. In the decision adopted by the Commission, the administrative law judge observed that Petitioner made more money after his injury than before he was injured. The appellate court affirmed the Commissionâs decision on the basis of a presumption that because of that earning discrepancy, Petitioner failed to prove that he suffered a loss of âwage-earning capacity.â The Supreme Court found that the Commission erred by considering Petitionerâs higher wage post-injury as determinative of his earning capacity. The Court found that Petitioner had rebutted the presumption regarding his earning capacity. Subsequently, the Court reversed both the Commissionâs and the appellate courtâs holdings and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellee Terrance Shanks filed a personal-injury action against Defendants-Appellants Kimball Glassco Residential Center and van driver Vera Richardson on behalf of his mother Lois Shanks. Ms. Shanks was injured when the van Ms. Richardson was driving went out of control. Ms. Richardson moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the action was barred by a one-year statute of limitations under state tort law. In its answer to the action, Kimball Glassco also raised the statute of limitations as a defense and argued that it was a state entity entitled to a level of immunity under the state tort law. The trial court denied Ms. Richardson's motion to dismiss and held that both Defendants had waived the statute of limitations defense earlier in the litigation. Furthermore, the court found that the state tort law did not give either Defendant immunity from liability. Upon consideration of the briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by finding that Defendants waived the statute of limitations as their defense. The Court found that Mr. Shanks filed his complaint one year after the expiration of the statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order, and rendered judgment in favor of Defendants.

In 2007, Plaintiff Lyshell Wilson entered Defendant CitiTrends' clothing store. While shopping, Ms. Wilson was brutally injured by Defendant Jocelyn Howard, who attacked her with a pair of scissors. Ms. Howard moved to dismiss Ms. Wilson's claims, arguing that Ms. Wilson failed to file her complaint within a one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery. Ms. Wilson denied she sued for assault and battery. Instead, she sued on a negligence claim. The trial court denied Ms. Howard's motion to dismiss. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Ms. Howard argued that Ms. Wilson attempted to circumvent the statute of limitations by characterizing her claim as one for negligence when it was really assault and battery. Ms. Howard maintained that Ms. Wilson's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court agreed with Ms. Howard. The Court held that the trial court erred in denying Ms. Howard's motion to dismiss. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellee Charles Buckner filed a personal-injury action against the Copiah County School District and Kenneth Funches. Appellee failed to serve process on either Defendant within the 120-day period provided by the state rules of civil procedure. After running the statute of limitations, Appellee moved for an extension of time to effect service of process. The trial court granted the motion, and allowed Appellee an additional 120 days to effect service. Appellee failed to serve Defendants under the second 120-day period. Defendants moved to set aside the extension granted to Appellee and moved to dismiss the case, but the trial court denied the motions. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Appellee two 120-day periods to effect service of process. The Supreme Court found that the statute of limitations had run before Appellee first asked for an extension of time. It ruled, therefore, that the trial court did abuse its discretion by granting the extension. The Court reversed the trial court, effectively dismissing Appelleeâs case against Defendants.

Cable company employee David Marble was injured when he touched a live electrical wire while attempting to splice a new cable into an old one. He brought suit against Deviney Construction Company, Inc. (Deviney), alleging that Deviney negligently dug up the electrical wire and failed to secure it. Before trial, the trial judge ruled that witnesses could only be called once. Deviney objected, arguing that the defense should not be âhandcuffedâ and should be able to call its witnesses in its own case-in-chief. Mr. Marble ultimately called fourteen witnesses in his case, including two of Devineyâs fact witnesses. During trial, Deviney renewed its objection to the trial judgeâs ruling, but the trial judge affirmed her earlier ruling. Mr. Marble would win a $2.5 million verdict against Deviney. Deviney appealed the verdict, arguing among other things, that the trial judgeâs ruling on the presentation of witnesses constituted reversible error. The Supreme Court agreed that âa court has broad discretion . . . to manage the pace of a trial by placing âreasonableâ limitsâ on the presentation of evidence but found that the trial judge âundulyâ interfered with Devineyâs presentation of its case. The Court reversed the trial courtâs decision, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Appellant Shirley Collins filed suit against Appellees-Defendants Koppers, Inc. and several others, alleging she was injured as a result of environmental contamination caused by a wood-treatment facility. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss after Collins repeatedly failed to comply with a court order to provide expert opinions that causally linked her injuries to the alleged contamination. The trial court granted the Defendantsâ motion to dismiss and awarded them attorneyâs fees. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not grant her enough time to respond to Defendantsâ discovery requests. âIt is obvious that the trial judge exercised considerable patience and restraint in dealing with the delays caused by [Appellantâs] counsel. The record is replete with examples of instances of the failure of [Appellantâs] counsel to abide by the orders of the trial court.â Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial courtâs ruling.

The City of Jackson appealed a judgment made against the city for damages based on a police officerâs pursuit of a vehicle. The suspectâs vehicle collided with another vehicle owned by Eric and Kristina Law. The Jackson Police Department has a written pursuit policy which stipulates all police officers perform a balancing test when in pursuit of suspects. This means that police officers should weigh the immediate danger posed by their pursuit to that of allowing the suspect to remain at large. The trial court held that the officer acted recklessly when he pursued the suspect causing damage to the vehicle owned by Eric and Kristina Law. The court awarded each of the Laws $250,000. The Supreme Court found that the officer had violated the applicable pursuit policy by failing to weigh the potential harm to the public. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs ruling.

Sixteen former clients (Clients) sued two lawyers (Lawyers) who had represented them in a mass-tort litigation, claiming the lawyers had breached their fiduciary duty by prematurely settling their cases in order to maximize attorney fees. Responding to a motion for summary judgment, the Clients produced a witness who testified that he had worked for the Lawyers and had settled numerous similar cases for much more than the Clients received. The witness also produced a document he prepared that the Lawyers used as a settlement template. The trial judge found the witnessâ testimony and template were inadmissible as hearsay, and that the Clients could not prove they would have won their mass-tort case at trial in order to sue their Lawyers for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted summary judgment against the Clients, and they appealed. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by requiring the Clients prove they would have won their mass-tort case at trial. Furthermore, the Court held that the witnessâ testimony should not have been excluded at trial as hearsay. The Court found that the witnessâ testimony was offered to establish facts already in the record: â[w]hile those decisions may have been based on [the witnessâ] opinions at the time, the decision-making process and the resultant [template] wasâ a matter of fact. The Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.