Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Stephen Johnson was arrested and convicted for driving on a suspended license (in the third degree). His license had been suspended for failing to pay a traffic fine. Johnson appealed his DWLS 3rd conviction, arguing: (1) the former RCW 46.20.342(1)(c)(iv) (2008) did not proscribe his continuing to drive after the suspension of his license for failing to pay a traffic fine; or alternatively, (2) that because he was indigent, the suspension was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution's due process and equal protection clauses, which required the State to inquire into his ability to pay the fine before suspending his license. Furthermore, Johnson argued the trial court erred by denying him counsel to fight these charges, and wanted reimbursement for attorney fees spent in his defense. The Supreme Court rejected Johnson's arguments on appeal, but remanded the case for further proceedings to determine Johnson's right to reimbursement for attorney fees. The plain meaning of former RCW 46.20.342(1 )( c )(iv) allows the State to convict a driver for DWLS 3rd where the underlying license suspension occurred for failure to pay a fine. Johnson was not constitutionally indigent, but statutorily so; on remand, the Supreme Court instructed the district court to enter an order designating Johnson either as (1) indigent or (2) indigent and able to contribute. If Johnson is able to contribute, the district court would have to enter an order determining the costs he should bear for his appeal. View "Cade v. Beard" on Justia Law

Helen Schroeder was a passenger in an automobile driven by her husband Harry, when a log truck collided with the rear of the automobile. Harry was killed, and Helen was severely injured. A consequence of the accident was that Helen suffered diminished mental capacity. In a federal lawsuit, Helen claimed the truck driver was at fault and denied that Harry was negligent. After the federal judge denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Helen settled the federal suit. Helen then sued Harry’s estate in state court, claiming Harry was partially at fault. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the estate on judicial estoppel grounds. But, because the federal judge stated his denial of summary judgment was based on his finding of genuine issues of material fact as to the truck driver’s negligence, not “Harry Schroeder’s potential contributory negligence,” the Supreme Court reversed. View "Clark v. Neese" on Justia Law

In 2007, fifteen-year-old Alexandria Miller and sixteen-year-old Kelly Garvin were traveling on a two-lane road when their vehicle collided with two horses that had escaped from a nearby property and were standing in the middle of the road. Garvin sued Miller alleging negligent operation of the vehicle. Garvin asserted claims of negligent entrustment against Miller’s mother and stepfather, Melanie and V. M. Cleveland, and Tupelo Furniture Market, Inc. (TFM), and a claim of negligent training/instruction against V. M. Cleveland. Garvin further asserted that Melanie and V. M. Cleveland were liable for Miller’s negligence because they had signed Miller’s driver’s license application. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the claims of negligent entrustment and negligent training/instruction in favor of the Clevelands and TFM. Garvin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly granted summary judgment and accordingly affirmed that court's judgment. View "Guardianship of Kelly Garvin v. Tupelo Furniture Market, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, Edward Miles drove his pickup truck into an intersection in front of Virgil Burcham’s eighteen-wheel fuel truck. Miles died several hours following the accident. Virgil Burcham sued Edward Miles’s estate for negligence and negligence per se. Burcham received a $60,000 judgment, which the Miles estate appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to liability, subject to remittitur. View "Estate of Edward Miles v. Burcham" on Justia Law

Larry Smith worked on various drilling rigs from the mid-1960s until the early 1990s. A heavy smoker, Larry smoked roughly two to three packs a day from at least the mid-1950s through at least 1986. He was diagnosed with lung cancer in August 2002 and died three months later. This case arose from a jury verdict that awarded his widow Elsie Smith and other wrongful death beneficiaries monetary damages for Larry's death. Elsie claimed that her husband’s proximity to working with these products led to his lung cancer because the drilling additives contained asbestos. After a jury verdict in favor of the beneficiaries, the defendant corporations filed a joint motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), which was granted by the trial judge. The beneficiaries appealed the grant of JNOV. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it granted JNOV by applying the the beneficiaries’ proof to the frequency, regularity, and proximity test rather than to the elements of the their negligent design claim sounding in products liability. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Smith v. Union Carbide Corporation" on Justia Law

Sherry Walker was denied disability benefits by the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS). The Circuit Court reversed PERS’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, reinstating PERS’ denial of benefits. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded PERS’ decision to deny Walker’s request for regular disability benefits was unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed part of the appellate court's decision and reversed the Circuit Court's decision, and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in Walker’s favor on her regular disability benefits claim. View "Public Employees' Retirement System v. Walker" on Justia Law

Illinois Central Railroad Company appealed a jury verdict for Perry Brent awarded under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) for injuries he sustained during his employment with Illinois Central. While the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in failing to grant Illinois Central's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict on the FELA negligence per se claim, the Court affirmed the jury's general verdict based on Brent's FELA negligence claim. View "Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Brent" on Justia Law

Two vehicles struck multi-ton counterweights owned by Mitchell Crane Services, Inc., which were on a traveled portion of a highway. The accident occurred in 1999, at night. The occupants of the two vehicles sued Mitchell Crane. During the liability phase of a bifurcated trial, the jury found that a thief was seventy-five percent responsible, and Mitchell Crane was twenty-five percent responsible for any damages. The trial court denied Mitchell Crane’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). At the conclusion of the damages trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Patricia Page and the other plaintiffs. Mitchell Crane renewed its motion for JNOV, which was denied. Mitchell Crane appealed, and Page cross-appealed. Given a jury finding that a thief stole the truck, the trial court erred by not applying our controlling law and granting Mitchell Crane’s original motion for JNOV. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Mitchell Crane Services, Inc. v. Page" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a civil suit brought by the estates and wrongful-death beneficiaries of Christopher Allan Bloodworth, Steven Earl Tallant Jr., Marcus Richardson, and A.W. Hilson, four men killed at a railroad crossing when a freight train collided with the truck in which they were traveling. The beneficiaries of Bloodworth, Tallant, Richardson, and Hilson filed their complaint(s) against Illinois Central Railroad Company and several of its employees, including the track crew, as well as other employees of Illinois Central’s track department. Defendants filed two motions for summary judgment; the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims alleging negligent operation of the train. The circuit court also granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants on three of four contested issues regarding the engineering and maintenance of the railroad crossing, leaving one surviving claim. The circuit court then granted five of Defendants’ motions in limine to exclude Plaintiffs’ evidence. Finding that, without the excluded evidence, Plaintiffs could not support the remaining claim, the circuit court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment in their entirety and issued a judgment and certificate pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decisions to the Supreme Court, and Defendants cross-appealed as to certain trial court rulings. Because the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on each claim by Plaintiffs, the Court dismissed Defendants’ cross-appeal as moot. View "Estate of Bloodworth v. Illinois Central Railroad Company" on Justia Law

Three motorists sued the Mississippi Department of Transportation after their vehicles collided with a pine tree that had fallen across the highway. The Department filed a motion to dismiss asserting immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), and the trial court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The motorists appealed. Finding that the Department’s motion to dismiss should not have been granted, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Little v. Mississippi Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law