Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Ronnie and Pamela Goss filed suit against defendants Rickey Wilkerson and Phenix Transportation, Inc. alleging that "Rickey Wilkerson fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to settle their workers' compensation claims and to release all claims against Phenix Transportation, Inc." in return for $65,000. The Gosses further alleged that Wilkerson knew, or should have known, that the checks would not clear due to insufficient funds. The Gosses did not allege any specific facts in their complaint nor did they present any cognizable evidence to establish venue in Smith County. Defendants timely answered the complaint, including in their answer a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to transfer jurisdiction and venue. Defendants argued that the Gosses' claims were legal in nature and were improperly brought in chancery court. Defendants also argued that venue was not proper in Smith County because Wilkerson resides in Scott County and Phenix has its principal place of business in Scott County. Defendants further argued that venue was not proper because no substantial act or omission or substantial event that allegedly caused the injury occurred in Smith County. The Gosses never filed a response to Defendants' motion. The chancery court heard oral argument on Defendants' motion. No transcript exists of the hearing. The chancery court found that the settlement checks and other documents were sent to the Gosses in Smith County, and the Gosses attempted to negotiate the checks in Smith County. Therefore, the chancery court concluded that venue was proper in Smith County because the "cause of action occurred/accrued in Smith County." The chancery court also found that the Gosses' claims were "more legal than equitable in nature" and transferred the case to the Circuit Court of Smith County. On appeal, Defendants argued that the chancery court erred in denying their motion to transfer venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Chancery Court of Smith County erred in its interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 and in denying Defendants' motion to transfer venue. View "Wilkerson v. Goss" on Justia Law

After an administrative judge (AJ) ruled on a claimant's petition to controvert a workers' compensation claim, the claimant had twenty days to file a notice of appeal with the full Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission. In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether an AJ's order, handed down more than twenty days after the AJ's ruling and granting a claimant thirty additional days in which to prosecute her claim, should be given legal effect by the Commission so that the claimant's notice of appeal, filed within the additional thirty days, would be considered timely. Upon review, the Court found that, under the facts and circumstances presented, such an appeal was timely. View "Felter v. Floorserv, Inc." on Justia Law

Carl Patterson Jr. sustained serious injuries in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. He sued T. L. Wallace Construction, Inc. and Turtle Creek Development, Inc. for damages. T. L. Wallace and Turtle Creek both filed motions for summary judgment. The Circuit Court of Marion County granted each motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, finding the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment, reversed and remanded for a trial. Both defendants filed writs of certiorari, which were granted. After considering the parties' arguments and applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated and affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment. View "Patterson, Jr. v. T. L. Wallace Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Elizabeth Swain and Mona Cates lived together from 2000 until 2006. After they severed their relationship, Swain filed an action seeking the repayment of funds she first had invested in a property in Washington State, which were then used to purchase a residence in Mississippi. The chancellor rejected Swain's claim of a constructive trust or a resulting trust. The chancellor found that Cates had been unjustly enriched by Swain's contributions and awarded Swain a judgment in that amount. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor's rejection of the trust claim but reversed the decision of the chancellor, which was based on unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals held that, because “cohabitation alone cannot form the basis of an equitable remedy between non-married cohabitants,” the remedy of unjust enrichment was outside the bounds of the chancery court's equitable powers. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor was empowered to award relief on the basis of unjust enrichment. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it affirmed the chancellor's rejection of Swain's claim of a constructive trust or a resulting trust. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals with regard to the unjust-enrichment award. Because the chancellor made a mathematical error in the calculation of the unjust-enrichment award, the Court vacated the chancellor's judgment in part, and remanded the case to the chancery court for entry of judgment in the correct amount. View "Cates v. Swain" on Justia Law

Martin Vance filed a medical-malpractice/wrongful-death action on behalf of Mamie Vance Hemphill, alleging that Dr. Charles H. Laney was negligent in his treatment of the decedent, Hemphill. Vance initially sued other medical providers, but all but Dr. Laney were dismissed. Trial was held; Dr. Laney was the sole defendant. The jury returned a verdict of $1,000,000 to Vance. In response, Dr. Laney filed this appeal, presenting three issues to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in remitting plaintiff's economic damage award to $103,688 when the substantial weight of the evidence proved that the award should have been zero; (2) whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions; and, (3) whether plaintiff's counsel made inappropriate comments, and, when taken with the erroneous jury instructions, should have warranted Dr. Laney a new trial. Because the trial judge committed reversible error in instructing the jury that they could consider the "value of life" of the deceased in awarding damages, and because counsel for Vance made improper and prejudicial comments to the jury during closing arguments, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Laney v. Vance" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned premises liability in the context of a wrongful death action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that the deceased was an invitee at the time of his death and that the plaintiff breached no duty to the deceased under the standard applied to those classified as invitees while on the property of another. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed the grant of summary judgment was appropriate but disagreed with the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to the reason. The Court found that the injured party was not an invitee at the time of the incident, but a trespasser. Because both the Court of Appeals and the trial court incorrectly classified the decedent as an invitee, the Court affirmed only the result. View "Handy v. Nejam" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned an interlocutory appeal of the Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) which sought review of the denial of its motion for summary judgment in a wrongful-death action filed by the beneficiaries of A.J. Cowart (Nosef). Cowart drove into an unmarked culvert and flipped his car. Cowart was taken to the hospital where he later died. Nosef filed this suit against MDOT, claiming that MDOT's failure to place warning signs around the culvert resulted in the accident that caused Cowart's death. MDOT claimed in its motion that it was immune from liability under the state Tort Claims Act. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the law imposed a ministerial duty to place warning signs around highway culverts which had not been abrogated or repealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court and affirmed the denial of summary judgment. View "Mississippi Dept. of Transportation v. Nosef" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Shirley and Robert Alston filed suit against Defendants Justin Pope and T.K. Stanley, Inc. seeking damages they claimed resulted from a motor-vehicle accident in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The circuit court dismissed the case on grounds of forum non conveniens. The Alstons then filed suit in Alabama. The suit was dismissed because Alabama's statute of limitations for the claim had expired. The Alstons thereafter filed a motion for relief from judgment, under Rule 60(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure at the circuit court, claiming the circuit court's previous dismissal was void because Defendants had failed to file a written stipulation with the court, waiving the right to assert a statute-of-limitations defense. The circuit court denied the Alstons' motion and the Alstons appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the matter for an adjudication on the merits after finding the circuit court abused its discretion by denying the Alstons' Rule 60(b) motion. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. After its review, the high court found that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the circuit court's decision to deny the Alstons' Rule 60(b) motion, Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court's judgment denying the Alstons' Rule 60(b) motion. View "Alston v. Pope" on Justia Law

In a wrongful death action against a nursing home, the nursing home moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the nursing home resident was the third-party beneficiary to the admission and arbitration agreements signed by his sister. The trial court denied the motion, finding that no valid contract was signed by someone with the legal authority to do so, and the nursing home appealed. Because the resident's sister lacked the authority to contract for him, and thus no valid contract existed, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "GGNSC Batesville, LLC v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In a slip-and-fall case, Laura Karpinsky alleged that she sustained injuries when she fell in a puddle in a shopping mall. The Circuit Court found that Karpinsky had failed to offer any evidence that her fall was caused by negligence attributable to the Defendants, and entered summary judgment against her. The Court of Appeals found that the circuit court had erred and reversed the summary judgment order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, finding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in this case, reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the order of the circuit court. View "Karpinsky v. American National Insurance Company " on Justia Law