Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Isaiah Robinson attacked Respondent Linda Knox in a Kroger parking lot, punching her several times and taking her purse. Claiming that Kroger had a duty to place an armed guard in its parking lot and that its breach of that duty lead to her injuries, Respondent sued the Kroger Company and Kroger Limited Partnership and recovered damages. Kroger appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that unless Kroger was on notice of an atmosphere of violence in its parking lot, it had no duty to place an armed guard there. Respondent failed to present sufficient evidence on that point, so the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for entry of dismissal.

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Southern Health Corporation of Houston, Inc. d/b/a Trace Regional Hospital, and Marcia Morgan, a registered nurse. Aggrieved, Ruth Crosthwait appealed to the Supreme Court, which in turn assigned this case to the Court of Appeals. In a four-four plurality opinion (two judges not participating), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The case arose from a slip and fall incident at the hospital: Crosthwait was admitted to Trace Regional Hospital for treatment of fluctuating blood sugar stemming from diabetes. Crosthwait was eighty-two years old, lived alone, and generally could walk without assistance. While she was hospitalized, Crosthwait's attending physician instructed her to ring a bell to have a nurse assist her when she rose from her hospital bed. In 2008, Crosthwait was preparing to leave the hospital, and she decided to take a shower. Crosthwait called for Marcia Morgan to assist her with undressing. Crosthwait walked into the bathroom unassisted. Morgan offered Crosthwait a shower stool, which she accepted. Morgan then left and returned with a chair, which she placed in the shower. While Crosthwait showered, Morgan told Crosthwait she would have to leave to attend another patient. When Morgan returned, she turned off the shower and Crosthwait exited the shower. It was undisputed that the fall caused Crosthwait significant injury, including a broken hip and a loss of mobility and independence. Crosthwait filed suit against the hospital and Morgan. The hospital and Morgan filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Crosthwait's action was for medical malpractice, and summary judgment was proper because, among other things, Crosthwait needed expert testimony to establish the duty of care owed to her by the hospital and to show whether that duty had been breached. Crosthwait responded that the claim was for ordinary negligence, for which expert testimony was not required. The circuit court granted the hospital’s motion, and Crosthwait appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

Petitioner Troy Lofton alleged he suffered from asbestosis as a result of exposure to the Defendant's product, Flosal, during the course of his employment on various oil and gas drilling rigs. Petitioner filed suit in 2004, alleging two theories of product liability (design defect and inadequate warning), as well as claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Petitioner on his claims of design defect and negligent infliction of emotional distress, with one hundred percent of the liability assigned to Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP, successor-in-interest to ConocoPhillips Company, formerly known as Phillips Petroleum Company, and Phillips 66 Company, formerly doing business as Drilling Specialties Company (CPChem) and total damages in the amount of $15,200,000. CPChem's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and its motion for new trial and/or remittur were denied. Aggrieved, CPChem filed this appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial due to the trial court's error in allowing Petitioner's counsel to read from drilling records that were not admitted into evidence during the cross-examination of CPChem’s expert pulmonologist.

In 2009, Charles Larry McGraw filed a personal-injury action against four sand suppliers: Clark Sand Company, Inc.; Mississippi Valley Silica Co., Inc.; Precision Packaging, Inc.; and Custom Aggregates and Grinding, Inc. McGraw alleged the four defendants' sand caused his lung disease, silicosis. On the day of the trial, after the jury had heard the parties' opening statements, the court recessed, and the parties reached a settlement agreement. Subsequently, McGraw filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add his wife as a plaintiff and American Optical Corporation as an additional defendant. He then filed an amended motion for leave to amend his complaint (First Amended Complaint) to modify his request to add four more defendants: Lonestar Industries, Inc.; Specialty Sand Company; Pearl Sands, Inc.; and Pearl Specialty Sand, Inc. In early 2010, the trial court granted McGraw's amended motion and allowed him to add the five new defendants to the complaint. McGraw later filed a Second Amended Complaint, which added a sixth defendant, Dependable Abrasives, Inc., without seeking leave of court. All six defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal concerning the trial court's order denying their Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint and Dismiss First Amended Complaint. The defendants argued that, because the original parties settled with McGraw prior to his motions for leave to amend, the trial court improperly allowed the filing of the First Amended Complaint to add new parties. The defendants also argue that, because McGraw did not seek court approval in filing his Second Amended Complaint, that complaint should be struck. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing McGraw to file his Second Amended Complaint, because he was required to obtain court approval. However, the Court found that the trial court did comply with the rules of procedure when it allowed McGraw to file his First Amended Complaint. The Court therefore affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and reversed the denial of the motion to strike the Second Amended Complaint.

This interlocutory appeal challenged the dismissal of plaintiffs' Deborah and Harold Knapp's medical malpractice claim related to a slip and fall in a hospital bathroom. The Knapps sued the hospital after a 2006 incident that had her admitted. She slipped and fell on a wet bathroom floor, allegedly from a leaky toilet. She was transferred to the Behavioral Health Unit, and while there, was attacked by another patient. Based on these two events, the Knapps listed "negligence," "breach of warranty" and "gross negligence, punitive damages, etc." as grounds for their complaint. Finding that the claim at issue did not involve professional negligence, and that the trial court properly recognized the parties' discovery obligations, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Two appeals are were consolidated from chancery-court cases. In the first case, Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owners Association, Inc. sued Thomas R. Alfonso, III, and Anne Scafidi Cordova,1 d/b/a Bay Jourdan Publishing Co. (BJP) for breach of a contract to publish "The Diamondhead News." In 1997, the chancery court entered a preliminary injunction order preventing BJP from publishing "The Diamondhead News," selling advertising, collecting or disposing of advertising revenues derived from the publication the paper, and interfering with the printing, publication, or distribution of "The Diamondhead News." The chancery court also found that an arbitration clause in the publishing contract was inapplicable to the lawsuit. The chancery court denied BJP’s two subsequent motions to compel arbitration of the breach-of-contract dispute. BJP appealed the chancery court’s latest denial of arbitration. In the second case, BJP sued Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing Co., Inc., d/b/a "The Sun Herald" (“Gulf Publishing”), for intentional interference with the publishing contract. Gulf Publishing filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to Gulf Publishing and directed the entry of a final judgment as to Gulf Publishing pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). BJP appealed the grant of summary judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s order denying BJP’s third motion to compel arbitration because the issue was ruled upon previously, and no appeal was taken. Finding genuine issues of material fact for trial, the Court reversed the chancery court’s order granting summary judgment to Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing, and remanded the second case for further proceedings.

Henry Morgan, Sr. filed a personal-injury suit against eighty-eight defendants, claiming injuries related to silicosis. Morgan, Sr., died while the personal-injury case was pending, and the case eventually was dismissed. More than three years after Morgan, Sr.'s death, his son, Henry Morgan, Jr., filed a wrongful-death suit individually and on behalf of all wrongful-death beneficiaries of Morgan, Sr. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion. Because the wrongful-death suit was filed more than three years after the death of Morgan, Sr., the statute of limitations barred any wrongful-death and survival claims. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and render judgment in favor of the defendants.

After an insolvent employer's insurance company also became insolvent, the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Self-Insurers Guaranty Association (SIGA) made workers' compensation payments to an injured worker. SIGA sued the Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association (MIGA) for reimbursement of those payments, and the trial court ordered reimbursement. The issue came before the Supreme Court who, after consideration, concluded that SIGA's claim against MIGA did not fall within the statutory definition of a "covered claim," and reversed the trial court’s reimbursement decision.

In 2002, Dung Thi Hoang Nguyen stopped behind Karen Thompson at a red light. In reaching for her purse, her foot slipped off the brake and her car bumped into Thompson's. Neither car was damaged. The two exchanged insurance information without calling the police. But after Thompson arrived at her parents' home, her father told her to get a police report for her insurance provider, so Thompson called Nguyen, who agreed to meet her at the police station that night. A few days later, Thompson visited her physician complaining of neck pain. An MRI of Thompson’s spine revealed a preexisting degenerative-disc disease associated with disc bulges. And despite ongoing therapy, Thompson continued to complain of headaches, insomnia, depression, and neck pain until, in 2004, she was referred to a neurosurgeon, who performed surgery in 2005, Thompson to treat her abnormal discs. Thompson filed suit against Nguyen, seeking $234,316.49 in compensation. Nguyen admitted liability but contested that the accident had caused Thompson that much damage. A jury awarded Thompson $9,131– the exact amount of her physical therapy bills, but she filed a motion for additur or a new trial on damages alone, which the circuit court denied. Thompson appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial on damages. The jury awarded Thompson less than the amount requested. Thompson appealed the jury’s second award. Because causation was central to Thompson's argument for the new damages award, the Supreme Court found it a question of fact for the jury, and affirmed its award.

Henry Gibson was a resident of Arnold Avenue Nursing Home (AA) in Greenville from 2001 until 2002. After being hospitalized in December 2002, Gibson was moved to another nursing home and died on January 26, 2003. Gibson's estate filed a wrongful-death action in 2004 seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs averred that Magnolia Healthcare, Inc., the owner of AA, and Foundation Health Services, Inc. were negligent in causing various injuries, some of which contributed to Gibson's death. The jury awarded $1.5 million in compensatory damages, which the trial court reduced to $500,000 for noneconomic damages and $75,000 for permanent disfigurement. The trial court refused to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. Plaintiffs appealed asserting: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider punitive damages; and (2) whether the statutory cap for noneconomic damages was constitutional. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's refusing to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to raise the constitutionality of the statutory cap before the trial court; thus that issue was procedurally barred.