Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Deborah Gervich appealed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying her workers' compensation benefits as a dependent of her deceased husband, Gary Gervich. The Commission found that Gary's right to permanent total disability benefits terminated at the time of his death because his wife's right to such benefits had not "vested" prior to the 2008 statutory amendments that eliminated dependents from the definition of "employee" in Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.020.1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutes in effect at the time of Gary's injury governed, and under those statutes, the dependents of an injured worker, who was entitled to permanent total disability benefits and who died of causes unrelated to the work injury, are included within the definition of "employee"; (2) therefore, such dependents are entitled to continuing permanent total disability benefits; and (3) because an employee's dependents are determined at the time of the injury and include the spouse of an injured worker, the Commission was not authorized by law to deny such benefits to Deborah.

Lonnie Lewis died when the tractor trailer in which he was a passenger overturned. The driver of the truck, Nathan Gilmore, was employed by Buddy Freeman, and Freeman operated the tractor trailer pursuant to a contract with DOT Transportation. Neither Freedman nor DOT carried workers' compensation insurance. Lewis' dependents filed a claim for workers' compensation against Freeman and DOT and a wrongful death action against Freeman and Gilmore. An ALJ entered an award in favor of Lewis' dependents. After the entry of the workers' compensation award, DOT intervened in the Lewises' wrongful death action. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Gilmore and Freeman, finding the wrongful death action was barred because the Lewises had made an election of remedies when they obtained a workers' compensation award against DOT. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Lewises' civil action against Freeman was not barred by their workers' compensation award from DOT, as Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.280 allowed the Lewises to proceed in a civil action against Freeman as a result of his failure to insure his liability under the Missouri workers' compensation laws even though the Lewises obtained a workers' compensation award against DOT.

Sandy Johme was employed by St. John's Mercy Healthcare as a billing representative, and her work involved typing charges at a computer in an office. After making a pot of coffee at an office kitchen at work, Johme fell and injured herself. Johme was "clocked-in" as an employee at the time of her fall. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission awarded workers' compensation benefits to Johme after applying Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.020.3(2). The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's decision, holding that Johme was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because she failed to show that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment as specified in section 287.020.3(2).

A railroad employee (Plaintiff) was injured when his co-employee's personal pistol accidentally discharged. Plaintiff filed a vicarious liability claim under the Federal Employer's Liability Act against the railroad for his injury. The incident occurred while the men were within their hours of employment, but each of the employee's proposed jury instructions failed to submit the issue of whether the co-employee was carrying the pistol in furtherance of the interests of the employer. The jury entered a verdict in favor of the railroad. Plaintiff appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to submit his proposed verdict directing instructions to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in refusing Plaintiff's incorrect proposed verdict directors where Plaintiff repeatedly failed to prepare a verdict director that correctly submitted the respondeat superior issue; and (2) the trial court did not err in failing to create its own verdict director property submitting respondeat superior in place of Plaintiff's erroneous proposed instructions.

While Myrna Roberts (Myrna) worked for Western Blue, a document printing and management service company, Myrna oversaw a contract with the University of Missouri. In the meantime, Mel Roberts (Mel) operated Graystone Properties, which was named part owner of DocuCopy. Acting on Western Blue's behalf, Myrna hired DocuCopy as a subcontractor for the university contract. Neither Myrna nor Mel disclosed their interest in DocuCopy to Western Blue. After Western Blue was purchased, Myrna and a large number of staff left their employment with Western Blue and began working for DocuCopy. Thereafter, the university awarded DocuCopy rather than Western Blue the renewal of its contract. As a result of losing the university contract, Western Blue lost another contract and was forced to close a branch office. Western Blue filed a petition against Myrna, Mel, DocuCopy, and Graystone Properties (Appellants), alleging breach of fiduciary duties, tortious interference with a valid business expectancy, computer tampering, and civil conspiracy. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Western Blue and awarded attorneys fees. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment finding Myrna owed Western Blue a fiduciary duty and affirmed in all other respects. Remanded.

Ronald Sanders recovered judgments against Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed and Iftekhar Ahmed, P.A. (collectively, Defendants) for the wrongful death of his wife. After the jury returned a verdict awarding $9.2 million in non-economic damages, the trial court entered a judgment providing just over $1 million in non-economic damages in accordance with a statutory cap on non-economic damages. On appeal, Sanders challenged the constitutionality of the damages award cap, and Defendants appealed the judgment, the denial of reduction pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.060, and the denial of periodic payments. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in all respects except as to reduction under section 537.060, which permits a defendant's liability to be reduced by the amounts of settlements with joint tortfeasors. The Court reversed the judgment in respect to that section, as a discovery denial prejudiced Defendants' ability to plead and prove the affirmative defense of reduction, and insofar as the settlements included economic damages, the statutory cap would not obviate statutory reduction. Remanded.

Max and Glenna Overbey recovered judgments against Chad Franklin National Auto Sales North, LLC (National) and Chad Franklin (Franklin) for fraudulent representations in violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act made in connection with National's sale of a vehicle to the Overbeys. Franklin appealed, and the Overbeys appealed the trial court's reduction of the punitive damage verdict as required by statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the award against Franklin was fully supported by the evidence; and (2) the limit of punitive damages did not violate the Overbeys' constitutional rights or the separation of powers doctrine.

Michael Patton filed a two-count personal injury action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act against his employer, BNSF Railway Company, alleging that BNSF negligently required him to perform heavy manual labor in extreme heat and, as a result, he lost consciousness and fell, and that striking his head in the fall caused him to suffer subsequent reoccurring seizures and fainting spells. To bolster its defense that Patton's injuries were caused by prescription drug use, BNSF sought discovery of records held by Patton's treating psychiatrist. The trial court issued a protective order preventing the discovery of the records. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to lift its protective order, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in holding that discovery of the records of a treating psychiatrist is precluded entirely where, as here, the plaintiff alleges only physical rather than psychological injury; and (2) BNSF showed that it had reason to believe that discovery of treatment records held by Patton's psychiatrist was calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence on its theory of causation. Remanded.

The underlying dispute in this case involved a contract and tort action brought by homeowners in a subdivision against certain homebuilders, including the Kerckhoff defendants. The trial court ordered that the case be referred to mediation. The parties were unable to agree to terms in a written settlement agreement at the conclusion of the mediation. The homeowners and some defendants then filed motions to enforce settlement and motions for sanctions against the Kerckhoffs, alleging the Kerckhoffs acted in bad faith during the mediation. The trial court entered an order denying the motions to enforce settlement but granted the motions for sanctions. The Kerckhoffs filed a motion with the trial court requesting that its order be certified as final and appealable, and the court entered an order finding that its prior ruling imposing sanctions was final for purposes of appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. The Supreme Court granted transfer and dismissed the appeal, holding that because the trial court's order imposing sanctions did not dispose of a "claim for relief," the trial court certification of its order as final and appealable under Mo. R. Civ. P. 74.01 was ineffectual.

A young woman died from injuries she sustained after falling from a portable rock climbing wall at a minor league baseball game. Her parents sued the team's owner, who had an excess insurance policy with Respondent Great American Assurance Company (Great American). To protect himself from additional liability, the team owner entered into an agreement with the parents that limited collection of any judgment to the limits of both primary and excess insurance policies. The trial court entered judgment against the team owner, finding him liable, and awarded $4 million in damages. The parents then brought an equitable garnishment suit to collect against the primary and excess policies. The primary insurers settled for less than their policy limit. However, the parents entered a release of judgment for the full policy limit. The excess insurer, Great American, disputed its obligation to pay under its policy because the primary insurance limit had not been exhausted. The appellate court agreed with Great American, and denied the parents equitable garnishment. The parents appealed, arguing that the excess insurance policy did not require exhaustion before it was obligated to pay. The Supreme Court reviewed the policy and found it had no provisions requiring exhaustion. The Court reversed the appellate court on the exhaustion issue, and affirmed the lower court's decision on all other matters brought on appeal.